The State

1. The State

2. 1. Transition from Civil Society to the State Institutional overlap between civil society and political state (legal system, police) Civil society contains institutions that aim at common good and therefore stand above particular interests (separate interests that individuals have as private persons) Police and corporation ‘care for the particular interest as a common interest’ (§ 188) Common good = a good that cannot be reduced to an aggregation of the particular and separate interests of individuals It is the common good of the political community as a whole (private goods v. public goods)

3. The necessity of political state is shown by the way in which a power over everything particular turns out to be a condition of civil society Without the state, civil society generates problems that would lead to its own destruction But the police ‘remains an external order’ (§ 231) What the police provides for in the first instance is the actualization and preservation of the universal which is contained within the particularity of civil society, [and it does so] as an external order and arrangement for the protection and security of the masses of particular ends and interests which have their subsistence in this universal. (§ 249R)

4. The particular (subjectivity) and the universal (ethical substance) stand in an ‘external’ relation to each other, in the sense that the former does not directly identify itself with the latter Rather, the state and its institutions are regarded in purely instrumental terms, as the means of achieving security, being able to pursue one’s own interests effectively, etc. To remain at this standpoint is to confuse the state with civil society :

5. If the state is confused with civil society and its determination is equated with the security and protection of property and personal freedom, the interest of individuals as such becomes the ultimate end for which they are united … But the relationship of the state to the individual is of quite a different kind. Since the state is objective spirit, it is only through being a member of the state that the individual himself has objectivity, truth, and ethical life. Union as such is itself the true content and end, and the destiny of human beings is to lead a universal life; their further particular satisfaction, activity, and mode of conduct, have this substantial and universally valid basis as their point of departure and result. – Considered in the abstract, rationality consists in general in the unity and interpenetration of universality and individuality. Here, in a concrete sense and in terms of its content, it consists in the unity of objective freedom (i.e. of the universal substantial will) and subjective freedom (as the freedom of individual knowledge and of the will in its pursuit of particular ends. (§ 258R)

6. (1) It transcends the particular interests of individuals and does not exist only to secure and protect these interests (2) Individuals make the common good (or general interest) of the political whole of which they are members into the direct object of their willing The ‘universal’ is therefore no longer simply a means but is itself the end Union is not, therefore, a matter of aggregation based on the arbitrary choice to enter into society with others so as to secure and protect one’s interests (as Hegel thinks is the case with social contract theory) (3) Only in making the universal into the direct object of their willing and actions do individuals fully realize themselves as free and rational agents

7. (4) Given (1) and (2), the ethical substance assumes primacy in relation to the particular needs, interests etc. that constitute individuals’ ends in civil society (this primacy becomes manifest in times of war) The satisfaction of these ends is conditioned by the ethical substance, which is taken to be valid independently of these individuals’ own wills [T]his ultimate end possesses the highest right in relation to individuals, whose highest duty is to be members of the state. (§ 258) Thus, at the level of the political state, the unity of the subjective and the objective (or particularity and universality) which characterises ethical life and rationality more generally becomes fully manifest: ‘The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea’. (§ 257)

8. (5) Identification with the universal as such must nevertheless accommodate, and therefore be mediated by, particularity (unity of objective and subjective freedom): The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. But concrete freedom [unity of objective and subjective freedom, DJ] requires that personal individuality and its particular interests should reach their full development and gain recognition of their right for itself (within the system of the family and of civil society), and also that they should, on the one hand, pass over of their own accord into the interest of the universal, and on the other, knowingly and willingly acknowledge this universal interest even as their own substantial spirit, and actively pursue it as their ultimate end. (§ 260)

9. How can particular interests ‘pass over’ into universal interests in such a way that individuals come consciously (‘knowingly’) to identify themselves with and to will (‘willingly’) the latter as the direct and final (‘ultimate’) end of their actions? This implies some kind of spontaneously achieved, unintended result, whereby the particular and the universal become bound up with each other in such a way that the latter becomes the direct object of the former Is the corporation the institution which explains this process and result, and thus the transition from civil society to the state?

10. Corporation as mediating institution Individuals come to pursue more consciously the common good embodied in the corporation, even though this common good may have been the unintended outcome of the self-interest which animates civil society Corporation comes into existence through individuals seeking to further their interests once they have recognised that the truly effective pursuit of these same interests demands that they join forces with others who have similar interests The common interest of the corporation must, however, be consciously willed if this institution is to fulfil its original purpose Its members will have to exhibit such qualities as a sense of commitment and a willingness to sacrifice their purely particular interests for the sake of the interests of the corporation as a whole

11. Association itself becomes something of intrinsic value Thus the corporation represents a form of association whose individual members consciously identify themselves with the universal will embodied in this form of association and regard this form of association itself as one of their fundamental ends However, while the corporation is a form of association that is universal in relation to the wills of its members, it remains particular in relation to the political state: The end of the corporation, which is limited and finite, has its truth in the end which is universal in and for itself and in the absolute actuality of this end. (§ 256)

12. Is, then, the necessity of the transition from civil society to the state really immanent to PR? In relation to the spheres of civil law and private welfare, the spheres of the family and civil society, the state is on the one hand an external necessity and the higher power to whose nature their laws and interests are subordinate and on which they depend. But on the other hand, it is their immanent end. (§ 261)

13. Question of corresponding disposition (subjective aspect of ethical life) The ‘political’ disposition or ‘patriotism in general’, though typically habitual is justified, because it stems from the rationality of institutions within the state This disposition is in general one of trust (which may pass over into more or less educated insight), or the consciousness that my substantial and particular interest is preserved and contained in the interest and end of an other (in this case, the state). As a result, this other immediately ceases to be an other for me, and in my consciousness of this, I am free. (§ 268)

14. A matter of comprehension based on awareness of identity of my interests with interests of the state of which I am a citizen and of acting in accordance with this awareness Political virtue = ‘the willing of that thought end which has being in and for itself’ (§ 258) Consciously making the universal as such into the direct end of one’s activity Hegel seems to associate this political virtue with particular estates, especially the universal estate of bureaucrats and high-ranking government officials, which has ‘the universal interests of society as its business’. (§ 205)

15. Doesn’t the act of making ‘union as such’ into ‘the true content and end’ of one’s consciousness and will so as ‘to lead a universal life’ require direct political activity and participation? Yet Hegel recognises that many members of the modern state will lack any direct political role or form of activity Rather, for many people the corporation forms the limits of activity directed towards the universal: In our modern states, the citizens have only a limited share in the universal business of the state; but it is necessary to provide ethical man with a universal activity in addition to his private end. This universal [activity], which the modern state does not always offer him, can be found in the corporation. (§ 255A)

16. 2. The Constitution Constitution of state as a whole (that is, state as politically organised community) (1) Constitution in ‘the realm of particularity’ (§ 265) Comprises family and civil society as ‘the pillars on which public freedom rests, for it is within them that particular freedom is realized and rational’. (2) The political state Has its own constitution (form of internal organisation)

17. (i) Legislative power – universality Two houses: Higher, unelected – made up of members of ‘substantial’ estate – landed nobility with entailed property Lower, elected – made up of deputies elected by corporations (to avoid atomisation of society) Monarch has a legislative role to play as power of final decision, as does the executive in form of his ministers (ii) Executive power – particularity High-ranking civil servants, government officials and monarch’s ministers – state bureaucracy

18. (iii) The sovereign or ‘princely power’ - individuality Constitutional monarch as head of state and bearer and personification of sovereignty Hegel begins with monarch, thereby reversing order of moments of logical concept Wish to emphasize role and power of monarch? The monarch must rule in accordance with the constitution and base decisions on advice of ministers Wish to emphasize unity of state? Legislative, executive and ‘princely’ powers separated but united in the person of the monarch

19. The ‘political constitution’: ‘the organism of the state’, whose ‘different aspects are accordingly the various powers [within the state] with their corresponding tasks and functions, through which the universal continually produces itself’ (§ 269) The state conceived as self-sufficient and self-producing whole, whose members, through their activity, produce the whole whose particular functional requirements determine their actions and relations to each other The internal organisation of this whole ‘determined by the nature of the concept’ (presumably the concept of the will)

20. The constitution of a state will depend on customs, historical factors, religion etc. which shape the dispositions of its members A ‘rational’ constitution of the kind outlined in PR may not, therefore, be applicable to all nations Rather, ‘Each nation … has the constitution appropriate and proper to it’. (§ 274) Thus, PR itself would appear to presuppose a certain level of cultural and historical development together with appropriate type of ethical disposition

21. 3. The state and religion Hegel often ascribes divine attributes to the state: The state consists in the march of God in the world, and its basis is the power of reason actualizing itself as will. In considering the Idea of the state, we must not have any particular states or particular institutions in mind; instead, we should consider the Idea, this actual God, in its own right. (§ 258A) We should therefore venerate the state as an earthly divinity. (§ 272A) Is this merely a rhetorical move? (Such claims tend to be found in student lecture notes)

22. This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a Common-Wealth, in latineCivitas. This is the Generation of the great Leviathan, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortal God, our peace and defence. (Hobbes, Leviathan) Given the importance of its members’ dispositions, does the state depend on religion? (Hegel as apologist for Prussian ‘Christian’ state) Or has modern state emancipated itself from its Christian origins to become the secular state (profane realm distinct from realm of grace)?

23. Although true religion (as a form of absolute spirit) represents a higher standpoint than the state (objective spirit) in Hegel’s system, the latter has its own rights in relation to the former (1) It provides a bulwark against religious fanaticism (subjectivism), which may assume a hostile attitude towards the state (2) In order to do this, the state must be accorded an objective validity based on reason that makes it independent of the subjectivity of religious feeling and faith (3) In this respect, the state stands above religious differences

24. (4) Religion may nevertheless help to foster an appropriate disposition towards the state in people: … since religion is that moment which integrates the state at the deepest level of the disposition [of its citizens], the state ought even to require all its citizens to belong to such a community – but to any community they please, for the state can have no say in the content [of religious belief] in so far as this relates to the inner dimension of representational thought. (§ 270R) While atheism is to be avoided, religious toleration may even be extended to sects (e.g. Quakers, Anabaptists) whose religious beliefs conflict with some of their direct duties as citizens The capacity to tolerate such sects is a sign of the strength of the state

25. Religious doctrine (in so far as it does not have harmful external consequences) is not the province of the state Conversely, the state has no obligation to recognize the teachings of any religion simply on the basis of religious authority Thus Hegel appears to reject the idea of unity of the Church and the state Yet elsewhere he suggests that the disposition associated with Protestantism is a condition of the modern form of ethical life This is because Protestantism (unlike Catholicism) recognises the moment of subjective freedom (freedom of conscience, absence of external religious authority) Protestantism also does not oppose religion to ethical life (e.g. it rejects celibacy, accepts the need for individuals to work and to participate in society, etc.)

26. Religious reformation is a condition of effective and lasting social and political reform Revolutionary France is an example of where this has not happened In Protestant states there is a unity of religion and the state, which is to be explained in terms of the concept of freedom Immediate unity – theocracy Division – Catholicism Reconstituted unity based on freedom – Protestantism and modern state Religious toleration and independence of the state vis-à-vis religion are themselves expressions of a principle common to religion and the state, and whose origin is a religious one