Antisocial Behaviour Management and Housing

1. Antisocial Behaviour Management and Housing Simon Y. Yau Department of Public and Social Administration City University of Hong Kong Public Lecture @ The University of Adelaide 15 February 2012

2. Outline of the Presentation • Overview of antisocial behaviour and its control • definitions, classifications and causes • control or mitigation measures • Control of ASB in public housing in Hong Kong • introduction of the Marking Scheme • does the Marking Scheme work? • flaws or social impacts of the marking scheme • ASB in Hong Kong’s private housing • insignificant or ignored? • Future directions for ASB research and policy-making

3. Part AOverview of Antisocial Behaviour and its Control in Housing

4. Definitions of “Antisocial Behaviour” • Antisocial behaviour (ASB) is behaviour that opposes society's norms and accepted standards of behaviour. • include criminal acts and less serious nuisance such as dumping rubbish (Chartered Institute of Housing, 1995: 3) • “…the problem is a direct result of behaviour by one household or individuals in an area which threatens the physical or mental health, safety or security of other households and individuals.”(Scottish Affairs Committee, 1996) • ASB is “behaviour that caused or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as the perpetrator”. (1998 Crime and Disorder Act)

5. Definitions of “Antisocial Behaviour” (cont’d)

6. Definitions of “Antisocial Behaviour” (cont’d) • ASB is a confusing term • never straight-forward to have an precise definition • different parties (e.g. residents, politicians and housing managers) use the term for their own purpose • ASB is also named as • problem of “disruptive tenants or residents” in Australia • “quality-of-life crime” or problem in the US • “misdeed” in Hong Kong • incivilities, social disorder, neighbourhood nuisances …… etc. • ASB takes different forms with varying levels of intensity

7. ASB as a Spectrum (Source: Chartered Institute of Housing, 1996: 4) (Source: Scott & Parkey, 1998: 329)

8. ASB Classes under Three-Strike Policy in WA

9. Perceived Causes of ASB in the UK (Source: Ipsos Mori, 2006) N = 2,048

10. Perceived Causes of ASB in Hong Kong (Source: Yau, 2011) N = 339

11. Common Measures to Control ASB in Housing • Legal measures • ASB orders or injunction orders • parenting orders • Tenancy measures • lease termination or non-renewal of leases • introductory, probationary or fixed-term tenancies • acceptable behaviour contract or agreement • Mediating or intervention measures • mediation or neighbourhood wardens • close monitoring or intervention unit (e.g. in WA) • multi-agency approaches

12. Common Measures to Control ASB in Housing (cont’d) • Tenant incentive schemes • paint kits or garden subsidies (e.g. in NT and WA) • priority response to repair order or rental concession • recognition and rewards scheme (in SA)??

13. Part BControl of ASB in Public Housing in Hong Kong

14. Control of Anti-social Behaviour in Hong Kong • ASB is a term never used by the Hong Kong Government • Piece-meal controls over different ASB in the city:

15. Opportunistic Start of ASB Control in Housing • As an aftermath of the SARS outbreak in 2003 • Team Clean set up on 5 May 2003 • stringent enforcement of spitting and littering in public areas • raising fixed penalty for spitting and littering from $600 to $1,500 • inspection of external drainage pipes in all residential buildings • clean-up of hygiene blackspots • terminating the leases of and evicting public housing tenants who repeatedly breach the health code • The Subsidized Housing Committee of the Housing Authority (HA) endorsed at its meeting on 29 May 2003 • to strengthen action through the introduction of a marking scheme for tenancy enforcement in public housing

16. Introduction of the Marking Scheme • Marking Scheme for Tenancy Enforcement • implemented since 1 August 2003 by the Housing Department • in public rental housing (PRH) and interim housing (IH) • renamed to the Marking Scheme for Estate Management Enforcement in Public Housing Estates on 18 October 2006 to signify its wider use for more effective estate management • Stated objectives of the marking scheme • to promote environmental hygiene and managementof public housing estates • to build up a sustained healthy and pleasantliving environment

17. Operation of the Marking Scheme • Leasing conditions • public housing tenants should keep the leased premises and the estate environment clean and hygienic • tenants should not interfere life enjoyment of other tenants • Marking Scheme for Tenancy Enforcement • tenancy terminated when 16 points recorded within 2 years • if tenancy is terminated, the households will be barred from applying for PRH through General Waiting List for two years 5 pts 5 pts 5 pts 10 pts 1 Jan 05 5 Jan 06 17 Aug 06 1 Jan 07

18. Operation of the Marking Scheme (cont’d) • Other effect on the household • any household carrying valid penalty points to be barred from applying for alternative accommodation, better/larger or otherwise, through external or internal transfer (except those affected by government’s relocation actions) • As at 31 January 2012, there were 28 misdeed items • grouped under Category A, B, C or D • Category A - minor misdeeds carrying 3 points • Categories B and C - more serious ones carrying 5 and 7 points respectively • Category D - the most serious one carrying 15 points

19. Misdeeds(with prior warning before point allotment)

20. Misdeeds(no prior warning before point allotment)

21. Misdeeds(no prior warning before point allotment)

22. Figures about the Marking Scheme (up to Dec 2011) • 17,990 allotments of penalty points • involving 16,410 households (2.3% of public housing households) • 1,030 households accrued 10 points or more • Most frequently committed misdeeds • smoking in estate common area (6,160 cases) • littering (5,720 cases) • 46 households receiving 16 or more points • 2 surrendering their PRH flats voluntarily • 34 Notices-to-quit (NTQs) issued • with 10 cases withdrawn on special grounds (Source: Hong Kong Housing Authority)

23. Is the Marking Scheme Effective? (Source: Yau, 2012) N = 339

24. Flaws and Social Impacts (1) • Household as a subject unit of the marking scheme • one of the members commits wrongdoings and other members of the family are punished as well i.e., collateral punishment or sanction by association • contradicting with the principle of welfare contractualism • 40.4% of the respondents (in Yau, 2012) regardedhousehold-based punishment unfair • 59.6% thought that family harmony has been undermined because of the marking scheme (due to “culture of blame”) Think Point: Should a resident be responsible for the activities of his or her family member in public housing?

25. Flaws and Social Impacts (2) • Tenure-biased or selective enforcement against ASB • public rental housing tenants being the only subject • 46.9% of the respondents (in Yau, 2012) opined that the marking scheme has stereotyped public housing tenants as problematic residents • Enforcement against ASB being location-specific • penalty points will be allotted only if the misdeed is committed in the housing estate where the perpetrator is living Think Point: If the marking scheme aims to rectify bad habits of the residents, why bother discriminating the enforcement?

26. Flaws and Social Impacts (3) • Mutual surveillance among neighbours • 54.9% perceived a greater tension among residents after the implementation of the scheme • Eviction helps victims but not perpetrators • fostering a culture of “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) • beyond the capacity of the HKHA to change behaviour (e.g. creating nuisance due to mental illness) • 35.7% of the respondents (in Yau, 2012) worried that someone could abuse the marking scheme to pick on them  social exclusion of minority or disadvantaged groups • 50.7% became more afraid of being evicted because of weakened tenure security

27. Flaws and Social Impacts (4) • No prior comprehensive public or tenant consultation • consulting Estate Management Advisory Committee only • 34.5% thought that they had not been well consulted before the implementation of the marking scheme • Do all the items under the marking scheme are socially undesirable? • e.g. pet guardianship at home? • misdeeds that are not necessary to be included (Yau, 2012) • obstructing corridors or stairs with sundry items • keeping animal inside leased premises without consent • water dripping from air-conditioner

28. Flaws and Social Impacts (5) • Whose responsibility in case of design flaw? • drying clothes in public areas  no balcony or utility platform damaging sewage pipes causing leakage to the flat below  drain stack running in the flat (not on the external wall) Waste stack

29. Part CASB in Hong Kong’s Private Housing(an ongoing study)

30. No ASB in Private Housing ?

32. Perceived Seriousness of ASB (Sources: Yau, 2012; an ongoing study)

33. Perceived Causes of ASB (Sources: Yau, 2011; an ongoing study)

34. Determinants of intolerance with ASB (Sources: Yau, 2011; an ongoing study)

35. Unhelpful Housing Management Agents • For those who have lodged complaints against ASB to the property management company or residents association • 67% opined that the agent could help them to solve the nuisance that affect many owners in the building • 22% opined that the agent could help them to solve the nuisance that affect the complainant only Perpetrator Managing Residents Association / Property Manager Electing or Appointing Complainant

36. Control of ASB in Private Housing • Powerful sanction e.g. eviction considered in few cases only • e.g. rental housing estate solely owned by one single landlord • owner-occupiers under no threat of eviction • In most private multi-owned housing, ASB control relies on • enforcement of deed of mutual covenant or house rules • specific ordinances e.g. Noise Control Ordinance • statutory injunction order • tort law (claiming for damages only) Think Point: Is private property right always a hurdle for ASB control in private housing? What else can we do in private housing?

37. Part DFuture Directions for ASB Research and Policy-Making

38. A New Perspective into ASB Research ? • Anatomy of social problems and associated policies • social constructionism/constructivism, path dependency … etc. • how about using new institutional economics? • Common assumptions of neoclassical theories • property rights being clearly defined • cost of enforcement (e.g. court proceedings) being negligible • Transaction costs incurred in different stages of control • contract writing – defining the rights and ASB • bargaining – reaching acceptable agreement • policing – checking for ASB • enforcement – punishing perpetrator

39. Example 1: Noise Nuisances • Why noise nuisances are so difficult to deal with? • right to silence? or right to make sounds? • what is or constitutes a noise? • barking dog? crying baby? • standard of silence? 45dB? 60dB? • costs of policing and enforcement disproportionately high • noises can be discontinuous and spontaneous • how can you take the evidence of the nuisance? • High contracting, policing and enforcement costs  prevalence of the noise problem

40. Example 2: Good Resident Agreement • What is a good resident? • what are acts that a good resident should not do? • can all these acts listed in the agreement exhaustively? • is there a universal agreement applicable to all communities? • Definition of ASB can be community-specific • e.g. playing firecrackers • considered a dangerous and annoying act inhigh-rise housing • welcomed by villagers because it is a traditional custom • How to be agreed by a large group of people?

41. Reducing Transaction Costs in ASB Control New South Wales • Maintaining a pleasant and comfortable living environment • a matter of collectivism • proper behaviour of one household is not enough ! • Cooperation is more likely • if there is strong social norm, community cohesiveness, place attachment, ... etc. • ethical or norm-oriented behaviour reducing transaction costs • Community- or neighbourliness-building strategies • community-building projects in public housing in Hong Kong • Good Neighbour Award in Singapore • any examples in Australia ?

42. An old Chinese saying: “ 遠 親 不 如 近 鄰 ” Good neighbours are more helpful than distant relatives. -- Our neighbours can offer timely help when we are in need while distant relatives may not be able to offer immediate assistance.

43. References Chartered Institute of Housing (1995) Housing and Crime, How Well Are We Managing, Edinburgh: Chartered Institute of Housing. Chartered Institute of Housing (1996) Housing and Anti-social Behaviour, Coventry: Chartered Institute of Housing. Ipsos MORI (2006) Public attitudes to parenting, http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemId=374. Scott, S. & Parkey, H. (1998) “Myths and reality: anti-social behaviour in Scotland”, Housing Studies, 13(3): 325-345. Scottish Government Social Research (2007) Use of anti-social behaviour orders in Scotland, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/198276/ 0053019.pdf. Yau, Y. (2011) “Ruling out trouble: unacceptable behaviour and its control in Hong Kong’s public housing”, Habitat International, 36(1): 11-19. Yau, Y. (2012) “Social impacts of the marking scheme in public housing in Hong Kong”, Social Indicators Research, forthcoming.

44. Thank You ! For comments and questions, please e-mail me at y.yau@cityu.edu.hk