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Understanding Voting Methods - Reviewing Election Processes

Explore different voting methods and election processes, including Plurality, IRV, Borda, and more. Learn about preferences, winners, and flaws in the voting systems.

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Understanding Voting Methods - Reviewing Election Processes

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Presentation Transcript

  1. Voting Review Material

  2. Walking

  3. 0 of 30 How many people voted in this election? • 13 • 35 • 45 • 55 • Can’t tell Voting - Review

  4. 0 of 30 How many different preference ballots are there for an election with 6 candidates? • 6 • 21 • 36 • 120 • 720 • None of the above Voting - Review

  5. 0 of 30 A preference schedule can have a row in which the same candidate appears twice • True • False • Can’t tell Voting - Review

  6. 0 of 30 What’s wrong with this preference schedule? • Column 1 • Column 2 • Column 3 • Nothing Voting - Review

  7. 0 of 30 “Plurality” means • Most number of votes • 50% of the votes • More than 50% of the votes • More votes than most of the candidates Voting - Review

  8. 0 of 30 Who wins using Plurality? • A • B • C • D Voting - Review

  9. 0 of 30 Who wins using IRV? • A • B • C • D Voting - Review

  10. 0 of 30 Who wins using Hare? • A • B • C • D Voting - Review

  11. 0 of 30 Who wins using Borda? • A • B • C • D Voting - Review

  12. 0 of 30 Who wins using Condorcet? • A • B • C • D Voting - Review

  13. 0 of 30 Who wins using Approval?(Voters approve of the candidates in RED) • A • B • C • D Voting - Review

  14. Jogging

  15. 0 of 30 An election involves three candidates. The preference schedule has two columns. So, there must be a majority winner. • True • False • Can’t tell Voting - Review

  16. 0 of 30 A Plurality winner • Must be a majority winner • Can be a majority winner • Cannot be a majority winner Voting - Review

  17. 0 of 30 The greatest flaw of Plurality voting is • Time consuming • A small plurality could win • Encourages voter apathy • Costly • Difficult to carry out Voting - Review

  18. 0 of 30 The greatest flaw of IRV is • A strong 3rd place finisher would be eliminated on 1st round • A small plurality could win • Time consuming • Costly • Difficult to explain Voting - Review

  19. 0 of 30 An IRV winner always winds up with • A plurality • A majority • Neither Voting - Review

  20. 0 of 30 If there are three candidates in an election IRV and Hare • Never choose the same candidate • Sometimes choose the same candidate • Always choose the same candidate Voting - Review

  21. 0 of 30 Suppose that A is favored by a majority of the voters. Then the IRV method • Must choose A • May not choose A • Cannot choose A Voting - Review

  22. 0 of 30 Suppose that A is favored by a majority of the voters. Then the Hare method • Must choose A • May not choose A • Cannot choose A Voting - Review

  23. 0 of 30 On each re-tally, the Hare method eliminates the candidate with • The least number of first place votes • The most number of last place votes • Neither Voting - Review

  24. 0 of 5 Suppose that A is favored by a majority of the voters. Then the Borda method • Must choose A • May not choose A • Cannot choose A Voting - Review

  25. 0 of 5 The Condorcet Method • Never produces a winner • Always produces a winner • May not produce a winner • Can produce two different winners Voting - Review

  26. 0 of 5 Using the Condorcet method, if A beats B, and B beats C, then • A must beat C • A can’t beat C • A may beat C Voting - Review

  27. 0 of 30 In the Approval method you • Can vote for any number of candidates • Cannot vote for all candidates • Must vote for at least 2 candidates Voting - Review

  28. 0 of 5 Some voters exhibited irrational behavior when voting using the Approval method. How many columns contain highly suspicious entries? • 1 column • 2 columns • 3 columns • 4 columns • None Voting - Review

  29. 0 of 5 Who wins? • A • B • C • D • Can’t tell Voting - Review

  30. Running

  31. 0 of 30 A student club has 10 members. They will use the Borda method (3 – 2 – 1 – 0) to elect A, B, C, or D president. A gets 19 points, B gets 20, and C gets 18. How many points does D get? • 3 • 6 • 9 • 15 • Can’t tell Voting - Review

  32. 0 of 30 The Borda method will pick the same winner regardless of how the points are assigned to each preference level • True • False Voting - Review

  33. 0 of 30 To show that Approval voting violates the Majority Criterion we must show • If a candidate wins using Approval, that candidate has a majority • If a candidate has a majority that candidate wins using Approval Voting - Review

  34. 0 of 30 To show that Hare voting violates the Condorcet criterion we must show • There is a Condorcet winner but Hare doesn’t pick that candidate • The Hare winner is not a Condorcet winner. Voting - Review

  35. 0 of 30 To show that Borda violates the Irrelevant Alternative criterion we must show that • C wins the 1st election but H wins the 2nd • C wins the 1st election but Me wins the 2nd • Me wins the 1st election but H wins the 2nd Voting - Review

  36. End

  37. 0 of 30 A candidate having a majority of the votes may not win using • Plurality and IRV • Plurality and Hare • Borda and Approval • Borda and Condorcet Voting - Review

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