Non-Combatant Evacuation Lebanon – July 2006

1. Non-Combatant EvacuationLebanon – July 2006

2. CONTENTS • EXECUTIVE SUMMARY • COMMAND & CONTROL ORGANIZATION • CHRONOLGY • PHASES OF THE OPERATION • 16 – 19 JULY – BACKLOAD THE MEU • 18 – 20 JULY – MOVEMENT TO JOA • 20 – 23 JULY – EVACUATION EXECUTION • 24 – PRESENT – FOLLOW-ON MISSIONS • METRICS • LESSONS LEARNED UNCLASSIFIED

3. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY • Nearly 15,000 evacuated from 16 to 29 July – no injuries • Over 7,000 evacuated by Navy ships and Marine Corp helo • Backload of entire MEU and transit 600 NM in 3 days, including Suez transit • All operations conducted safely in spite of war close by • Environment more conducive to LCU over LCAC • Excellent use of both deliberate and crisis planning • Interagency, joint, and coalition operation UNCLASSIFIED

4. Interagency and Joint Forces • Interagency • Complex DoS and DoD interaction at all levels • Coordination with USAID to organize HA effort • Interaction at all levels with intelligence organizations • Joint service effort led by CTF-59 in Akrotiri • USMC – 24 MEU and supporting elements • - 2400 Marines, ACE • USN – IWOSG/CDS-60 • - 8 Ships, over 3000 sailors • USAF – MH53 Support as air bridge to Beirut • Evacuated over 350 AMCITS • USA – Provided specialized support UNCLASSIFIED

5. Coalition Forces • Force density in JOA and heightened threat increased likelihood of Blue-on-Blue/Blue-on-White activity, making early coordination and LNO participation critical • British, French, and Italian forces had a large footprint offshore Beirut • Early coordination critical to de-conflicting evacuation efforts and for identification of potential areas of mutual support • Israeli blockade and combat operations required detailed coordination with CCC Tel Aviv • Coalition forces involved in operations concurrent with US efforts UNCLASSIFIED

6. OPCON TACON C2 ORGANIZATION CENTCOM COMUS NAVCENT CTF 59 AKROTIRI, CY CTG 59.2 24 MEU (SOC) CTG 59.1 CPR-4 352ND SOG USMC SEC FOR CO IST DET (PSYOP) SCC AMWC CORE IWOSG DEPLOYERS HSV SWIFT USS NASHVILLE USS IWO JIMA USS GONZALEZ* USS BARRY ADC DET SEC FOR USS WHIDBEY ISLAND USS COLE* USS TRENTON DET MED * USS GONZALEZ DEPARTED EMED 01 AUG, AND COL INCHOPPED 03 AUG UNCLASSIFIED

7. CHRONOLOGY GEO-POLITICAL EVENTS HEZBOLLAH ROCKET ATTACKS PM OLMERT TELLS UN THAT FIGHTING WILL CONTINUE UNTIL HEZBOLLAH ELIMINATED IDF WARNS S. LEBANON RESIDENTS TO EVACUATE ISRAELI SAAR HIT BY C802 & EGYPTIAN FERRY SUNK HEZBOLLAH TAKES TWO ISRAELI SOLDIERS PRISONER BEIRUT – DAMASCUS HIGHWAY CUT BY IDF AIR FORCES UN 5-POINT PEACE PROPOSAL ISSUED IDF WARNS S. LEBANON RESIDENTS TO EVACUATE IDF FORCES MASSED ON BORDER ISRAELI BLOCKADE BEGINS 1ST LAF SOLDIER KILLED 12 JUL 13 JUL 14 JUL 15 JUL 16 JUL 17 JUL 18 JUL 19 JUL 20 JUL NSH COMP BACKLOAD, ENR SUEZ CANAL IWO/WBI COMMENCE BACKLOAD MEU CH 53s EVAC 42 BEIRUT - CYPRUS NSH XST SUEZ WBI COMP BACKLOAD MEU CH 53 EVAC 121 ECC ASSISTS EMBASSY W/ ORIENT QUEEN EVAC OF 1066 NORWEIGEN FERRY EVAC 126 MEU CH53s EVAC 121 BEIRUT - CYPRUS IWOSG COMP BACKLOAD, ALL SHIPS ENR SUEZ IWO/WBI/TRE RAS/VERT SAT/BHN MEU CH 53 EVAC 157 BEIRUT - CYPRUS FIRST USN EVAC - NSH EVAC 1058 CH 53/MH 53 EVAC 191 IWO/WBI/TRE/BHN XST SUEZ SWIFT U/W DJIBOUTI ENR SUEZ CANADIAN SHIP EVACS 160 AMCITS TO TURKEY ORIENT QUEEN EVACS 874 PERS BEIRUT - CYPRUS MT WHITNEY ARR JOA NAVCENT TETHERS ISG TO AQABA (36 HR TETHER 3 MEU CH 53s SENT TO CYPRUS NAVCENT ORDERS ISG TO BACKLOAD MEU FROM AQABA 2XCH 53 EVAC FIRST 21 BEIRUT - CYPRUS 2 KC-130’S AND 40 MAN SECURITY AND MAINT TEAM SENT TO CYPRUS CTF 59 DEPLOYS TO CYPRUS NSH BEGINS BACKLOAD ACE FLY-ON IWO NEO ACTIVITY UNCLASSIFIED

8. CHRONOLOGY GEO-POLITICAL EVENTS ANTI-US PROTESTS IN DAMASCUS SHORTAGES INCREASE IN LEBANON LEB CALLS FOR US HELP TO CREATE SECURE ROUTE OUT OF S. LEB HUMANITARIAN CRISIS DETERMINED USAID COORD HA EFFORT LAF NEGOTIATES ONE RUNWAY AT BEIRUT WITH IDF FRANCE ANNOUNCES IT WILL TAKE PART IN PEACEKEEPING FORCE IS CONTINUES GROUND CAMPAIGN IDF BEGINS GROUND ATTACK INTO S. LEB SECSTATE RICE VISITS BEIRUT BINT JBEIL INVADED, ISRAEL REITERATES DESTRUCTION OF HEZBOLLAH AS GOAL IS PARLIAMENT VOTES AGAINST IDF REQUEST TO EXPAND WAR AGAINST HEZ LOOTING BEGINS IN BEIRUT, LAF FORCES INCREASED 500,000 LEBANESE DISPLACED 150,000 REFUGEES IN SYRIA HEZBOLLAH DIGS IN FOR ANTICIPATED IS GROUND ASSAULT 21 JUL 22 JUL 23 JUL 24 JUL 25 JUL 26 JUL 27 JUL 28 JUL 29 JUL TRE EVAC 1854 NSH OFFLOADS LIM, RETURNS TO BEIRUT, EVACS 1130 CH / MH 53 EVAC 191 RAHMAH EVAC 824 • WBI EVAC 817 • MH 53 EVAC 40 • RAHMAH ENGINE CASUALTY IPT LIM • ORIENT QUEEN DIVERTED TO MERSIN, TK • WATER SHORTAGE • NSH/GON/TRE/ • BAR RAS BHN • TRE EVAC 1641 • TRE DIVERTS TO MERSIN, TURKEY • NSH EVAC 526 TO CYPRUS (LCU BOW RAMP CASUALTY) • MH 53 EVAC 39 TO CYPRUS • WBI OFFLOADS IN CYPRUS ORIENT QUEEN EVAC 776 TO CYPRUS RAHMAH EVAC 154 MH 53 EVAC 28 TO CYPRUS TRE OFFLOAD DELAYED IN MERSIN NSH OFFLOADS IN CYPRUS SWIFT TRANSITS SUEZ TYRE EVAC BY ISG HALTED BY EMBASSY VITTORIA- M EVAC 282 TO CYPRUS ORIENT QUEEN EVAC 489 TO CYPRUS MH 53 EVAC 40 TO CYPRUS MH 53 DELIVERS THREE HA KITS PRINCESS MARISSA EVAC 173 FM TYRE AS ISG STANDS SHOTGUN ORIENT QUEEN EVAC 379 TO CYPRUS VITTORIA- M EVAC 250 TO CYPRUS MT WHITNEY DETACHED JOA VITTORIA- M ATTEMPTS EVAC TYRE – SECURITY DETERIORATES, AMCITS OVERLAND TO BEIRUT MH 53 EVAC 2 TO CYPRUS DEP FROM BEIRUT UPGRADED FROM “AUTHORIZED” TO “ORDERED” MH 53 EVAC 5 TO CYPRUS ORIENT QUEEN EVAC 308 TO CYPRUS SWIFT INPORT LIM TO ONLOAD HA SUPPLIES HSV SWIFT DELIVERS HA SUPPLIES - BEIRUT CDS 60/GON DETACHED VITTORIA-M/ORIENT QUEEN CONTRACT CANCELLED BY DOS 14,455 AMCITS EVAC TO DATE ISG REMAINS ON STATION NEO ACTIVITY UNCLASSIFIED

9. PHASES OF OPERATION • PHASE ONE • Backload MEU from Jordan • Initial Planning Enroute • Insert FCE/ECC/SEC • Initial Evacuation • Planning • Movement to objective • PHASE TWO • Northern Stage • Deliberate operations in Beirut (Embassy) • Southern Stage • Outlying areas in the North • Part One • Assessment • Muster • Security • Part Two • Extraction • PHASE THREE • Southern Lebanon • On call/ hasty evacuation (AIR/SURF) • PHASE FOUR • Consolidation and retrograde force MEU Commander “We will provide capability sets for such missions a TRAP, ECC/SEARCH/, etc. Consider need for SPLIT ESG, air routes, penetration points, fires…” UNCLASSIFIED

10. INITIAL FORCE LAYDOWN • GONZALEZ • BARRY CTF-59 Bahrain to Cyprus Infinite Moonlight Inport Aqaba -IWO/WBI/NSH -24 MEU • HSV SWIFT Determined Azidi - COLE - TRENTON UNCLASSIFIED

11. BACKLOAD THE MEU • MEU Operating ~176nm N of Aqaba, Jordan for Infinite Moonlight ’06 • Transit to Aqaba and full MEU backload in 48hrs • First units backload to NASHVILLE and underway in under 36 hours, including overland transit time. • 3xCH-53’s fly from King Faisal Air Base to Cyprus and serve as initial platform for Authorized Departure. • MC-130’s transport 40 man security/maintenance det to Cyprus, including AMEMB augmentation force. QATRANA TRAINING AREA1st Element Dep 16Jul KING FAISAL AIR BASE CH-53’s Enroute AM 16 Ju1 MC-130 w/ 40 man det To Cyprus AQABA NAVAL PORT NSH U/W 17 Jul, 1248C Qatrana to Aqaba Straight: 242 Km / 147 milesRoute: 283 Km / 176 miles UNCLASSIFIED

12. MOVEMENT TO JOA • NSH departs ahead of group after finishing backload 17 Jul • NSH transits Suez 18 Jul as advance force • IWO/WBI continue backload for 19 Jul departure • IWO/WBI/TRE rendezvous with Saturn and Big Horn for VERTREP/RAS • IWO/WBI/TRE transit Suez together on 20 Jul • Nashville takes first load of 1058 from Beirut on 20 Jul • Entire force rendezvous in JOA 20 Jul, including GON • SWI enroute from Djibouti UNCLASSIFIED

13. EVACUATION EXECUTION • First runs via CH-53’s out of Cyprus • Limited airlift capacity from AMEMB pad • NSH on station with LCU out of Khoury Marina • Civilian charters; Ocean Queen, Rahmah, Vittoria-M begin runs out of Beirut • GON/BAR provide shotgun escort for all civilian ferries • WBI/TRE arrive and provide maximum lift capacity • IWO serves helicopter platform/lilypad/command element • Max daily lift capacity approx 6,000 AMCITS • Total evacuated • 14,455 (Jul 16-Jul 29) UNCLASSIFIED

14. CDS-60 SUPPORT • CDS-60 as supporting commander provided DDG escort any time Blue or White shipping entered missile threat envelope • USS GONZALEZ, USS BARRY, and USS COLE provided AD coverage • Over 30 escort runs made to support NEO out of Beirut harbor and from Ad Dubayah/Khoury complex • Continuous escort provided for ships acting as lilypad in the missile threat envelope Tripoli Jouneih Shipping Corridor Beirut Shipping Corridor Entry Point Sidon Tyre UNCLASSIFIED

15. FOLLOW-ON MISSIONS IWOSG on station through late Aug as contingency force Potential Scenarios: • Foreign humanitarian assistance. • Peacekeeping as a BRIDGING FORCE until and international peacekeeping force is prepared to assume the mission. • In-extremis support to an international peace enforcement force in Lebanon. UNCLASSIFIED

16. METRICS • CH53’s alone were inadequate initially, but IWOSG and civilian shipping quickly generated excess capacity • Limiting factor for military shipping is transit time and re-supply considerations • Charter shipping provided sustained lift capability • Airlift was critical in early stages for security and as a rapid response tool • Sustained airlift is not a recommended option for mass NEO operations. Upon arrival of NSH, the “bottleneck” in the NEO process shifted from lift capacity, to front/back-end processing capability (at ECC and Cyprus) UNCLASSIFIED

17. METRICS (Con’t) • Excludes civilian lift capacity • Airlift is based upon CH/MH-53 with 2 round trips (Cyprus-Beirut) per day • Airlift does not include all ACE aircraft on IWO JIMA (total capacity of all ACE helos ~250) ~360 AMCITS with CH-53’s Arrival of MH-53s UNCLASSIFIED

18. LESSONS LEARNED • Speed to Objective • Ship to Shore – LCU • Medical Coordination • Sanitation • Water Considerations • Children/Childcare • Cultural Issues • Air Control • Information Dissemination • Navy Forward Command Element • Intelligence Collection • Rules of Engagement Lesson titles linked to complete lesson slides “It was like a dependent’s day cruise on steroids” – CO Nashville UNCLASSIFIED

19. BACKUP SLIDES UNCLASSIFIED

20. IWOSG/24 MEU SOUTH LEBANON SOUTH LEBANON CONTINGENCY • IDF pushes into S. Lebanon, and Tyre becomes a focus of air attacks • AMCITS in S. Lebanon focus on Tyre and selected towns in S. Lebanon as potential collection points • DOS/IWOSG/24 MEU plan to evacuate AMCITS out of Tyre • DOS decides to move AMCITS to Beirut for evacuation, and to minimize military presence in area SELECTED TOWNS INLAND TYRE UNCLASSIFIED

21. Approx TTW Limit Tripoli IWOSG ON STATION OFFSHORE N13 Jouneih Shipping Corridor Beirut Shipping Corridor Entry Point Sidon El Jnoub River Tyre Disposition of the force and the JOA • IWOSG ON STATION IN EMED • JOINT OPERATING AREA ESTABLISHED FOR ALL FORCES OPERATING IN EMED ICW LEBANON • ISRAELI NOTAM AREA ESTABLISHED TO AID IN BLOCKADE OPERATIONS (NOT RESTRICTIVE FOR US FORCES) UNCLASSIFIED

22. LESSONS LEARNED UNCLASSIFIED

23. SPEED TO OBJECTIVE • OBSERVATION: Getting ships on station off the coast of Beirut as early as possible paid huge dividends in terms of heavy lift capability, operational flexibility, and public impression of the US response. • DISCUSSION: Prior to the Beirut NEO, 24 MEU was operating in Jordan, with IWOSG in the Gulf of Aqaba, necessitating a backload of forces prior to the transit to the EMED. During the MEU backload from Jordan, USS NASHVILLE was the first to complete her retrograde operations.  Rather than wait for the entire force, NASHVILLE was detached, approximately 2 days ahead of other units. This allowed her to be on station and conducting NEO operations in advance of the rest of the force. As shown by the graph below, NSH began her first lift on the 20th, greatly expanding the overall lift capacity of the force (to the point where there was excess lift capacity). As shown, airlift is critical to initial evacuation and to resupply of the AMEMB/ECC, but it is inadequate for any type of mass NEO. • LESSON LEARNED: Detach ships individually when ready to be on station ASAP, rather than waiting for the entire force to transit together. UNCLASSIFIED

24. LCU CAPACITY FOR NEO • OBSERVATION: During the July 2006 embarkation and transport of 817 American Citizens onboard WBI, the primary method of embarkation was via LCAC. Specifically, WBI embarked approx 75% of her guests via an LCAC equipped with the Personnel Transport Module (PTM). • DISCUSSION: During the July 2006 Authorized Departure from Lebanon, WBI embarked approx 75% of her guests via an LCAC equipped with the Personnel Transport Module (PTM). Although WBI had a second LCAC embarked, only one PTM was available. An LCAC equipped with a PTM can carry approximately 150-160 civilian passengers and their luggage during a NEO. Conversely, a non-PTM LCAC can only carry 20-30 passengers. Several options for increasing the capacity of the non-PTM craft were discussed, and ultimately rejected. One of the options discussed was loading a pair of Amphibious Assault Vehicles into the LCAC well to act as makeshift transport modules. These AAVs could have each carried approx 30 guests, but were not used for several reasons including overall weight vs fuel consumption reasons, as well as local perceptions of “armored vehicles” hitting the beach for a NEO. An alternative consideration was loading several lighter vehicles into the LCAC well. This choice was ultimately discarded because of concerns about the comfort of guests in a vehicle with the potential for high temperatures, moisture, and powerful wind forces. The end result was that WBI used just one LCAC for surface embarkation during the Authorized Departure. Compared to the LCUs embarked on other Amphibious shipping, WBI's LCAC was capable of making a much faster run from the ship to the beach. However, loading was somewhat slower, and the capacity of the PTM craft is significantly less. Additionally, LCACs have no organic defense. Because of this, they are not suited for landings on beaches with even minor opposition. What the PTM LCAC does bring is "over the horizon" capability, and fast ingress and egress. Potentially, a PTM LCAC could wait offshore, be directed to land at a specific time once the embarking guests were ready to go, and then get back off the beach in an expeditious manner in cases where time was a factor in evacuating a relatively small number of personnel. This process was put to good use in our last few loads of passengers, as the processing station ashore arranged personnel in "sticks" to ensure a more organized loading process. • LESSON LEARNED: • - Recommend ships and ESG staffs make the PTM LCAC a part of their planning when looking at options for moving passengers during a NEO. The PTM option would be especially attractive if the expected number of evacuees is relatively small (150 or less) and if the embarkation beach is secure, or if there is a desire to keep Amphibious shipping over the horizon. • - Recommend ESGs keep an additional PTM onboard one of the Amphibious ships. Although one PTM LCAC is generally sufficient for most Amphibious offloads, a second PTM equipped craft could have increased the loading capacity and speed of embarkation for WBI and IWO ESG. UNCLASSIFIED

25. CRAFT CAPACITY UNCLASSIFIED RETURN TO INDEX

26. MEDICAL PLANNERS CROSS COMMUNICATION • Observation: A break in communications for medical planning existed between blue and green sides within the force. • Discussion: Blue forces typically have no personnel on scene at the ECC, and ECC to CATF Surgeon communication channels/ circuits were unclear. Patient handoff from ECC to ship’s Medical Dept. did not always occur seamlessly. In particular, patient prioritization and medical condition was not always clearly communicated from shore to ship, resulting in acute patients arriving unannounced, ships unready to treat specific incoming ailments, missing medications, etc. • Lesson Learned: Seamless communication between all medical forces from the beach to the afloat forces must exist IOT facilitate the flow of patients and information across the AOA. • Recommended Action: • CATF/MEU Surgeon should be included in all key battle rhythm meetings during NEO operations, particularly the Air Planning Board and PMC board. • CATF/MEU Medical circuits and/or alternate communication plans should be developed ahead of time by CATF personnel for integration into USMC ECC plans. POTS lines are ideal. • Environment permitting, a MEU medical representative/checkpoint should be at the ECC, with direct communications to the ship/Surgeon. • Medical personnel should brief Flag Plot/CIC/LFOC on medical necessities and flow prior to MEU. UNCLASSIFIED

27. NEO/MEDICAL CAPACITY PLANNING FACTORS UNCLASSIFIED RETURN TO INDEX

28. SANITATION • Observation: Overall sanitation of the ship may become a problem as ship’s force becomes overwhelmed. In particular, sanitation of heads becomes difficult given the long lines and heavy use. • Discussion: Sanitation difficulties were compounded for a number of reasons, including: • Heavy use and passenger load. • Despite the fact that most evacs are AMCITS, there are many cultural differences, and proper training of disposal of toilet paper (in head vs. trashcan) is critical. Many heads did not have waste bins or they were overflowed, and used toilet paper began to pile up. • Limited ships force personnel to clean heads. In some cases, GI illness began to occur, and was perhaps related to sanitation of the heads. This is a matter of expecting filthy heads to happen and planning to pay attention to this need frequently. • Lesson Learned: Filthy heads (and other areas) will occur more quickly than one would expect. Frequent cleaning of heads and hand sanitizer at water and food dispersing areas would be beneficial in preventing gastrointestinal illnesses. • Recommended Action: • Supply hand sanitizer at water and food dispersing areas. • Have a plan to clean heads frequently. • Thoroughly and repeatedly brief evacs on sanitation requirements. UNCLASSIFIED

29. WATER CONSIDERATIONS • Observation: Water was the key element in preventing most medical complications, and heat injury/dehydration were critical threats. • Discussion: Water supply aboard ship quickly becomes a problem as AMCITS are embarked. Water distribution points at the ECC, ship embarkation site, ship berthing areas, and any area with a high concentration of passengers is essential. ½ liter bottles work best – the passengers tend to finish these and discard properly. One liter bottles tend to be half consumed then left lying around. • Lesson Learned: Water everywhere will ameliorate significant cases of dehydration and heat injury. • Recommended Action: • Supply ample amounts water to all passengers. • Utilize smaller bottles (½ liter) if possible as they tend to be consumed fully rather than discarded partially full. UNCLASSIFIED

30. CHILDREN/CHILDCARE CONSIDERATIONS • Observation: Children required increased attention/consideration, and raise particular safety concerns. • Discussion: Children of all ages required increased attention and supplies. Pediatric medical supplies should be considered in any replenishment plan. Safety is an issues as well (Childrenlove toys/novelties. One child drank the fluid from a chemical light and required medical attention). Excess/volunteer personnel were encouraged and critical to occupying young children with toys, games, etc. • Lesson Learned: With so many children, safety observers should be posted in as many places as possible (everywhere). There is need of pediatric specific antibiotics, IV equipment, etc. • Recommended Action: • Pediatric medical supplies need consideration in the replenishment plan. • Post safety observers in as many places as possible. • Provide activities/toys where possible for children. UNCLASSIFIED

31. CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AMONG EMBARKED GUESTS • Observation: During the embarkation and transport of authorized departees from Lebanon, crews noted several cultural issues that required special attention. These differences were evidenced in disparities between military and civilian cultures as well as Western and Middle Eastern cultures. • Discussion: During the embarkation and transport of authorized departees from Lebanon, crews noted several cultural issues that required special attention. Although all embarked guests were American Citizens (AMCITS), many of them have lived in the Middle East for extended periods of time, which meant that they had slightly different cultural norms than our Sailors and Marines were used to. Additionally, the disparity between civilian and military cultures raised some issues and questions. Specific issues noted included: - Menu restrictions. Many of our guests were Muslim, and required some restrictions to the menu that would normally be acceptable onboard ship. Supply Dept was challenged to find meals that could be prepared in bulk, for continuous feeding, that did not include ham or pork products. Guests did appreciate the effort made to get serve hot meals instead of cold cuts or finger foods. • All guests were met with a friendly smile and a welcome, but some were not comfortable shaking hands. • - Some guests were not accustomed to flushing toilet paper down the commodes. Since there aren’t wastebaskets located inside bathroom stalls, the crew spent a good amount of time cleaning up used toilet paper. • Lesson learned: Ships need to better understand cultural differences; even though they evacuated American Citizens. • Recommendation: • Recommend ship’s spend a portion of their NEO planning process focusing on potential cultural differences that might arise during operations. Educate the crew ahead of time, if possible, with regard to courtesies, hygiene, and religious norms that might not fit perfectly with shipboard life. UNCLASSIFIED

32. AIR CONTROL OPERATIONS • Observation: SPINS/ACO for Lebanon NEO were not approved until nine days after the NEO commenced. These critical messages should have been sent in the first 24 hours of operations to reduce the chance of accident. • Discussion: Due to communications difficulties the time required to staff ACO/SPINS through higher headquarters staff for approval was excessive. The local commander needs to establish firm control of the airspace in the JOA from the commencement of operations. CTG-59.1 should have issued interim LOCAL ACO/SPINS until guidance was approved by higher authority. • Lesson Learned: Issue local guidance until such time as it is superceded and the higher organization can have time to set up. • Recommended Action : TACRON will issue local ACO/SPINS for all future operations w/in 24 hours of tasking. UNCLASSIFIED

33. INFORMATION DISSEMINATION • Observation: Multiple Crisis web pages/portals complicated information dissemination. • Discussion:  Multiple theater and agency separate web page/portals were stood up in support of the NEO. Each portal had excellent information, but a single page with fused products would have been much more beneficial to all units executing the mission. Multiple portals with varying levels of information from multiple sources slowed dissemination of information as planners had to “hunt for the nugget” of information hidden in a forest of websites. • Lesson Learned: One single crisis specific portal should be established in which all National, Theater, and Afloat Intelligence organizations post relevant products. • Recommendation: Combatant Commanders Joint Intelligence Centers: Develop a single web page/portal ISO contingency/adhoc crisis support to provide the tactical user a single intelligence dissemination repository. RETURN TO EXEC SUMMARY UNCLASSIFIED RETURN TO INDEX

34. NEO LEBANON MED SUPPORT SUMMARY UNCLASSIFIED

35. NAVAL FORWARD COMMAND ELEMENT • Observation: CPR4 Staff did not have internal visibility of things that were going on at the embassy or at beach in order to coordinate shore to ship operations. • Discussion: During the authorized departure of American Citizens (AMCITS) from Lebanon, CPR4 Staff was relied solely on the MEU Staff to provide information, about expectations at the beach and the number of AMCITS that the ships were going to receive. CPR4 Staff did not have someone assigned to the Forward Command Element (FCE)/Evacuation Control Center (ECC) who could do an assessment of the beach and who could coordinate the shore to ship movement using the naval staff organic assets. The ship’s receiving AMCITS had no idea of who they were getting until they got onboard the ship. • Lesson learned: In order to have visibility and be part of the planning process ashore, a Naval Forward Command Element (FCE) needs to be established along with the Marine Corps FCE. • Recommendation: Recommend that a Staff augment the FCE/ECC. UNCLASSIFIED

36. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION • Observation: At the onset of a multi-theater contingency crisis, there was no centralized POC that could effectively communicate/task assets to meet intelligence collection requirements. • Discussion:  During the IPE phase of the Lebanon NEO, there was confusion regarding who to contact and what format to use when submitting collection requirements. At any given time the Joint Information Center (JIC) sifted through and had contact with a plethora of organizations to include tactical collection units, Joint Task Force Commander, NAVCENT, EUCOM and CENTCOM to submit requirements. Furthermore, each organization had different formats for collection requirements submissions. This issue was resolved after the initial days of the crisis, when the NAVCENT became our single point of entry for collections in the mutli-theater battlespace. • Lesson Learned: From the start of IPE, a single POC and format needs to be identified as the point of entry for collections requirements. • Recommendation: Component Combatant Commander Intelligence Centers must establish a single POC that has both the knowledge and authority required to task assets in a multi-theater crisis environment. Also, a single format must be used regardless of assets or theater of operations. There also needs to be a structure in place that pushes collection asset availability to the warfighter and collection target decks to prevent overlapping requirements. UNCLASSIFIED

37. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT • Observation (Issue): Supplemental requests for ROE were slow in processing for a very dynamic environment. • Discussion: A separate ROE request was made for the Lebanese NEO which needed to be approved by SECDEF. SECDEF approved the ROE supplementals on 20 Jul. CENTCOM issued its version of the supplementals on 25 Jul through a DEPORD. In addition, the ROE request was made with the assumption that the NEOs would be in a permissive environment. Due to the length of time between requests and approval and the rapidly deteriorating environment, the assumption proved to be optimistic. ROE that necessitated SECDEF approval should have been made early on. This ROE could have been withheld at the CENTCOM or NAVCENT (preferred) level until the appropriate time it was needed. Although ultimately, NEOs were not conducted in Southern Lebanon, if they had there would not have been enough time to request ROE appropriate for that environment. • Lesson Learned: Higher HQ must foresee the need to quicken the approval process for supplemental ROE. • Recommended Action: Ask for ROE early. Track the request. Make sure everyone understands the urgency of the situation. If the ROE is necessary ask for a separate message. Both SECDEF and CENTCOM issued the ROE through either EXORDs or DEPORDs. There is no requirement that the ROE be tied with these messages. So long as the ROE references the specific mission it could be issued in a stand alone message. Lawyers need to sit down with operators and think worst case scenario to better prepare for any contingency. UNCLASSIFIED

38. So…How do you spell it? HIZBOLLAH HIZBALLAH HEZBALLAH HIZB’ALLAH HIZBULLAH HEZBULLAH UNCLASSIFIED