The Great Nuclear Dream of DPRK: North Korea's Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons

1. The Great Nuclear Dream of DPRK • Why North Korea pursued a nuclear option for over 30 years • The state of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs • Kim Jong-Il political motivations and internal pressures • The current state of the North Korean regime • The possibility that Kim Jong-Il becomes a “Nuke-R-Us

2. Strategic Options 3 1 2 Agenda CurrentSituation NationalInterest Background Drivers(External) Drivers(Internal)

3. Why We Need Nukes Nuke Is Indispensable The Final Solution for Suvival Real,Constant Hostilityand Threatfrom the U.S. Agreed FrameworkProvedFraudNo LWR/Oil Fear of Being Absorbed toSouth Korea(1/40 in GDP) Axis of Evil,Saddam’sExecution IsolationUSSR dead China’s SupportWaning

4. Important Background Factors ConventionalForces (KPA) Capacity Situation Lessons ofAgreed Framework& 2000/2001 US Distractedto Iraq and Iran Memory Ideology JucheIdeology

5. New Administration in Russia (Mid-2008) Olympic Games in Beijing (Summer ’08) New Administration in South Korea New Administration in the U.S. Window of Opportunity Next 6-PartyTalk Scheduled(Mar. 19, 2007) 3 • Shutdown & Sealing of the Nuclear Facilities for Eventual Abandonment • Discussion on a list of all nuclear programs • Bilateral Talk with the U.S. and Japan • Energy, Economic, and Humanitarian Assistance. (50,000 tons of HFO Supply) 2 • 5 Working Groups Talk Begins 1 30 days 60 days Jan. 2009 Feb. 2008 Outcome of the Joint Statement

6. Plutonium: Max. 60kg (Equiv. 10 bombs) • HEU: little technological Capabilities with 20 Centrifuges East Sea Our Capacity • Considerable Biological and Chemical Weapons Capabilities

7. National Interest Extremely Important Vital Maximize Foreign Tribute KeepChina’sSupport No Regional Nuclear Arms Race DearLeader’s Wellbeing Disrupt ROK/USAlliance NuclearCapability Economic Growth Vital, Extremely Important, Important RegimeSurvivalNo Attack to Us DPRK Interest

8. Long Term (20 months/we get) • Normalize Relationship with the U.S. • Additional Economic “Tribute” from China and South Korea • What We Should Get • Long Term (20 months/we do) • Stay focused on nuclear issues only (no ballistic missiles, no Japanese abductees outside WG, no human rights, no democratization) • Maintain appearance of “good behavior” • Preserve full defense and control • Strategic Option Needed Time Frame Joint Venturewith South Korea • Short Term (60 days/we get) • Secure Initial Economic Benefit • Lift Economic Sanctions Oil • Basic Survival • Short Term (60 days/we do) • Establish appearance of compliance • Maintain military readiness Econ. Aid How the Situation Will Unfold Operational Objectives

9. China • “Big Brother” • Leadership GenerationChange – Thinner Ideological Link with us • 2008 Olympic Games • Wants to Appear a Responsible Regional Leader U.S. South Korea • “ATM,” but Their PatienceRapidly Wearing Thin • Presidential Election Scheduled Dec. 2007 • Dark Omen: Current Top 1,2,3 Runners All fromthe Conservative Opposition Party (GNP) • Unreliable: Lessons from 2000 and 2001 • Presidential Election Scheduled Nov. 2008 • Either Dem/Rep. Admin.Hard to Negotiate • “Spoiler,” Potential ATM • Abe Shinzo Brand New, So Far Being Moderate • Thorny Issue: Abductees Japan Drivers/Assumptions - External Unmissable Chance, But…the Window Is Rapidly Narrowing

10. Drivers/Assumptions - Internal How to Look “Tough?” to the Eyes of the Military? Control On TheMilitary How Can We Domestically Propagate It as Victory? National Pride Sense of Crisis Needed for Regime Cohesion, butto What Extent? Balancing Crisis How Can We Insulate Information Flow fromOutsEconomic Tribute from Outside ide and Hold the People’s Discontent in Check? – Tight Control on People

11. Option Summary • Hide-and-Seek - Save for rainy day • All-in (5 vs. U.S.) – Try to Look Complying • Another Salami: Next Card for Another Carrot

12. Option 1: Hide-and-Seek Pro/Con What Should We Do? • Bitter History of 1994 Agreed Framework and 2000/2001: We Don’t Trust U.S. and Need It • Give up least, receive most • Domestically strong move • Too risky: Got caught, we lose everything • Give justification to • the U.S. allegation that we are unreliable. • Clearest Path towards Nuclear Japan and S.Korea (if revealed) • Exclude HEU from the Joint Declaration for the 60 days 1.잠재 고객 Short Term • Overstate plutonium spent in the past to save more Short Term • Constrain IAEA inspectors focused on Yongbyon and Taechon Short Term • Refuse to do beyond freezing until tangible compensation is made Long Term • Continue clandestine HEU research until revealed Long Term Hide-and-Seek

13. Option 2: All-In Pro/Con What Should We Do? • We’re responsible, hence more incentives expected (Libya redux) • Undercut the U.S. effort to isolate us • True to Great Leader’s Dying Injuction • Strike Capability Still Intactwith Conventional Weapons • Most Vulnerable Option - Losing the Kingpin Chip • Weakest Stance - Military Discomfort - National Pride Lost - Seen as Capitulation to External Forces • Declare all plutonium, Admit some HEU program 1.잠재 고객 Short Term • Open all sites for inspection (except for one, two military sites) • Full cooperation with IAEA Short Term • Constant recitation of compliance & transparency - Strong diplomatic push for aid Long Term • Shifted Focus from Nuke to Money Long Term • Isolate the U.S.: 5 vs. the U.S. • Show a good impression Long Term All-In

14. Option 3: Another Salami (Recommended) Pro/Con What Should We Do? • True to the Text, We’re Not to Blame and Welcome Another Negotiation - Cooperating in Other Areas. None Will Want to Break the Momentum • Difficult to predict additional benefit from other parties • Potential fraying relations with other parties (fatigue) • Balancing between difficult • Seeming to be compliant might not work – could be the worst outcome • Be True to the Text: NCND 1.잠재 고객 Short Term • Drag the Feet and Show Full Compliance as Written, not the HEU Short Term • Moderate and give concessions based on political calendars Long Term • Save the HEU Card until a new U.S.Administration Gets Sworn in Long Term • Use HEU for the next bargain chip for peace regime and aid Long Term Another Salami

15. Policy Evaluation and Recommendation 1 Hide and Seek Medium Highest Very High Medium DomesticConsensus? Feasible? Risk?(if failed) Benefit? 2 Easy Low Low High All-In AnotherSalami 3 Medium Medium Low High

16. Policy Implementation Plan • When Pushed to the Corner, Try to Appear a Honest Negotiator • Use HEU as a Bargaining Chip for Peace Accord and more Aid After Jan. ‘09 Till Jan. ‘09 • When Asked, Hint We’re Willing to negotiate with next administration • Take conciliatory stance to South Korea to Influence the Presidential Election • Secure as much Tribute as Possible In 60 Days • Welcome IAEA Inspectors, Look Friendly • Actively Engage in Working Groups Talk, Keep Momentum Next 6 Party Talk • Maintain Momentum – Be Cooperative • Stick to the Text – Avoid HEU, Abductees, etc • Pursue Bilateral Incentives through 5 WG

17. Appendix: NK Capability • More Information Needed • Full Economic Impact under UNSCR 1718 • Energy Scarcity • Electricity Production Level: 30 TW (cf. South Korea: 370TW) • Electric Consumption per capita: 0.71 TOE (Tons of Energy in terms of oil. Cf. South Korea: 4.6 TOE) • Food shortage Given at Next Slide • 400,000 tons of Food and Medical Aid ($70 million) from South Korea (2006) • 350,000 tons of Fertilizer ($209 million) from South Korea (2006) • $4.4 million by U.N. (suspended after the nuclear test) • $2 billion from China • Numbers of Defectors to South Korea • 1,193 (2002), 1,894 (2004), 1,383 (2005), 1,054 (til mid 2006) • Cumulative numbers of North Korean Defectors to South Korea: more than 10,000 as of 2006 July • Estimated 5,000 ~ 10,000 in China

18. Appendix: Food Shortage

19. Appendix: Verbatim • We Don’t Have Intention to Build Nuclear Weapons, Let Alone Running (Nuclear Arms) Race with Our Big Neighbors. As the Weapons Can Obliterate the Entire Nation, We Don’t Want To Build Nuclear Weapons • Kim, Il-sung, 1992 • You Called Us One of Axis of Evil. You Mocked Our Dear Leader. Your Forces Have Been Deployed on the Korean Peninsula and Constant Threat To Us. We are entitled to more than that (if you force us) • Kang Sok-ju, when asked by James Kelly whether they are seeking HEU program, Oct 16, 2002 • Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is still effective; It was the dying injunction of the Great Leader, Kim Il-sung. As the U.S. despises and threatens us, however, we are forced to have it. • Kim Jong-il, in a talk with South Korean unification minister. June 17, 2005 • Thanks to our nuclear program, the Yankee Imperialists (sic) cannot attack us. So China should be grateful to the DPRK for stability in the region • Kang Sok-ju, when cornered by Chinese official, August 2005

20. Appendix: Economic analysis • 30 Million in circulation with counterfeit money • Missile sales: Sold to Pakistan, Libya, Syria, and Iran – Established proliferation block