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Global Cooperation and the Atmosphere: Ozone Protection. International negotiations to protect the ozone layer are often cited as the most successful example of international environmental cooperation Context:
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Global Cooperation and the Atmosphere: Ozone Protection International negotiations to protect the ozone layer are often cited as the most successful example of international environmental cooperation Context: • CFC’s (Chloro-florocarbons) first invented by Dupont Chemical and General Motors in 1928. • CFC’s are non-toxic heat transfer fluids used in refrigeration and air-conditioning • Also used for propelents in aerosols sprays, as solvents, sterilents, and for blowing foam • By 1970s, US produced 50% of world’s CFCs, with remainder produced by European nations, Japan, USSR and a few LDCs (India, China, Brazil). est. $3-5 billion per year industry
Early Scientific Concerns and Responses (1973-1985) • Scientists (Rowland & Molina) first proposed a possible link between CFCs and ozone depletion in 1974: because CFCs are so stable and rise in the atmosphere, they are likely to eventually diffuse into the stratosphere where UV light exposure would break them down, releasing active Chlorine atoms which would be expected to react with ozone (converting it into O2). Reduction in ozone would lead to increased penetration of UV to the earth and subsequent increases in skin cancer, etc. • Initial political reactions came from the US (1974-77): * Intense debate developed over potential threat as measured against the frivolity of aresol sprays (which represented 50% of CFC consumption) * NRDC (NGO) became (and remained) principal environmental activist lobby on issue * Dupont Chemical and other industries lined up in opposition to any proposed regulations, arguing that science was too speculative to merit costly actions
Early Scientific Concerns and Responses (1973-1985) • Scientists (Rowland & Molina) first proposed a possible link between CFCs and ozone depletion in 1974: because CFCs are so stable and rise in the atmosphere, they are likely to eventually diffuse into the stratosphere where UV light exposure would break them down, releasing active Chlorine atoms which would be expected to react with ozone (converting it into O2). Reduction in ozone would lead to increased penetration of UV to the earth and subsequent increases in skin cancer, etc. • Initial political reactions came from the US (1974-77): * Intense debate developed over potential threat as measured against the frivolity of aresol sprays (which represented 50% of CFC consumption) * NRDC (NGO) became (and remained) principal environmental activist lobby on issue * Dupont Chemical and other industries lined up in opposition to any proposed regulations, arguing that science was too speculative to merit costly actions
Early Scientific Concerns and Responses, cont`d. 1977: UNEP-sponsored meeting on Ozone Layer in Washington, DC; reps from 33 nations: • Drafted “World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer”, outlining cooperation over research and assessments • UNEP agreed to play coordinating role in activities • Established Coordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer (CCOL), expert group tasked to meet annually (1977-85) and coordinate research, review findings, and draft policy recommendations • Industry representatives also participated 1977: US federal ban on CFCs in aerosols, except for “essential” uses, leads to immediate reductions on production by about 50%. Canada and nordics (Sweden, Norway) follow suit, responding for fear of possible Arctic ozone hole Industry, hard hit by the US ban, assumes a proactive position and initiates intensive research on CFC substitutes and forms anti-regulatory lobby group, “Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy” (ARCP)
Early Scientific Concerns and Responses, cont`d. 1977: UNEP-sponsored meeting on Ozone Layer in Washington, DC; reps from 33 nations: • Drafted “World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer”, outlining cooperation over research and assessments • UNEP agreed to play coordinating role in activities • Established Coordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer (CCOL), expert group tasked to meet annually (1977-85) and coordinate research, review findings, and draft policy recommendations • Industry representatives also participated 1977: US federal ban on CFCs in aerosols, except for “essential” uses, leads to immediate reductions on production by about 50%. Canada and nordics (Sweden, Norway) follow suit, responding for fear of possible Arctic ozone hole Industry, hard hit by the US ban, assumes a proactive position and initiates intensive research on CFC substitutes and forms anti-regulatory lobby group, “Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy” (ARCP)
Early Concerns and Responses, cont`d. • 1980: Reagan elected in US; appoints anti-regulatory officials who express skepticism over further CFC regulations • Canada and nordics lobby UN to initiate international action on ozone • 1981: UNEP establishes working groups to negotiate an ozone treaty and appoints CCOL as principal science and technical advisory body • Initial progress slow as major players--US, Japan & EC--are unsupportive of international regulations • 1983: Change in key administrative positions in US (James Watt and Ann Burford out) leads US to resume an active position on ozone issues • 1984: US joins Canada, nordics, Austria and Switzerland to form the “Toronto Group”, which drafts proposals for an international convention
Early Concerns and Responses, cont`d. • 1980: Reagan elected in US; appoints anti-regulatory officials who express skepticism over further CFC regulations • Canada and nordics lobby UN to initiate international action on ozone • 1981: UNEP establishes working groups to negotiate an ozone treaty and appoints CCOL as principal science and technical advisory body • Initial progress slow as major players--US, Japan & EC--are unsupportive of international regulations • 1983: Change in key administrative positions in US (James Watt and Ann Burford out) leads US to resume an active position on ozone issues • 1984: US joins Canada, nordics, Austria and Switzerland to form the “Toronto Group”, which drafts proposals for an international convention
Early Concerns and Responses, cont`d. • 1980: Reagan elected in US; appoints anti-regulatory officials who express skepticism over further CFC regulations • Canada and nordics lobby UN to initiate international action on ozone • 1981: UNEP establishes working groups to negotiate an ozone treaty and appoints CCOL as principal science and technical advisory body • Initial progress slow as major players--US, Japan & EC--are unsupportive of international regulations • 1983: Change in key administrative positions in US (James Watt and Ann Burford out) leads US to resume an active position on ozone issues • 1984: US joins Canada, nordics, Austria and Switzerland to form the “Toronto Group”, which drafts proposals for an international convention
Convergence of Evidence andPolitical Action (1985-1990) 1985: Vienna Convention • Highly sensitive and conflicting negotiations, with major split between pro-regulatory (Toronto Group) and anti-regulatory (EC) • Disappointing compromises eventually lead to 20 nations and EC signing • Nations pledge to cooperate over research and monitoring, but no commitments made to reductions until further evidence suggests that such reductions are warranted • UNEP empowered to convene working group negotiations for Protocol to be signed in 1987 (i.e., established mechanism for moving process forward)
Convergence of Evidence and Action, cont`d. • 1985: Shortly after Vienna, first accurate measurement of hole in the ozone layer above Antarctica: as large as continental US! • Sets off firestorm of media and public concern: US advocates complete phase-out of CFCs. • UNEP fast-tacks working group negotiations. • 1986: Further evidence supporting link between CFCs and ozone hole above Antarctica, and possible hole above Arctic. • Dupont Chemical announces CFC substitutes: shifts position away from full opposition to regulations on CFCs (i.e., recognizes inevitability of regulations and opportunity for capturing market with substitutes). Dramatically increases R&D investments in substitutes (HFCs, HCFCs). • Industry opposition continues to break down and public pressure for action mounts as environmental awareness surges in US and globally. • Germany-led EC begins to shift position in favor of strong regulations
Convergence of Evidence and Action, cont`d. • 1985: Shortly after Vienna, first accurate measurement of hole in the ozone layer above Antarctica: as large as continental US! • Sets off firestorm of media and public concern: US advocates complete phase-out of CFCs. • UNEP fast-tacks working group negotiations. • 1986: Further evidence supporting link between CFCs and ozone hole above Antarctica, and possible hole above Arctic. • Dupont Chemical announces CFC substitutes: shifts position away from full opposition to regulations on CFCs (i.e., recognizes inevitability of regulations and opportunity for capturing market with substitutes). Dramatically increases R&D investments in substitutes (HFCs, HCFCs). • Industry opposition continues to break down and public pressure for action mounts as environmental awareness surges in US and globally. • Germany-led EC begins to shift position in favor of strong regulations
1987: Montreal Protocol • Positive political climate strong action in negotiations • Strong commitments made: 50% cuts to 1986 levels • Trade restrictions imposed on non-parties (i.e., restricted from trading CFC products with parties) • Promotion of technical transfer to LDCs to assist their phasing-out production • LDCs given 10 year grace period to meet control targets • 1987: Shortly after Montreal meeting, critical scientific breakthrough made: high altitude measurements above Antarctica provide virtually definitive evidence of link between CFCs and ozone hole • 1988: Dupont agrees to stop all production of CFCs and advocates for global phase-out. Other US companies follow suit • 1989: EC supports total phase-out
1987: Montreal Protocol • Positive political climate strong action in negotiations • Strong commitments made: 50% cuts to 1986 levels • Trade restrictions imposed on non-parties (i.e., restricted from trading CFC products with parties) • Promotion of technical transfer to LDCs to assist their phasing-out production • LDCs given 10 year grace period to meet control targets • 1987: Shortly after Montreal meeting, critical scientific breakthrough made: high altitude measurements above Antarctica provide virtually definitive evidence of link between CFCs and ozone hole • 1988: Dupont agrees to stop all production of CFCs and advocates for global phase-out. Other US companies follow suit • 1989: EC supports total phase-out
1987: Montreal Protocol • Positive political climate strong action in negotiations • Strong commitments made: 50% cuts to 1986 levels • Trade restrictions imposed on non-parties (i.e., restricted from trading CFC products with parties) • Promotion of technical transfer to LDCs to assist their phasing-out production • LDCs given 10 year grace period to meet control targets • 1987: Shortly after Montreal meeting, critical scientific breakthrough made: high altitude measurements above Antarctica provide virtually definitive evidence of link between CFCs and ozone hole • 1988: Dupont agrees to stop all production of CFCs and advocates for global phase-out. Other US companies follow suit • 1989: EC supports total phase-out
1987: Montreal Protocol • Positive political climate strong action in negotiations • Strong commitments made: 50% cuts to 1986 levels • Trade restrictions imposed on non-parties (i.e., restricted from trading CFC products with parties) • Promotion of technical transfer to LDCs to assist their phasing-out production • LDCs given 10 year grace period to meet control targets • 1987: Shortly after Montreal meeting, critical scientific breakthrough made: high altitude measurements above Antarctica provide virtually definitive evidence of link between CFCs and ozone hole • 1988: Dupont agrees to stop all production of CFCs and advocates for global phase-out. Other US companies follow suit • 1989: EC supports total phase-out
Further (post-Montreal) Progress 1989/90: Helsinki and London meetings and London Amendments (1990): • Total phase-out by 2000 • Secretariat for Protocol established at UNEP • Established Multilateral “Ozone Fund” to assist LDC finance phase-out ($240 million) • Pledge to ensure technologies necessary to meet controls are made available to LDCs on “fair and most favorable terms”. • Comprehensive data reporting requirements (production, export, import) 1992: Copenhagen Amendments: • Phase-out dates advanced to 1994 (halons) and 1996 (CFCs) • HCFCs and Methyl Bromide brought under control for first time: 2020 phase-out
Further (post-Montreal) Progress 1989/90: Helsinki and London meetings and London Amendments (1990): • Total phase-out by 2000 • Secretariat for Protocol established at UNEP • Established Multilateral “Ozone Fund” to assist LDC finance phase-out ($240 million) • Pledge to ensure technologies necessary to meet controls are made available to LDCs on “fair and most favorable terms”. • Comprehensive data reporting requirements (production, export, import) 1992: Copenhagen Amendments: • Phase-out dates advanced to 1994 (halons) and 1996 (CFCs) • HCFCs and Methyl Bromide brought under control for first time: 2020 phase-out
Recent Progress 1993: Bangkok Amendments: • $510 million more added to Multilateral Ozone Fund 1995 (Vienna); 1999 (Beijing): • Accelerated phase-out schedules further Recent Developments: • Scientists Rowland & Molina awarded 1995 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for original research (1974) • CFC Phase-out occurring rapidly in most industrial countries, at a rate faster than required by Protocol • Major industrial producers complete phase-out of production • Phase-out in LDCs going more slowly than expected • Emergence of black-market trade in CFCs from LDCs to DCs: grace period allowed LDCs to continue to produce cheap CFCs which industries in DCs are willing to buy to forestall having to make expensive transitions to alternatives
Recent Progress 1993: Bangkok Amendments: • $510 million more added to Multilateral Ozone Fund 1995 (Vienna); 1999 (Beijing): • Accelerated phase-out schedules further Recent Developments: • Scientists Rowland & Molina awarded 1995 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for original research (1974) • CFC Phase-out occurring rapidly in most industrial countries, at a rate faster than required by Protocol • Major industrial producers complete phase-out of production • Phase-out in LDCs going more slowly than expected • Emergence of black-market trade in CFCs from LDCs to DCs: grace period allowed LDCs to continue to produce cheap CFCs which industries in DCs are willing to buy to forestall having to make expensive transitions to alternatives
Recent Progress 1993: Bangkok Amendments: • $510 million more added to Multilateral Ozone Fund 1995 (Vienna); 1999 (Beijing): • Accelerated phase-out schedules further Recent Developments: • Scientists Rowland & Molina awarded 1995 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for original research (1974) • CFC Phase-out occurring rapidly in most industrial countries, at a rate faster than required by Protocol • Major industrial producers complete phase-out of production • Phase-out in LDCs going more slowly than expected • Emergence of black-market trade in CFCs from LDCs to DCs: grace period allowed LDCs to continue to produce cheap CFCs which industries in DCs are willing to buy to forestall having to make expensive transitions to alternatives
Recent Progress 1993: Bangkok Amendments: • $510 million more added to Multilateral Ozone Fund 1995 (Vienna); 1999 (Beijing): • Accelerated phase-out schedules further Recent Developments: • Scientists Rowland & Molina awarded 1995 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for original research (1974) • CFC Phase-out occurring rapidly in most industrial countries, at a rate faster than required by Protocol • Major industrial producers complete phase-out of production • Phase-out in LDCs going more slowly than expected • Emergence of black-market trade in CFCs from LDCs to DCs: grace period allowed LDCs to continue to produce cheap CFCs which industries in DCs are willing to buy to forestall having to make expensive transitions to alternatives
Canadian Domestic Response • Ozone depleting substances listed under Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA) (1989/99) - stipulated aggressive regulation and phase-out • Series of specific Ozone Depleting Substances Regulations passed under CEPA (revised as Montreal Protocol revised). Placed strict, mandatory limits on the production, use, sale and import/export of listed chemicals • Permitted only “essential” uses where no alternatives available (e.g., propellent in asthma inhalers) • All Provinces passed complementing laws that addressed other sources of chemicals (i.e., removal of existing CFCs in old refrigeration, insulation, etc.) • Production of ozone depleting chemicals in Canada reduced by 95% between 1987-1996
Lessons from the Ozone Experience: Why Was it So Successful? • Strong scientific consensus developed by mid-1980s • Established formal mechanism early on to facilitate ongoing consultation/negotiation (CCOL to 1985, then UNEP) • Montreal Protocol was flexible and transparent: set rigid targets, but countries can choose the most appropriate/cost-effective means to achieve these • Strong role of UNEP: forced agenda forward, especially after 1985. • Industrial effects & response: costs not too high and key industry players eventually came fully on-board • Public awareness and NGO pressure: images of ozone holes and rising environmental awareness • US position waxed and waned over time, but played key leadership role at early and later stages. Canada and the Nordics “carried the ball” forward when US leadership lagged in the early 1980s.
Lessons from the Ozone Experience: Why Was it So Successful? • Strong scientific consensus developed by mid-1980s • Established formal mechanism early on to facilitate ongoing consultation/negotiation (CCOL to 1985, then UNEP) • Montreal Protocol was flexible and transparent: set rigid targets, but countries can choose the most appropriate/cost-effective means to achieve these • Strong role of UNEP: forced agenda forward, especially after 1985. • Industrial effects & response: costs not too high and key industry players eventually came fully on-board • Public awareness and NGO pressure: images of ozone holes and rising environmental awareness • US position waxed and waned over time, but played key leadership role at early and later stages. Canada and the Nordics “carried the ball” forward when US leadership lagged in the early 1980s.
Lessons from the Ozone Experience: Why Was it So Successful? • Strong scientific consensus developed by mid-1980s • Established formal mechanism early on to facilitate ongoing consultation/negotiation (CCOL to 1985, then UNEP) • Montreal Protocol was flexible and transparent: set rigid targets, but countries can choose the most appropriate/cost-effective means to achieve these • Strong role of UNEP: forced agenda forward, especially after 1985. • Industrial effects & response: costs not too high and key industry players eventually came fully on-board • Public awareness and NGO pressure: images of ozone holes and rising environmental awareness • US position waxed and waned over time, but played key leadership role at early and later stages. Canada and the Nordics “carried the ball” forward when US leadership lagged in the early 1980s.
Lessons from the Ozone Experience: Why Was it So Successful? • Strong scientific consensus developed by mid-1980s • Established formal mechanism early on to facilitate ongoing consultation/negotiation (CCOL to 1985, then UNEP) • Montreal Protocol was flexible and transparent: set rigid targets, but countries can choose the most appropriate/cost-effective means to achieve these • Strong role of UNEP: forced agenda forward, especially after 1985. • Industrial effects & response: costs not too high and key industry players eventually came fully on-board • Public awareness and NGO pressure: images of ozone holes and rising environmental awareness • US position waxed and waned over time, but played key leadership role at early and later stages. Canada and the Nordics “carried the ball” forward when US leadership lagged in the early 1980s.