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RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR POWER AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21st CENTURY

Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference PLUTONIUM UTILIZATION IN REACTOR FUEL A. Zrodnikov Director General State Scientific Center of the Russian Federation “ Institute for Physics and Power Engineering” September 18-20, 2003.

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RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR POWER AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21st CENTURY

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  1. Second Moscow International Nonproliferation ConferencePLUTONIUM UTILIZATIONIN REACTOR FUELA. ZrodnikovDirector General State Scientific Center of the Russian Federation“ Institute for Physics and Power Engineering”September 18-20, 2003

  2. RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR POWER AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21st CENTURY • Operating nuclear power plants • RBMK-1000 (11) • VVER- 440 (6) • VVER-1000 (7+1) • EGP-6 (4) • BN-600 (1) • Transport power systems • Research reactors • Nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure

  3. NUCLEAR POWER STRATEGY • Maintenance of safe and efficient functioning of operating NPPs and fuel infrastructure. • Progressive replacement of operating NPPs with 3-rd generation traditional power units, a moderate increase of generating capacity in the first quarter of the 21st century; expanding the export potential. • Development and introduction of innovative economically competitive reactor and nuclear fuel cycle technologies.

  4. LARGE SCALE NUCLEAR POWER FOR THE 21st CENTURY • Liquid-metal cooled fast reactors of inherent safety • Proliferation-resistant closed fuel cycle • Reduce the volume and long-term toxicity of nuclear wastes and radiation-balanced disposal of radwastes • Technological support for non-proliferation • Economic competitiveness

  5. SMALL AND MEDIUM REACTORS • No on-site refueling and sophisticated nuclear infrastructure, long-lived core lasting 10…20 years • Completely sealed reactor, transportable to and from the site • 50 to 150 MWe class, fuel enrichment  20% • Simplified design, high level of passive safety • Cost comparable to the cost of competitive systems

  6. SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: CURRENT STATUS • Short - term storage in cooling ponds • Accumulation and interim “wet” storage for subsequent placement in long-term centralized “dry” storage • Radiochemical reprocessing with U and Pu separation followed by their involvement in the fuel cycle

  7. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE USE OFPLUTONIUM STOCKS • Plutonium, as a nuclear material, has a unique energy potential, it is a national asset, and it can be put to maximum effective use under Russia’s national energy strategy • The ultimate strategic goal is to make full use of plutonium’s energy potential, with the waste converted to a state, that makes it unusable for subsequent weapons-production and ensures their secure ecological isolation • Once approved, plans for plutonium utilization must be implemented in a manner which ensures that it is stored, transported and handled in accordance with the highest national and international standards in terms of nuclear safety, ecology, physical protection, accounting and control

  8. PLUTONIUM CONTAINED IN SPENT FUEL Totals for the country As of December 31, 1999 • Plutonium contained in spent fuel at civil reactor sites 47 000kg • Plutonium contained in spent fuel at reprocessing plants 4 000kg • Plutonium contained in spent fuel kept elsewhere 20 000kg

  9. CIVIL UNIRRADIATED PLUTONIUM As of December 31, 1999 • Unirradiated separated plutonium in product storage facilities at reprocessing plants 30 900kg • Unirradiated separated plutonium in manufacturing or fabrication and the plutonium contained in unirradiated products at fuel fabrication or other plants or elsewhere - • Plutonium in unirradiated MOX fuel or other fabricated products at reactor sites or elsewhere 200kg • Unirradiated separated plutonium kept elsewhere 900kg The quantities of Pu withdrawn from the military sphere will be declared when placed in storage at PA “Mayak”

  10. EX-WEAPONS PLUTONIUM MANAGEMENT CONCEPT • Reliable and controllable interim storage • In-pile transformation, including MOX-forms, into spent fuel with subsequent utilization in the proliferation-resistant closed fuel cycle

  11. HISTORY BR-5 (1959); BR-10;Obninsk BOR-60 (1966);Dimitrovgrad BN-350 (1972);Kazakhstan BN-600 (1980);Urals BN-800 (1992, design)

  12. 120REACTOR/YEARS EXPERIENCE:BR-10, BOR-60, BN-350, BN-600 • Major technological problems have been already solved • 5000 MOX fuel rods have been irradiated • Closed fuel cycle is realized for BOR-60 • Pyrochemical technology and vibro-compacted MOX can significantly decrease cost and terms • Advanced design of BN-800 is available

  13. BN-600 NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR Electricity to the consumer Transformer Control rods Steam generator Generator Turbine Cooling water pond Condenser Circulation pump Feedwater pump Fuel Main coolant pump of the secondary circuit Main coolant pump of the primary circuit

  14. BN-800 REACTOR 1 - primary pump 2 - large rotating plug 3 - refueling mechanism 4 - small rotating plug 5 - central rotating column with control and scram system mechanism 6 - upper stationary shield 7 - reactor vessel 8 - guard vessel 9 - heat exchanger 10 - core

  15. BN-600: CURRENT STATUS Hybrid core as the first stage, 280 kg Pu/year 100% MOX fueled core, 1250 kg Pu/year Some features of MOX fuel

  16. BN-600: CURRENT STATUS (cont.) Radiation characteristics of fuels Neutron radiation rate, Gamma radiation rate, Fuel n/s SA /s SA fresh irrad. fresh irrad. UO2 4.8 х 102 1.2 х 105 2.9 х 109 4.5 х 1014 MOX (wPu) 6.7 х 105 1.3 х 106 1.1 х 1012 5.2 х 1012

  17. SCENARIOS OF THE EX-WEAPON PU STOCK-PILE REDUCTION IN RUSSIA

  18. PLUTONIUM NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES • Storage and management • Reliable security measures • Safeguards and control • Minimum personnel with authorized access • Minimum handling operations • Minimum transportation • Minimum sites with plutonium handling • Conversion into spent fuel • Dilution in MOX fuel • Cladding and assembling • Irradiation in nuclear reactors

  19. PLUTONIUM NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES (cont.) • Unified models for non-proliferation analysis: ISTC project and bilateral collaboration • Is closed cycle potentially less protected to proliferation than open one? • How does BN-800 minimize the proliferation risk? • Development of an internationally recognized methodology for the quantitative assessment of the proliferation risk

  20. CLOSED NUCLEAR CENTER CONCEPT • Russian specific features - rather large territory - many sparsely populated regions • MAYAK site in South Urals - RT-1 reprocessing plant, in operation now - 30 t of civil Pu are stored • Complex-300 MOX fuel fabrication plant • BN-800 fast reactor

  21. OPTIONS FOR TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE OF MOX FUEL

  22. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION • Russian - US cooperation • Russian - French - German Research Program • Russian - Canadian collaboration • Russian - Japanese cooperation

  23. Conclusions • The use of existing fast BN-600 reactor and, subsequently, fast BN-800 reactor (to be constructed) makes it possible to consume 50MT of weapons plutonium by the year 2020 and to reduce the cost of the Russian Ex-W Pu disposition Program. • Dual-use BN-800 reactor (Ex-W Pu utilization and the new electricity production) opens opportunities for potential investment options. • There are no proliferation concerns with the fast reactor technology at the stage of final disposal; elimination of the breeding zones in both BN-600 and BN-800 could be the first step to a more self-protected fast reactor technology. • Closed nuclear centers are the best way to ensure the non-proliferation of fissile materials, especially ex-weapons plutonium in Russia.

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