Threat of Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material

1. Threat of Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material

2. Outline • Objectives • Nuclear Weapons and Devices • Radiological Devices • Evaluation of the nuclear security threat • Conclusion

3. Objectives • Identify the RN threats: • Nuclear weapons and devices • Radiological devices • Identify types of materials used in nuclear weapons and devices • Identify materials suitable for radiological devices • Evaluate the nuclear threat

4. Identify the RN Threat What do we protect against? • Nuclear Weapons • Improvised Nuclear Devices (IND) • Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD) • Radiological Exposure Devices (RED)

5. Nuclear weapons and devices

6. Brief history of nuclear weapons • United States (1945) • USSR (1949) • United Kingdom (1952) • France (1960) • China (1964) • India (1974) • Pakistan (1998) • North Korea (claim, test 2006)

7. Nuclear weapons • Stolen military warhead with initialization device • High destruction • 100.000ds of killed and wounded people • wide ranged exposure and • contamination

8. HEU-based gun-type device Principle: • The critical mass is separated in two subcritical masses • An explosion brings the two pieces together • At the same time the two components of the neutron trigger Po-Be get in touch in order to initiate the reaction Explosive Trigger: Be & Po 2 subcritical masses

9. Pu-based implosion device Principle: • The entire mass is in a subcritical configuration • An explosion compresses the mass to a high density critical configuration • SF neutrons are always present in Pu Explosive Tamper/ Reflector Subcritical Pu core

10. Improvised Nuclear Device – IND • Self-made nuclear device: • HEU and Plutonium from nuclear fuel cycle • Redesigned military warhead • High destruction • 10.000nds of people killed and wounded • wide ranged exposure and contamination

11. Material used in nuclear weapons and devices • Critical mass depends on bomb design and reflector material • Uranium-235: • HEU (> 90% U-235): 12-50 kg • HEU (20% U-235): 400 kg • Plutonium-239 • Weapons grade Plutonium (> 93% Pu-239): 6-10 kg • Uranium-233: about 15 kg • Other materials • Conventional explosive material, detonators and initiation technology

12. Uranium-235 • Natural uranium contains 0.7% of the fissile isotope U-235 • To make a nuclear weapon it is necessary to raise U-235 content up to at least 20% (HEU), but preferably >90% (wg-HEU) • The process to increase the content of an isotope in a material is called enrichment • Possible enrichment processes: gas diffusion, gas centrifuge, laser,… • In commercial nuclear fuel U-235 is enriched <5% (LEU) and cannot be used for nuclear weapon • Some research reactors and naval propulsion reactors use fuel based on HEU • IAEA significant quantity is 25 kg

13. Plutonium-239 • Plutonium does not exist in nature • Pu is generated in nuclear reactors by the irradiation of uranium with neutrons • After reactor irradiation Pu is contained in spent fuel along with other fission products (highly radioactive) • Plutonium extracted from spent fuel through sophisticated chemical processes • Pu from commercial reactors has an isotopic composition not favorable to design a nuclear weapon • Weapon-grade Pu is produced in dedicated military reactors • IAEA significant quantity is 8 kg Tungsten sphere approximate size of IAEA significant quantity of Plutonium

14. Radiological devices

15. Radiological Dispersal Device – RDD • High contamination and distribution rate • Low effect to public’s physically health, • High effect on public’s mentally situation, mass panic and disruption? • High effect to economy, • High restoration costs • Examples of dispersal: • Explosion (Dirty Bomb) • Air circulation (air condition, subway stations) • Agriculture aircrafts

16. Radiological Exposure Device – RED • Radioactive material placed in tactical location • Provides high exposure rate to public. • Only a small group of people will get harmed or killed

17. Materials suitable for RDD • Source Material • Special Nuclear Material (SNM) • Radioactive Sources • Low activity sources • Industrial sources (Sr-90,Cs-137, Co-60, Ir-192, Se-75 ) • Instruments with radioactive sources • Medical sources • Sterilization • Radioisotope Thermal Generators (RTGs) • Spent fuel, high level waste • Good dispersal probabilities (e.g. CsCl) Three forms of Uranium Plutonium powder Calibration sources Reactor Fuel pellets Radiography instrument RTG Well logging source

18. Material suitable for RED • Size of radioactive material could be several mm3 only • Example: Cs-137 with 100 TBq, exposure time 1 hour: • Dose at 1m distance > 7 Sv – dead within 2 weeks • Dose at 2,7 m distance about 1 Sv – radiation sickness • Dose at 8 m distance about 115 mSv – theoretically higher probability to get late effects (cancer) Cs-137 148 GBq8x12 mm

19. Summary of Elements for NW/IND/RDD/RED

20. Nuclear Security Threat Evaluation

21. Nuclear Material: How much is there? • Under IAEA Safeguards • Plutonium: • 795 tonnes in irradiated fuel • 89 tonnes separated • 14 tonnes separated in reactor fuel • Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU >= 20%) • 32 tonnes • Low Enriched Uranium (LEU is < 20%): • 54875 tonnes • Not Under Safeguards (Military and non-Safeguard States) • Weapons states have many hundreds of tons of Weapon Grade Plutonium and HEU

22. Radioactive Material: How much is there? • There are millions of radioactive sources in use in the world • Over 3,000 Medical Tele-therapy Units, 120,000 Brachytherapy Facilities • 50,000 Radiography Facilities; Over 100 Commercial Irradiators; 500,000 industrial sites • Tremendous Number of Shipments • 20,000,000 per year

23. The likelihood equation Consequences Likelihood • Seizure of Nuclear Weapons– of particular concern are thousands of deployed and stored nuclear weapons and materials • Theft or Purchase of Fissile Material to Build a Nuclear Explosive Device– animprovised nuclear device (IND) • Attack on or Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities, including nuclear power plants spent fuel storage sites or weapons production facility • Manufacture of Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs) (such as dirty bombs)

24. Factors to be considered for MEST • Number of sources • Quantity (activity) • Half-life • Radio toxicity (, ,  or n) • Form • Accessibility • Dispersal method

25. Conclusion • Too much nuclear and radioactive material is not properly secured. • Known interest of terrorists to acquire such material • Possible criminal and intentional unauthorized acts involving such material is a continuing worldwide threat. • Even though nuclear terrorism does not stop at national borders, the responsibility for establishing an appropriate nuclear security regime rests entirely with individual States