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Return of Refugee Warriors to Afghanistan

Return of Refugee Warriors to Afghanistan. The Faculty of Law, University of Oslo 9 April 2008 Kristian Berg Harpviken.

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Return of Refugee Warriors to Afghanistan

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  1. Return of Refugee Warriors to Afghanistan The Faculty of Law, University of Oslo 9 April 2008 Kristian Berg Harpviken

  2. ‘highly conscious refugee communities with a political leadership structure and armed sections engaged in warfare for a political objective, be it to recapture the homeland, change the regime, or secure a separate state’ Zolberg, Suhrke & AguayoEscape from Violence (1989)

  3. Humanitarian sanctuaries allow: Militants to hide Independence Control Legitimacy Fiona TerryCondemned to Repeat (2002)

  4. . Analytical foci: Refugee regime Host state Other states Sarah Kenyon LischerDangerous Sanctuaries (2005)

  5. Two pathways: State support (Afghan example) Refugee regime (Rwandan ex.) Stedman & Tanner, edsRefugee Manipulation (2004)

  6. Explaining Refugee Mobilization • State support • Refugee Regime • Ideology • Identity • Trauma • Social Networks

  7. State Support 1 • Escaping home state • Host state support • Capability • Willingness

  8. State Support 2 - ’Manipulation’? Refugees are also regularly manipulated by host states and ‘third parties’. Since the logisitcal demands of triggering small-scalce violence in Africa are relatively modest, even poor states can readily facilitate the emergence of a resistance movement to trouble their neighbours. (...) In Africa, governments in the Horn, particularly Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan, have used asylum and assistance to so-called ‘refugee warriors’ as a surrogate form of support for rebel movements in other states.’(Muggah, 2006: 12)

  9. Refugee Regime • Protection • Humanitarian support • Legitimacy – ’refugeehood’

  10. Ideology • Need to legitimize struggle: • Internally • Relation to third parties • Ideological frames • Refugeehood • Political ideologies • Religious narratives

  11. Identity • Reception by host population • Cultivating identity in exile • Separation • Assimilation • Integration -> transnational solidarity

  12. Trauma 1 • Expelled by violent means • Memories of loss, abuse • Symbolic ties to homeland • Key role in framing • Non-reconciliatory?

  13. Trauma 2Conflict-generated diasporas (…) networks of those forced across borders by conflict or repression – commonly have a specific set of traumatic memories and hence retain symbolic ties to the homeland. (...) frequently have a prominent role in framing condlict issues and defining what is politically acceptable. Diaspora groups created by conflict and sustained by traumatic memories tend to compromise less and therefore reinforce and exacerbate the protracted nature of conflicts.’ (Lyons, 2006: 530)

  14. Social Networks • ’Flight Collectives’ • Leadership (Conflict Entrepreneurs) • Institutions

  15. Research Agenda • Continuity between refugee warriors and other phenomena • Internal displacement and mobilization • ‘Returnee warriors’

  16. Afghanistan and the region

  17. Main fieldwork area

  18. Four successive regimes (Herat) • PDPA (1978–92) • Mujahedin (1992–95) • Taliban (1995–2001) • Karzai government (2001–present)

  19. PDPA (1978–92) • Sara-e Nau: • Most people left • Majority mujahedin associates • Sara-e Nau: • Majority stayed • Some with mujahedin • Hosting IDPs (also from muj families)

  20. Habibullah (Sara-e Nau): Iran did not give us weapons. When we had an injured soldier and brought him to the border, we had to contact our office in Teheran to get the documents, it could take two to three days. When papers were arranged, we were not allowed to accompany him, but had to leave the injured person with party people in Iran.

  21. Mujahedin (1992–95) • Sara-e Nau • Few residents • Rapid return • Little tension • Izhaq Suleman • Village intact • Tempered returns • Considerable tension

  22. Taliban (1995–2001) • Sara-e Nau • Muj associations a disadvantage • Considerable migration • With exile-based resistance • Izhaq Suleman • Less distrust from Taliban • Some migration (mainly for work)

  23. Sare-e Nau resident (2002) • After you were here the last time [spring 1999], I went to Iran for some time. I was captured in my house, the Taliban said that you are with the mujahedin, they kept me in jail for nine to ten days, then I paid some money to be released, and I left for Iran. I came back three to four months before the fall of the Taliban, having spent six months in Mashad as a laborer. When I came back, I went to Mazar [with Ismael Khan]; we were ready to attack the Taliban. Also here in Herat, there were people who were ready to attack the Taliban at that same time. I am now working with the military.

  24. Karzai government (2001–present) • Sara-e Nau • Rapid return of refugees • New people in power • Positions in new administration • Izhaq Suleman • Rapid return • Power structure stable • Continued labor migration

  25. Conclusions • Resistance-associates are early returners, late returners lack protection and access to jobs • Need to link • Repatriation and reintegration of refugees • Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) • Research: Under what conditions do refugees engage in organized violence upon return?

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