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The Hungarian informant reward programme

Addressing challenges in Hungary's leniency program, proposing incentives for managers to provide valuable information on cartel infringements. Discussing conditions, practical experience, and the impact on anti-cartel activities.

francesca-roberts
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The Hungarian informant reward programme

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  1. The Hungarian informant reward programme Ádám Remetei-Filep Gazdasági Versenyhivatal

  2. The problem with leniency • Hungary has a leniency programme since 2004, which is based on the ECN model leniency programme. • Despite the similar rules, no comparable success to that of the programmes of the EU, or Member States such as France or Germany. • Very limited number of true stand-alone leniency cases; • Hungary is a small economy with limited number of market players, managers do not speak; • Managers are uncertain about the consequences of leniency applications, fear retaliation on the market or criminal charges.

  3. We need to change the incentives of managers, just as in the case of leniency for companies. • Cooperation should be rewarded to overcome any negative personal consequences. • This creates a race between not just companies but also between companies and their employees. • 1% of the final fine given as a monetary reward, free of taxes (capped at ~ EUR 160 000). How tosolve this problem?

  4. Written evidence should be provided that is indispensable to prove hard core cartel infringements, or • Other information that enables to obtain a court warrant for dawn raids in the course of which the agency founds indispensable written evidence. • Reward to be paid after theadoption of the final decision of the agency, not afterfinalcourtrulings. Changes to the fine in court procedures has no impact on the already paid amount. • No reward can be paid to managers of a leniency applicant. • No reward can be paid for evidence obtained illegally or to several people having the info from the same source. The conditions of the programme

  5. The programme is considered as a useful tool for detection, it produces cases that would not be discovered otherwise. • The programme should be viewed as an element of the agency’s overall anti-cartel activities besides ex officio proceedings, leniency and thecartel chat. • Since its introduction, there are four finished cases initiated based on info from informants, payments reached up to EUR 80 000. There are also ongoing cases. • Quality of the information is diverse, often referring to other criminal activities. Anonymity considered as a cornerstone of the programme. The practical experience with the programme

  6. Thankyouforyourattention!filep.adam@gvh.hu

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