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Ragnar Arnason: A Review of International Experiences with ITQs

Ragnar Arnason: A Review of International Experiences with ITQs. Background information United States is the 5 th largest fishing nation. Basic fisheries management law in US is Magnuson – Stevens Fishery and management act. (8 regional mgt. councils).

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Ragnar Arnason: A Review of International Experiences with ITQs

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  1. Ragnar Arnason: A Review of International Experiences with ITQs Background information • United States is the 5th largest fishing nation. • Basic fisheries management law in US is Magnuson – Stevens Fishery and management act. (8 regional mgt. councils). • ITQs established in 4 fisheries in 1990s with some degree of success, two more proposed in late 1990s, blocked by congress • Currently only three ITQ managed fisheries in USA. Three fisheries are (1) Ocean quahog and surf clams fisheries (2) Atlantic wreckfish fishery (3) North Pacific Halibut/Sablefish fisheries

  2. Discussion of (1) Ocean quahog and surf clams fisheries. • Initial allocation based on historical catch record • Ownership of a vessel is not a requirement for holding a quota • ITQs are freely tradable, anyone can hold ITQ, no upper limits on size of ownership except to the extent it may violate US Antitrust Laws. • Substantial trade in quotas => in first two years number of vessels reduced from 128 to 59, and then in next few years down to 35. • Following intro of ITQ, enforcement costs plummeted. A lot of detailed conservation regulations became redundant, could be scrapped.

  3. Discussion of (2) Atlantic Wreckfish fishery. • ½ of initial allocation based on vessel owner catch record • ½ divided equally to all that had a history of participation in fishery. • ITQs are freely tradable • Substantial trade in quotas => vessels reduced from 90 to 40 in first two years, and in next few years down to 9. • Cost of enforcement reduced under ITQ. Coupons followed the landed fish through purchasing chain, thus making it possible to verify landing receipts. Question: What about the fact that only 1/10 the vessels remain? Author did not mention this.

  4. Discussion of (3) North Pacific Halibut/Sablefish fisheries. • Initial allocation only to vessel owners and lessors that had landings in at least one of the years 88-90. • Quota associated with a vessel. Owner has to be on vessel when quota is caught. Transferability restricted to the same vessel class. Question: When above restrictions diminish value of quotas, who’s interest do they serve? • ITQ trade/holdings subject to a number of restrictions that are constantly evolving. • Cost of enforcement decreased. Everyone gets a debit card.

  5. Summary: Anecdotal evidence of increased compliance and increased resource stewardship under the three ITQ systems. e.g. Fisherman voluntarily removed bottom longlines known to damage corals from their arsenal. Question: Why does the US only have three ITQ managed fisheries?

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