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Threat of Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material

Threat of Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material. Outline. Objectives Nuclear Weapons and Devices Radiological Devices Evaluation of the nuclear security threat Conclusion. Objectives. Identify the RN threats: Nuclear weapons and devices Radiological devices

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Threat of Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material

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  1. Threat of Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material

  2. Outline • Objectives • Nuclear Weapons and Devices • Radiological Devices • Evaluation of the nuclear security threat • Conclusion

  3. Objectives • Identify the RN threats: • Nuclear weapons and devices • Radiological devices • Identify types of materials used in nuclear weapons and devices • Identify materials suitable for radiological devices • Evaluate the nuclear threat

  4. Identify the RN Threat What do we protect against? • Nuclear Weapons • Improvised Nuclear Devices (IND) • Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) • Radiological Exposure Devices (RED)

  5. Nuclear weapons and devices

  6. Brief history of nuclear weapons • United States (1945) • USSR (1949) • United Kingdom (1952) • France (1960) • China (1964) • India (1974) • Pakistan (1998) • North Korea (claim, test 2006)

  7. Nuclear weapons • Stolen military warhead with initialization device • High destruction • 100.000ds of killed and wounded people • wide ranged exposure and • contamination

  8. HEU-based gun-type device Principle: • The critical mass is separated in two subcritical masses • An explosion brings the two pieces together • At the same time the two components of the neutron trigger Po-Be get in touch in order to initiate the reaction Explosive Trigger: Be & Po 2 subcritical masses

  9. Pu-based implosion device Principle: • The entire mass is in a subcritical configuration • An explosion compresses the mass to a high density critical configuration • SF neutrons are always present in Pu Explosive Tamper/ Reflector Subcritical Pu core

  10. Improvised Nuclear Device – IND • Self-made nuclear device: • HEU and Plutonium from nuclear fuel cycle • Redesigned military warhead • High destruction • 10.000nds of people killed and wounded • wide ranged exposure and contamination

  11. Material used in nuclear weapons and devices • Critical mass depends on bomb design and reflector material • Uranium-235: • HEU (> 90% U-235): 12-50 kg • HEU (20% U-235): 400 kg • Plutonium-239 • Weapons grade Plutonium (> 93% Pu-239): 6-10 kg • Uranium-233: about 15 kg • Other materials • Conventional explosive material, detonators and initiation technology

  12. Uranium-235 • Natural uranium contains 0.7% of the fissile isotope U-235 • To make a nuclear weapon it is necessary to raise U-235 content up to at least 20% (HEU), but preferably >90% (wg-HEU) • The process to increase the content of an isotope in a material is called enrichment • Possible enrichment processes: gas diffusion, gas centrifuge, laser,… • In commercial nuclear fuel U-235 is enriched <5% (LEU) and cannot be used for nuclear weapon • Some research reactors and naval propulsion reactors use fuel based on HEU • IAEA significant quantity is 25 kg

  13. Plutonium-239 • Plutonium does not exist in nature • Pu is generated in nuclear reactors by the irradiation of uranium with neutrons • After reactor irradiation Pu is contained in spent fuel along with other fission products (highly radioactive) • Plutonium extracted from spent fuel through sophisticated chemical processes • Pu from commercial reactors has an isotopic composition not favorable to design a nuclear weapon • Weapon-grade Pu is produced in dedicated military reactors • IAEA significant quantity is 8 kg Tungsten sphere approximate size of IAEA significant quantity of Plutonium

  14. Radiological devices

  15. Radiological Dispersal Device – RDD • High contamination and distribution rate • Low effect to public’s physically health, • High effect on public’s mentally situation, mass panic and disruption? • High effect to economy, • High restoration costs • Examples of dispersal: • Explosion (Dirty Bomb) • Air circulation (air condition, subway stations) • Agriculture aircrafts

  16. Radiological Exposure Device – RED • Radioactive material placed in tactical location • Provides high exposure rate to public. • Only a small group of people will get harmed or killed

  17. Materials suitable for RDD • Source Material • Special Nuclear Material (SNM) • Radioactive Sources • Low activity sources • Industrial sources (Sr-90,Cs-137, Co-60, Ir-192, Se-75 ) • Instruments with radioactive sources • Medical sources • Sterilization • Radioisotope Thermal Generators (RTGs) • Spent fuel, high level waste • Good dispersal probabilities (e.g. CsCl) Three forms of Uranium Plutonium powder Calibration sources Reactor Fuel pellets Radiography instrument RTG Well logging source

  18. Material suitable for RED • Size of radioactive material could be several mm3 only • Example: Cs-137 with 100 TBq, exposure time 1 hour: • Dose at 1m distance > 7 Sv – dead within 2 weeks • Dose at 2,7 m distance about 1 Sv – radiation sickness • Dose at 8 m distance about 115 mSv – theoretically higher probability to get late effects (cancer) Cs-137 148 GBq8x12 mm

  19. Summary of Elements for NW/IND/RDD/RED

  20. Nuclear Security Threat Evaluation

  21. Nuclear Material: How much is there? • Under IAEA Safeguards • Plutonium: • 795 tonnes in irradiated fuel • 89 tonnes separated • 14 tonnes separated in reactor fuel • Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU >= 20%) • 32 tonnes • Low Enriched Uranium (LEU is < 20%): • 54875 tonnes • Not Under Safeguards (Military and non-Safeguard States) • Weapons states have many hundreds of tons of Weapon Grade Plutonium and HEU

  22. Radioactive Material: How much is there? • There are millions of radioactive sources in use in the world • Over 3,000 Medical Tele-therapy Units, 120,000 Brachytherapy Facilities • 50,000 Radiography Facilities; Over 100 Commercial Irradiators; 500,000 industrial sites • Tremendous Number of Shipments • 20,000,000 per year

  23. The likelihood equation Consequences Likelihood • Seizure of Nuclear Weapons– of particular concern are thousands of deployed and stored nuclear weapons and materials • Theft or Purchase of Fissile Material to Build a Nuclear Explosive Device– animprovised nuclear device (IND) • Attack on or Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities, including nuclear power plants spent fuel storage sites or weapons production facility • Manufacture of Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs) (such as dirty bombs)

  24. Factors to be considered for MEST • Number of sources • Quantity (activity) • Half-life • Radio toxicity (, ,  or n) • Form • Accessibility • Dispersal method

  25. Conclusion • Too much nuclear and radioactive material is not properly secured. • Known interest of terrorists to acquire such material • Possible criminal and intentional unauthorized acts involving such material is a continuing worldwide threat. • Even though nuclear terrorism does not stop at national borders, the responsibility for establishing an appropriate nuclear security regime rests entirely with individual States

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