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Chapter 35. Asymmetric Information. Common knowledge and private information . The latter leads to Asymmetric information , or Asymmetry of information. Akerlof model: the market for lemons. Density. Quality. Adverse selection as a hidden information problem. Moral hazard
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Chapter 35 Asymmetric Information
Common knowledge and private information. The latter leads to Asymmetric information, or Asymmetry of information.
Akerlof model: the market for lemons. Density Quality
Adverse selection as a hidden information problem. Moral hazard as a hidden action problem.
Signaling Two roles of education: To raise and to distinguish Productivities Spence model
$ C(Y) for L wage system C(Y) for H Y* Y Best Choice of L, and of H
Graph to show separating equilibria and pooling equilibria.