Bandits, Villains and Bosses: Kidnappers in the Southern Philippines

1. Bandits, Villains and Bosses: Kidnappers in the Southern Philippines eric.gutierrez@live.com 19 March 2012

2. KFR not an index crime, but … • It already appeared as a problem in Jose Rizal’s El Filibusterismo. Kabesang Tales was kidnapped, and ransom was paid by daughter Juli. He later joins the Tulisanes, and became known as Matanglawin. Simoun, who was plotting revolution, narrowly escapes being kidnapped himself. • The Philippines has been called “Kidnap Capital of Asia”. KFR incidents have prompted the creation and funding of specialised, inter-agency task forces – Ramos’ PACC; Estrada’s PAOCTF; Arroyo’s PACER and NAKTAF; and now, Aquino’s Anti-Kidnapping Group.

3. Two-fold research question • Why is there such high numbers of kidnappings in western and central Mindanao? • What factors determine periods of heightened kidnappings over the last 25 years in these regions of the Philippines?

4. Bandits The State and Its Agents ? Villains Bosses Analytical Framework • Social bandits – present day Matanglawins. • Villains – antisocial bandits or criminal entrepreneurs • Bosses – predatory local politicians and strongmen

5. Case studies • Boss – Ali Dimaporo invents a new political weapon: kidnappings in Marawi, 1986 to 1989 • Social bandits? – Mubarak, Mubarak II, Tigre, Tilaka, Borongos and their corporate venture: kidnappings in Cotabato, 1989 to 2002 • Villains – the Abu Sayyaf network of gangs: kidnappings in Basilan, 1994 to 2001 Missing data: recorded kidnappings from 1986 to 2010

6. Conclusion – who 1 • Kidnapping incidents in the southern Philippines could be categorised and ‘located’ within a continuum of three groups – bandits, villains, bosses. This allows for more intensive analysis of the explicit and implicit motives of the perpetrators, as well as the links and social networks they rely on. • Kidnappers are typically more firmly embedded in local communities than the state and its agents. Hence, they often escape identification and could not easily be isolated. It is a mistake to assume they can always be found separate and discrete from the general population.

7. Conclusion – who 2 • Kidnap groups are not distinct and discrete social entities or conventional organisations with fixed memberships, chains of command, regularised authority. They can be networks of gangs who coalesce and disband, or ‘dark networks’ hidden in state institutions or rebel movements. • Kidnappers have overlapping layers of identities and roles, which explain much about their often confusing affiliations or constantly renegotiated allegiances. They should not be framed into discrete, immovable boxes that may obscure their links to other sections of society.

8. Conclusion – when they strike Kidnapping incidents tend to increase: • Before or after elections, for a variety of reasons -- fund-raising; voter intimidation; embarrassing opponents. • During regime change, as some form of low-intensity conflict between outgoing and incoming powers. • During offensives that tie down state and rebel forces in battle – either there is a vacuum in law enforcement, or kidnappings may be used as a diversion or to spread state forces thinly. • When pools of armed men lie idle with nothing to do and no mission to accomplish.

9. Conclusion – why 1 Certain structural conditions allow kidnappers to thrive: • Many public services and functions are fictional, and non-existent beyond military checkpoints. This allows bandits, villains and bosses to be private providers, and thus gain de facto legitimacy they won’t normally have if state is robust. • Firearms proliferate and armed groups, state and non-state, are everywhere, creating huge pools of armed men who are prone to get into some form of criminal mischief. • Widespread poverty and absence of stable means of income

10. Conclusion – why 2 Kidnappers thrive because state response is defective • The distinguishing lines between state and criminal is blurred - is the state behaving like criminals or are the criminals behaving like the state? • There are pendulum swings in government responses – no consistent and predictable state response. • State response is reactive, and prone to be shaped by media influence.

11. Conclusion – how to respond 1 • Areas where kidnappers thrive are not completely lawless - there could be informal governance structures, traditional institutions, or quid pro quo arrangements among the various actors that allow for some order to emerge. In such contexts, kidnappers/bandits sometimes become the private providers of security. The state should recognise not deny this. • Constructive engagement should always remain as an option for the medium to the long-term. State-building is more than a technical challenge, it is about relationship-building. Constructive engagement should not be confused with hostage negotiations.

12. Conclusion – how to respond 2 • Improve the reporting system and institutional memory – clarify definitions; develop guidelines on counting; complete investigations, even if no charges are filed; premature claims of success should be sanctioned. In other words, generate hard performance data over time, not press releases. • Focus attention and resolve weakness in law enforcement – a joined-up single police force approach. Do not create PACCs, PAOCTF or PACERs without first resolving basic problems of poor, uninspired performance and corruption. • Improve hostage negotiations skills of the relevant police forces, not media-seeking politicians.