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Computer-Mediated Communication

Computer-Mediated Communication. Collective Action and Public Goods II. Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem?. Selective Incentives Self-Interest. Types of Social Dilemmas. Different social dilemma games make different use of the payouts: T>R>P>S Prisoner’s Dilemma T>R>S>P Chicken

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Computer-Mediated Communication

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  1. Computer-Mediated Communication Collective Action and Public Goods II

  2. Solutions to the Free-Rider Problem? • Selective Incentives • Self-Interest Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

  3. Types of Social Dilemmas Different social dilemma games make different use of the payouts: T>R>P>S Prisoner’s Dilemma T>R>S>P Chicken T>P>R>S Deadlock R>T>P>S Stag Hunt B 3 (R) 5 (T) 0 (S) Reward Temptation Sucker Punishment 3 (R) A 0 (S) 1 (P) 5 (T) 1 (P) Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

  4. Example: Chicken Game T>R>S>P Chicken Coop = Swerve Defect = Do Not Swerve B 3 (R) 5 (T) 1 (S) Reward Temptation Sucker Punishment 3 (R) A 1 (S) 0 (P) 5 (T) 0 (P) Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

  5. Life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes 1651) Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

  6. Reconsidering the Free-Rider Problem Communality and Discretionary Databases “Second-Order” Communality Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

  7. Problem shift– Making private data publicMaintaining information privacy Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

  8. Collective Action and Group Size Smaller groups tend to have a better chance of producing a public good (Olson 1965) Why? • More benefits for each person • Larger impact of any single contribution • Generally, lower costs of organization Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

  9. But what about REALLY big groups? Analyzing and Visualizing the Semantic Coverage of Wikipedia and Its Authors (Holloway, Bozicevic and Borner 2005) http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0512085 Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

  10. Self-Interest in Small versus Large Groups Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

  11. Fallacy of Individuals and Collectives See: Mancur Olson (1965)“The Logic of Collective Action” Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

  12. Online Collectives are Good! BAD!? Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

  13. Finding “Roles” in Online Collective Action Behaviors Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

  14. Structural similarity Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

  15. Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

  16. Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

  17. Computer-Mediated Communication — Cheshire & Fiore

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