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Captain M. K. Mulvey USMC POE-40, PP&O. Prepositioning Road Map - 2025. 29 Sep 2009. Agenda. Background Campaign Plan Objectives Campaign Plan Overview MPF History and Relevance MPF Overview (Current and Future) Ashore Prepositioning Way Ahead. Background.
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Captain M. K. Mulvey USMC POE-40, PP&O Prepositioning Road Map - 2025 29 Sep 2009
Agenda Background Campaign Plan Objectives Campaign Plan Overview MPF History and Relevance MPF Overview (Current and Future) Ashore Prepositioning Way Ahead
Background • May 08: Develop comprehensive prepositioning campaign plan • Jul 08: Kick-off • Three campaignplan development OPTs • HQMC PP&O (POE, PLN) • HQMC I&L (LPO) • HQMC CD&I (SID) • HQMC P&R • MCLC (Blount Island Command) • OPNAV N42 • OPNAV N85 • Military Sealift Command (MSC) • Nov 08: Campaign Plan Workshop • Socialize plan and gain warfighter input • 96 Attendees • Included ops and log reps from HQMC, OPNAV, MARFORs/ NAVFORs, Navy and USMC Supporting Establishments and tactical units • Develop MPF 5-Year Exercise Plan
HQMC Objectives Develop Comprehensive Prepositioning Road Map that: Provides vision for both Ashore and Afloat Prepositioning Outlines near and long term objectives Integrates future programs and systems Describes how prepositioning will support emerging concepts, National Strategy, and Operational Requirements Provides broad planning guidance for operating forces and supporting establishments Informs future exercise and experimentation objectives Supports USMC Strategic Communications Plan Coordinated effort between HQMC, OPNAV, Navy and Marine Corps Operating Forces, and Supporting Establishments Provide unified Marine Corps story on the role of Prepositioning
Road Map Overview Foreword DC, PP&O and DC, CD&I Prepositioning - A Strategic Imperative Strategic relevance and history Employing Marine Corps Prepositioning MAGTF Overview and employing prepo Future of Marine Corps Prepositioning Integration of LMSRs, MPF(F) and increasing capability Vignette: reinforcing JFEO • Prepositioning in Support of Steady State Operations • Disaggregated MPF(F) module, force closure • Vignette: Module supporting MEU and GRF conducting IW • Enablers and Supporting Establishment • Enabling programs and organizations • Building Prepositioning Competency • Training, exercises, experimentation guidance • Plan of Actions and Milestones • Tasks over next Five years • Prepositioning Road Map updated every 5 years, at a minimum
History and Growth MPF + MPF (F) 2022 Capability & Equipment Growth Armoring & T/E Increases MPF(F) Less LMSR Integration 2008-2010 LMSR Port Dependence MPF Transition 1998-2002 Sea Basing MPF 1984-1998 LMSRs NTPF 1981-1984 NMCB, NFH, EAF In Stream Offload & Bulk Liquid Discharge Rolling Stock More Integration 3 x MPSRON Integrated 14 MPS, 1 Tanker, 1 Container 3 16 13
Operationally Relevant DESERT SHIELD/STORM – 1990 RESTORE HOPE – 1992 IRAQI FREEDOM - 2003 IRAQI FREEDOM II - 2004
Expanding Capabilities MPF(F) + Connectors MPF(F) FOC MPF(F) IOC LMSR Integration, 1st MPF(F) T-AKE Current Seabasing Charts are for illustrative purposes only – do not reflect assessment of capabilities
MPF Current - 2012 Maersk Termination/ Waterman Purchase LMSR Integration 2008 Integrates three LMSRs, a tanker and container ship 2010 2011 1 Mitigates T/E Growth and Armoring 3 2 Enables advanced seabasing experiments MPF Equipment Reset Complete 2009
MPF 2017 MPF (F) IOC Disaggregated MPF(F) Supports Phasing in of vessels Increases MPF(F) Advocacy 1 3 Supports USMC/USN emerging concepts 2 At Sea Arrival and Assembly of MEU Sized MAGTF 2017
MPF 2022 MPF(F) FOC Operates in restrictive access environments 2022 Integrates MPF(F) Vessels to respond to multiple AORs 2019 1 3 Increases Usage of MPF(F) for low spectrum ops 2 Arrive, assemble and integrate at sea of MEB sized MAGTF
MPF 2025 Seabasing Vision Seabasing Enablers 1 3 2
Operational and Strategic Flexibility MPF Vessels + MPF (F) Module = MPSRON (MEB Set) Disaggregating Provides Seabasing Capability to Multiple CCDRs MPF (F) Module x 3 = 1 MEB Set Aggregate MPF(F) to Support National Contingencies and Crisis MPSRON x 3 = MEF MPF Vessels MPF (F) Module
Notional Ashore Prepositioning2008-2025 • Meet MARFOR/CCDR demands • Mutually Supporting Afloat and Ashore Prepositioning sites • - Increased usage/relevance MCPP-N CLNC CPEN MCBH MPSRON-1 Mediterranean Western Pacific Guam Rota Okinawa Kuwait Singapore MPSRON-3 Guam/Saipan MPSRON Siting HOA/Djibouti Main Operating Bases (MOB) Gulf of Guinea MPSRON-2 Diego Garcia Darwin, Australia Forward Operating Sites (FOS) Cooperative Security Locations (CSL) 14
Considerations • MPF Maintenance Cycles • Squadron vs Module integrity • Command and Control • Aggregated Ops • Interoperability • Seabasing and Conventional
Way Ahead Expeditionary Policies Road Map Will combine both Prepo and Amphib Road Maps Address perceived gaps/seams in programs Annex to the Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan Appendix 1: Prepositioning programs Appendix 2: Amphibious programs Initial One-Star draft due early-Oct Final draft due Nov
Aggregated vs. Disaggregated POE/LP/SID/N85/N42/MSC have developed a MPF (F) Integration Plan that builds MPF (F) modules in each of the MPSRONs until MPF (F) FOC (2022). A MPF (F) module is comprised of one TAKR, one T-AKE, one MLP, and one big deck (LHA-R or LHD). This plan allows for seabasing experimentation and enables the incremental build up of MPF (F) capability to conduct CAESR (Close, Assemble, Employ, Sustain, and Reconstitute) at sea. Dis-aggregation of the MPF (F) will enable habitual relationships and training opportunities for all three MEFs and the supporting numbered fleets. Dis-aggregation decreases steam time and costs when employing MPF (F) modules in various AORs. Dis-aggregation tells a great story to Congress and OSD, displaying the incremental gains that come with MPF (F) vessels as well as the Services plan to employ the incremental improvements provided. N42 plans to recap MPF between 2023 and 2032 as the Watermans, E-ships and Amseas reach ESL
Force Closure • 10-14 day closure and stand-up of the MPF (F) MEB is difficult to defend when Amphibious MEB Task Force closure times are considered. • MPF can arrive and assemble much faster than ATFs can close, as is the case today. • While aggregating 3 MEUs would give a MEB like capability faster than a ATF-East/West, this concept raises many operational difficulties, not the least of which is C2.
Competing with MEU/ARG • USMC stakeholders must ensure MPF (F) capability is not seen as a replacement for one of the Assault Echelon Amphibious MEBs or as a replacement for MEU/ARG shipping. MPF (F) capability must be seen as an additive capability, providing CAESR at sea, a reinforcing MEB to the two assault echelon MEBs and as a means to equip forward deployed Naval Forces conducting Phase O/Theater Security Cooperation operations. Current CCDR requirements justify this. • The MEU/ARG brings a capability set (personnel, equipment, training) to the CCDRs that can not be matched by the MPF(F) Module • The MEU/ARG presence and rapid ability to respond to crisis can not be matched by the MPF(F) module as