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Access Safety Systems Modifications & tests in 2006

Access Safety Systems Modifications & tests in 2006. Presented by Rui Nunes TS-CSE-AAS. Topics. Introduction SPS project organisation SPS Primary Access System INB Constraints Project & Implications for 2006 (and beyond...) SPS from CCC PS Primary Access System Control from CCC / CSA

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Access Safety Systems Modifications & tests in 2006

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  1. Access Safety SystemsModifications & tests in 2006 Presented by Rui Nunes TS-CSE-AAS PS & SPS Days

  2. Topics • Introduction • SPS project organisation • SPS Primary Access System • INB Constraints • Project & Implications for 2006 (and beyond...) • SPS from CCC • PS Primary Access System • Control from CCC / CSA • Long-term plan & constraints • PS & SPS Experimental Areas Access System • Ongoing project PS & SPS Days

  3. Introduction • TS-CSE-AAS (all projects) • PS team : R. Bonzano, D. Chapuis • SPS team : M. Grill, R. Villard • SPS Projects • SPS Primary system reengineering • P. Lienard : Project Leader • G. Robin, C. Arimatea – AB/OP collaborators • SPS INB documentation and safety studies • E. Manola-Poggioli • S. Grau • PS Projects • PS  CCC • F. Havart, L. Hammouti, O. Ratcliffe, J. Duran-Lopez - AB/OP • (S)PS Experimental Areas • H. Nissen, F. Havart PS & SPS Days

  4. SPS Access Safety System - INB • The SPS is now considered as part of an INB • “Installations Nucléaire de Base” • Compliance problem • current SPS Access Safety System is • PLC-based • Not redundant • Does not comply with the major criteria sought by the INB authorities : • Common cause of failure PS & SPS Days

  5. SPS Access Safety System • Compensatory measures • Phase 1 - 2006 During Run • Interlocking of 4 critical access doors in AUG !! • Blocking / Condemning all other doors • SPS Reengineering • Phase 2 - 2006-2007 shutdown • Development of a separate cabled loop to provide redundancy to PLC system (like LHC) • Preparing for complete replacement of SPS Access Safety & Access Control Systems • Phase 3 - 2007 and beyond • Deploy new access control in a phased manner PS & SPS Days

  6. ATTENTION !! Ouverture de cette Porte provoque AUG PS & SPS Days

  7. VETO Access VETO Beam PS & SPS Days

  8. SPS from CCC Consoles are being put in place as we speak • “Old” LEP consoles (ugly consoles – sorry…) • Will stay until new SPS access system is functional • 1 day access interruption to reconnect cables and test Drawing by M. Grill PS & SPS Days

  9. SPS from CCC • SPS Access system has to be completely re-tested after 1 year of complete shutdown • 2 weeks technical verification • 3 days final testing before run • Operation guidelines shall be given to AB/OP by project team • Patrol before run • Opening of machine PS & SPS Days

  10. PS Primary Access Safety System PS & SPS Days

  11. PLC-based safety signals Key interlocks Via optical fibres Supervision Hardwired  Virtual Hardwired console replaced by TIM Virtual console CCC or CSA (not both) Possibility to delegate to CSA if needed during shutdown No beam operation possible from CSA PS from CCC Drawing by R. Bonzano PS & SPS Days

  12. PS from CCC • Control from CSA since November 2005 • Control from CCC planned from 4/Feb/2006 Drawing by R. Bonzano “Genevoise” in MCR TIM Virtual Console in CCC PS & SPS Days

  13. PS Primary Access in the Long term • PS Access system is an ageing system • Has suffered many modifications and has many layers due to different technology for each modification • Must be replaced soon • Not possible to maintain actual system much longer • Should be replaced by LHC-type Access • Main difficulty • PS has doors not “SAS” or turnstiles • Doors do not guarantee unique passage • Solution • Either install “sas” or turnstiles • Or accept CCC operator supervision (maybe not acceptable) • In any case investment is high but necessary • Risk is high : no PS  no SPS  no LHC beams PS & SPS Days

  14. PS Experimental Areas • Project to revamp PS Experimental areas has continued • Delayed by the PS CCC project • Implementation objective : • AD Experimental area access control for 2006 Run • East Hall revamp during 2006-7 shutdown • Extension to SPS if according to need • Safety PLC-based system • 1 PLC per zone • 1 master PLC concentrator per “Super Zone” • Interface by physical pin matrix for zone re-configuration • Documentation available for the moment • EDMS URD : 476292, SRD : 478678, ADD : 503535 • Accounts for requirements of PS and SPS • can be supervised remotely by the CCC via TIM PS & SPS Days

  15. Drawing by R. Nunes & Access team PS & SPS Days

  16. Conclusion • CCC • No major problems in sight, but last phase due in the coming weeks • SPS Primary • Tight schedule constraints and uncertainties as to SPS Access Control system renovation • PS Primary • We have made the last major change (CCC) that will ever be made before renovation is due • (S)PS Experimental areas • A project constantly delayed by other projects PS & SPS Days

  17. Thank you for your attention Questions? (hopefully answers too…..) PS & SPS Days

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