PEACE

1. PEACE Population and Environment Analysis for Counter-insurgency Evaluation Final Presentation prepared by Jason Southerland Kevin Neary Brian Kolstad Steven Darcy for Colonel Manago Center for Army Analysis

2. Herakles and Athena Herakles was making his way through a narrow pass. He saw something that looked like an apple lying on the ground and he tried to smash it with his club. After having been struck by the club, the thing swelled up to twice its size. Herakles struck it again with his club, even harder than before, and the thing then expanded to such a size that it blocked Herakles's way. Herakles let go of his club and stood there, amazed. Athena saw him and said, “O Herakles, don't be so surprised! This thing that has brought about your confusion is Aporia (Contentiousness) and Eris (Strife). If you just leave it alone, it stays small; but if you decide to fight it, then it swells from its small size and grows large.” - Aesop, Fables 534 (from Chambry 129)

3. The Victorious Warrior “A victorious warrior wins first and then goes to war, while a defeated warrior goes to war first and then seeks to win.” -Sun Tzu, The Art of War

4. Agenda Motivation and Background (Mr. Kolstad) Data (Mr. Darcy) Analysis (Mr. Neary and Mr. Southerland) Observations, Conclusions and Next Steps (Mr. Neary)

5. Agenda Motivation and Background (Mr. Kolstad) Data (Mr. Darcy) Analysis (Mr. Neary and Mr. Southerland) Observations, Conclusions and Next Steps (Mr. Neary)

6. Recent Events At any time since 1945, there has been at least one insurgency somewhere in the world. In some manner, the Unites States has been involved in many recent insurgencies. Bosnia Somalia Afghanistan Vietnam Iraq II

7. What Constitutes an Insurgency? “A struggle between a non–ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non–ruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g. organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.” Insurgency and Terrorism Bard E. O’Neill It is the use of violence that distinguishes insurgencies from other protest movements. 7

8. Background Efforts to define the force size and time required to restore and maintain order in a failed or failing state have been sporadic and far from complete. The United States Army’s “Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency” specifies a 20:1000 force ratio. James T. Quinlivan, in his RAND essay, “Burden of Victory: The Painful Arithmetic of Stability Operations,” establishes a 20:1000 force ratio. John J. McGrath, “Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations,” recommends a 13.26:1000 force ratio. Defining the correct force size should result in less risk to troops and greater chance of success.

9. Project Goal The goals of this project are to: Find a relationship between Troop Density and Violence in a counterinsurgency Find a method of predicting violence in an insurgency

10. Project Scope Provide an expansion upon the limited scope of counterinsurgency troop density studies Provide a means of framing a strategist’s troop density decision by identifying the key variables that define the operating environment

11. Project Evolution O’Neill classification of an insurgency “Can the O’Neill classifications be described statistically?” Using Bayesian networks to tie troop levels to the overall outcome of the insurgency “How many troops does it take to win?” Using Bayesian networks to tie troop levels to violence “How many troops does it take to reduce violence?” Analysis of troop and violence data Which metrics are the best predictors of future violence?

12. Agenda Motivation and Background (Mr. Kolstad) Data (Mr. Darcy) Analysis (Mr. Neary and Mr. Southerland) Observations, Conclusions and Next Steps (Mr. Neary)

13. Description of the Dataset • I Code • Case Name • Calendar Year • O’Neill Classification • Strategic Approach • Primary Terrain Type • Percent Urban Population • Indigenous Government • Government • Rules of Engagement of Intervening Force • Degree of outside support for insurgency • Structure of the insurgency • Developed Nation • Political concept • Total # Troops • Total # Intervening • Total # Indigenous • Total # Ind Military • Total # Police • Total Troop Density • Intervening Troop Density • Indigenous Force Density • Indigenous Military Density • Indigenous Police Density • Country • Population • Incidents • Incidents per 1000 population

14. Insurgencies Used

15. Statistical Summary of Numeric Data

16. Agenda Motivation and Background (Mr. Kolstad) Data (Mr. Darcy) Analysis (Mr. Neary and Mr. Southerland) Observations, Conclusions and Next Steps (Mr. Neary)

17. Data Analysis • Initial Data Analysis began with • Scatterplot • Histogram • Not strong relationship between troop density and violent incidents • Confirmed with Correlation matrix • Re–scaled violence by taking its logarithm • Again, not a strong relationship evident in the scatterplot • Expanded data set to include categorical variables Zoom–in Transform Violence and Zoom–in

18. Violent Incidents Model • Conducted stepwise linear regression of the data • Some of the variables of interest • Intervening Troop Density • Indigenous Police Density • Percent Urban Population • Degree of Outside Support (Some) • Primary Terrain Type (Foliated Mountains) • O’Neill Classification (3) • This model provides reasonable fit to the data, but is not necessarily insightful to changes in violence

19. MARS Analysis Multivariate non-linear regression Approximates non-linearity using piecewise linear functions Will a non-linear model fit our data well and still be useful for predictive analysis? Find “reasonable” model Test model using set-aside data Target Variable: Natural Logarithm of Violent Incidents per 1,000 population Continuous Predictor Variables: Intervening Troop Density, Indigenous Troop Density, Percent Urban Population, Natural Logarithm of Previous Relative Violence Rate Categorical Predictor Variables: O’Neill Classification, Degree of Outside Support for Insurgency, Insurgent Strategic Approach, Counter-Insurgent Rules of Engagement

20. MARS Model LogViolence = -7.312 + .704*B1 - .0206*B5 - .747*B6 + .854*B8

21. MARS Model • Values of Predictors for Which Basis Functions are Non-Zero • Natural Logarithm of Previous Violence >= -8.822 • Indigenous Troop Density <= 5.754 • Percent Urban Population >= 80.86 • Foreign Support = 2: Support from foreign entities that falls short of contribution of troops; may include: money, materiel, training and safe haven • Relationship of Values of Predictor Variables to Violence • As Previous Violence increases, violence increases • As Indigenous Troop Density increases, up to 5.754 troops per 1,000 population, violence increases • As Percent Urban Population increases, violence decreases • Foreign Support, short of foreign fighter involvement, increases violence

22. Testing the Model Max Error Min Error Mean Absolute Error Mean Square Error 1.683491796 -2.778205633 0.646543367 0.885780614

23. Analyzing the Residuals

24. Agenda Motivation and Background (Mr. Kolstad) Data (Mr. Darcy) Analysis (Mr. Neary and Mr. Southerland) Observations, Conclusions and Next Steps (Mr. Neary)

25. Observations Troop density was positively correlated to the natural log of violent incidents. Does the apple really get bigger? More troops means more targets? Who is counting the incidents? Mean Troop Density is 39.5, much higher than the 20 from Quinlivan or 13.26 by McGrath, but Median Troop Density is 11.87 Does aggregating violence over years and countries provide sufficient fidelity?

26. Conclusions Best predictor of Violence is previous year’s Violence High Urban populations are less susceptible to increasing violence Material foreign support of an insurgency increases violence Whether troops inspire violence or violence brings more troops is unresolved, but bears further study

27. Next Steps Expand the scope of the analysis to include political, economic, diplomatic and other factors Get more data Explore the individual nature of each insurgency How do you achieve victory BEFORE undertaking a counter-insurgency role?