Analysing the Nature of War : Past , Present , and Future

1. OnEffects-basedOperations, BiologivalEvolution, and SomeOtherInterestingStuffLt. Col. Dr. Zoltan Jobbagy AnalysingtheNature of War: Past, Present, and Future

2. WhydoSoldiersNeed Courage? MOTHER COURAGE: “That must be a rotten general.” THE COOK: “He’s ravenous all right, but why rotten?” MOTHER COURAGE: “Because he’s got to have men of courage, that’s why. If he knew how to plan a proper campaign what would he be needing men of courage for? Ordinary ones would do. It’s always the same; whenever there’s a load of special virtues around it means something stinks.” THE COOK: “I thought it meant things is all right.” (BERTOLT BRECHT)

3. On Today’s Menu • Theorising – what does ‘effects-based’ stand for? • Originating – where are the concept’s origins? • Reflecting – can we tame war’s unpredictable mechanism? • Conceptualising – what does a complex adaptive system stand for? • Generalising – how can we think ‘complexity-based’? • Concluding – how can we create ‘effects-based’ strategies?

4. OurGiudeThroughThisLecture

5. YouKnowHimBetterThisWay …

6. Theorising Effects-Based Operations

7. Assumed Advantages of EBO Low Cost Politically Correct Employment Of Force? Short Duration Low Casualty Limited Destruction

8. Approaches Checked NAME ORGANISATION APPEARANCE Enthusiastic Approach USAF 1995 Analytic Challenge Approach RAND 2001 Decision Superiority Approach IDA 2001 Jointness Approach USJFCOM J9 2001 Network Centric Approach CCRP 2002 Methodological Approach ACC 2002 Success Paradigm Approach AU CADRE 2002

9. First Impressions • Technological Focus – stealthy platforms and precision weapons as • basis … • Direct Causality – tactical actions aimed at achieving strategic level effects … • Deductive Thinking – top-down, proceeding from the big picture to the small … • Systemic Approach – enemy seen as system, sub-system, elements, … • Analytic Categories – observable structures based on logical reasoning (CoG) … • CONTROL – focus on psychology (influencing enemy thinking and behaviour) …

10. First Concerns • Technological Focus – too firepower centric, requires a certain • symmetry … • Direct Causality – cause and effect relationships often confusing … • Deductive Thinking – war is fluid and friction is everywhere … • Systemic Approach – unclear whether system-of-system or complex adaptive system … • Analytic Categories – most enemies have no analytically observable structures … • CONTROL – not always possible therefore in war you have to kill sometimes …

11. SemanticProblems(Webster’s) Effect refers to result or outcome, something that is produced by an agent or a cause directly. Thus it follows immediatelythe antecedent asa resultant condition and implies something that necessarily follows a cause Effect is synonymous with result, consequence, upshot, after-effect, aftermath, sequel, issue, outcome and event. They all signify remote conditions that are ascribable to a cause or a combination of causes

12. Some Remarks(Van Riper, Jobbagy) OK – direct, first order effects BUT – indirect, higher order outcomes, events, or consequences! Unfortunately, Clausewitz pointed out good two centuries ago that whatever we do “consequences of some kind [would] always follow.” Is the term ‘effects-based’ vacuous? Is the concept scarcely more than military truism & commonplace? DO WE GENERATE HOT AIR?

13. Warfighter’s Remark(OIF Alphabet Part One) Eis for Effects You thought it was a planning methodology. It is really an OPSEC tool. When the insurgents read our classified documents they can’t figure out what the hell we are up too! Come to think of I have no idea either.

14. Common Elements andCharacteristics(Jobbagy) EFFECTS-FOCUS Causality Clearly and directly linking actions, and effects Deduction Strategic objectives into tactical actions ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY Intangibles Focus on thinking, decision, behaviour and will Control Destruction as means in order to influence SYSTEMS APPROACH Categorisation All elements of power involved Analysis System-of-system or omplex adaptive system A deductivenomological (scientific) approach!

15. Continuum of War (Jobbagy) Ends Continuum as function of an ends-means relationship Psychological (Systemic) Physical Means Destruction Influence

16. ExamplesforEffectsAchieved Ends Psychological Strategic bombing campaign of Harris during WW II Conducting PSYOPS, CIMIC activities, hearts and mind campaigns, etc. Damaging electric power supply, lines of communication, critical infrastructure, C2 facilities, etc. (Systemic) Japanes soldiers comitting suicide after military defeat Destroying an enemy tank, IFV, APC killing soldiers, etc. Physical Means Destruction Influence

17. EBO intheContinuum of War Ends Effects-Based Operations (subordinating the means to the end, focusingon direct causality between actions andoutcome, emphasising the strategic overthe tactical, seeing the whole by mostlyneglecting the particular) Where and why does this exclusive focus come from? Psychological (Systemic) Physical Means Destruction Influence 17

18. Originating Effects-Based Operations

19. Confusing Origins(Explaining everything and nothing) • According to Clausewitz “manifestations in war … result mainly from the transformation of society and new social conditions”and stretching ideas can result in loss of proper meaning and declining value • Regarding the origins of EBO most sources deliver only superficial generalisations that de-emphasise specific social, political, cultural and economic factors, which depend on certain historical circumstances • It is undeniable that ‘strategy’ mostly follows a deductive logic in which the conclusion about particulars and the course of actions proceeds from general or universal premises

20. Examining the Classics • It is useful to take a close look at the vocabularies of significant past theorists of war in order to examine to what extent and in which context their works contained the term ‘effect’ and its derivatives • The intention is not to deliver a broad historical, philosophical, cultural or even linguistic overview but to allow the respective authors to speak for themselves as they represent different periods • The aim is to detect references that point toward the three identified elements of effects-based operations such as effects-focus, advanced technology, and systems approach

21. Selected Past ‘Classics’ Sun Tzu (ancient) Machiavelli (pre-modern) Jomini (modern) Clausewitz (modern) “The Art of War” 500 B. C. “The Art of War” 1521 “The Art of War” 1838 “On War” 1832 ‘we much like his book’ ‘we don’t know (t)his book’ ‘we bash and dismiss his book’ ‘we extensively quote his book’

22. Element One – Effects-Focus(Meyer/Wilson, etc.) • Sun Tzu intended his advices not as replacement for but as an adjunct to the actual use of force. He emphasised the importance of strategy and forming strategic alliances as alternatives to bloody wars • Machiavelli was less interested in how an army fights and more how it is possible to establish and sustain one that fights, which is reflected in the absence of the term ‘effect’ in his 27 rules of war • Jomini’s four maxims regarding the fundamental principles of the art of war do not contain any references to ‘effects’. Only as a succession of inconsiderable affairs could armies be destroyed without pitched battles • Clausewitz wanted to warn theorists that reality is too multifaceted for causal explanations (see book two/chapter five). In a critical analysis he addressed the inherent problem when attempting to detect cause-and-effect relationships in war

23. Element Two – Advanced Technology • No theorist put emphasis on elaborating on the difference that technology can and cannot make in war. Weapons were operated mostly by muscle power and being mounted on a horse was the fastest possible means of advancement • Although the disparity between methods and weapons used became clear as early as the Crimean and American Civil Wars, military lessons of past ages were not significantly influenced by changing technological conditions • Weapons of industrial mass production with their ever increasing destructive potential shattered the value of past military experience only in the 20th century as the immense gap became clear during World War I

24. Element Three – Systems Approach SUN TZU MACHIAVELLI JOMINI CLAUSEWITZ Way Only indirectly detectable based on the content ofhis books Strategy People Weather Grand tactics Military Leadership Logistics Government Terrain Engineering Discipline Tactics Discipline

25. Carriages vs. Cars • The allure to refer to past theories in order to support present day strategic thought is appealing. It provides for better prospect and stronger arguments to sell ideas and gain influence • Any such reference prohibits the decoding of unique historical conditions and detaches theory from practical relevance, which is superficial, misleading and extremely dangerous • A carriage pulled by a horse and a car driven by a combustion engine reveal obvious similarities but do not indicate that those who invented the carriage also had the car in mind • According to Clausewitz “every age had its own kind of war.... Each period … [holds] to its own theory of war … It follows that the events of every age must be judged in the light of its own peculiarities”

26. Gen. Deptula – USAF(InterwievMarch 2003) • The idea of effects-based operations came out of the scarcity of available aerial resources during the 1991 war against Iraq and appeared as a practical problem of how to compensate for this shortcoming • The unexpected success of the approach and the power of advanced technology resulted that from then on “that was the philosophy … we used in targeting for the rest of the war planning effort and then during the war”

27. Reflecting Effects-Based Operations

28. Obvious Similarities I. • Most air-power theories aim at certain vulnerable elements of the enemy with the intention to achieve victory through various coercive mechanisms aimed at influencing enemy thinking and behaviour EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS MILITARY COERCION Psychological focus Psychological focus Limited destruction Limited destruction Low casualty rate Low casualty rate Low costs Low costs Short duration Short duration

29. Obvious Similarities II.(K. Mueller, Jobbagy) MILITARY COERCION Target Force Mechanism CHANGE EFFECTS-BASED OPERATION Object Action Mechanism EFFECT BOTH APPROACHES REFOCUS FROM THE USE OF BRUTE FORCE MECHANISMS OTHER THAN ATTRITION & ANNIHILATION

30. Military Coercion vs. Brute Force Ends COLD WAR primary focus on military coercion Psychological HOT WAR primary focus on brute force (Systemic) Physical Means Destruction Influence

31. Locating the Mechanisms(Pape, Jobbagy) Ends Psychological Risk Punishment Decapitation (Systemic) Denial Attrition Annihilation Physical Means Destruction Influence

32. Mechanism and Friction(Pape, Clausewitz, Watts) • Pape– every mechanism poses serious problems: either because we don’t like them (attrition, annihilation), or they don’t work (punishment, decapitation), or they require specific circumstances (risk), or they are slippery (denial) • Clausewitz– used the term ‘friction’ in order to describe the nature of war. He argued that intellectual activity, exact sciences and mathematical logic are of little help since waging war is basically an art“in the broadest meaning of the term” • Watts– reconstructed friction and concluded that it is manifest in danger, physical exertion, imperfect information, structural resistance, chance events, physical & political limits, unpredictability from interactions, and disconnects between ends/means • He indicates that much of war has similarities with gambling, which means that “friction, uncertainty, and confusion are not superficial annoyances to be gradually eliminated”but integral and dominant parts of the game

33. Properties of Friction (Perrow) • The essence of friction in war can best be grasped through a structural analysis based on two properties such as couplings and interactions • The properties are of a qualitative nature and were originally introduced to understand and study the way accidents happen • Within this framework friction is understood as a phenomenon that comes mostly in the form of unintended and unexpected effects • The advantage of this approachis that it can also address the so-called ‘intricate’ relationship between causes and effects • Whereas couplings can be tight or loose, interactions can be linear or complex • The two properties offer four possible combinations that can be projected onto the continuum of war

34. Explaining the Properties (Perrow, Czerwinski) • Linear interactions – refer to highly structured, logical, sequential, and predictable relationships • Complex interactions – offer less predictability due to the presence of unplanned and unforeseen relationships • Tight couplings – stand for high centralisation and rigidity, which allow for close monitoring and a certain tolerance • Loose couplings – mean decentralised operations and allow for a wide variety of possible outcomes

35. Structural Analysis for Decomposing Friction(Perrow, Czerwinski, Jobbagy) Ends Psychological Chaotic (tight coupling & complex interaction) Complex (loose coupling & complex interaction) (Systemic) Complicated (loose coupling & linear interaction) Simple (tight coupling & linear interaction) Physical Means Destruction Influence

36. Explaining the Areas(Snowden et. al.) • Simple – stands for known causes and effects with clear and visible relationship. Due to their empirical nature causal relationships are not open to dispute as this area can be characterised by the predominance of centralised causes and centralised effects • Complicated – refers to knowable causes and effects. Although causal relationships exist, due to spatial and temporal separations they might not become fully known. Causality is difficult to comprehend as centralised causes increasingly yield decentralised effects • Complex – refers to cause-and-effect relationships that are not open to any inspection and defy most attempts at categorisation or other analytical techniques. Causes and effects are mostly decentralised and appear coherent only retrospectively but even then debatable • Chaotic – refers to cause-and-effect relationships that are not visible or perceivable. Due to spatial and temporal separations prediction is impossible as there is no meaningful way to plan for effects or discern any sort of causal relationships

37. Consequences for Being ‘Effects-Based’(E. Lorenz) • Colloquially we can say that in tightly linear systems everyone can detect causality. Whereas in loosely linear systems experts might detect causality, in loosely complex systems causality often becomes clear only retrospectively. Unfortunately in tightly complex systems there is no discernible causality that can guide our actions • In other words, effects-based operations offer considerable promise only for physical effects but in terms of psychological effects the concept appears to be pretty hopeless. In the case of systemic effects the concept roughly touches the borderline that separates prediction from pure guesswork • Effects-based operations are generally good for creating desired physical effects, and might occasionally be good for generating desired systemic effects. However, in the case of psychological effects the concept does not work well, although sometimes it might contain useful information

38. Conceptualising Effects-Based Operations

39. Structural Analysis Again Ends Psychological Chaotic (tight coupling & complex interaction) Complex (loose coupling & complex interaction) (Systemic) Complicated (loose coupling & linear interaction) Simple (tight coupling & linear interaction) Physical Means Destruction Influence

40. Structural Analysis Extended Ends Psychological Non-linearity Chaos (far from equilibrium, turbulence reigns) Complexity proper (dynamic equilibrium, emergence reigns) (Systemic) Stability (equilibrium, linearity reigns) Physical Means Destruction Influence

41. Increasing Unpredictability Ends As we move towards the area of effects-based operationsthe combinations of coupling and interaction indicate increasingstructural instability with serious consequences for causal relationships. Consequently, we suggest to extend the original exclusive focus of theconcept to the continuum of war in order to takethe entire band-withof causality better into account Psychological (Systemic) Physical Means Destruction Influence

42. ‘Dynamic Law of War’(Clausewitz) • Clausewitz observed that every “action in war is not continuous but spasmodic. Violent clashes are interrupted by periods of observation, during which both sides are on the defensive” • He defined this attribute the ‘Dynamic Law of War’. According to him in wars periods of inaction and response change with periods of action since “periods of active warfare will always be interspersed with greater or smaller periods of rest” • Although Clausewitz defined war by this continuous cycle, he was ready to emphasise that the “state of crisis is the real war; the equilibrium is nothing but its reflex” • Thus war oscillated for him on a continuum characterised by stability and chaos, which indicates that if he had the terminology of our times at his disposal he might have used the term ‘COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM’

43. War as CAS(One Definition) Ends War seen as a CAS’ indicates a non-linear dynamic system composed of interacting, semi-autonomous, and hierarchically organised parts that continuously self-organise as a result of changing environmental conditionsthus showing emergent attributes Psychological Chaos (far from equilibrium, turbulence reigns) (Systemic) Stability (equilibrium, linearity reigns) Physical Means Destruction Influence

44. Characteristics of CAS • A CAS forces us to think in terms of opposites, in which one side cannot be right at the expense of the other. Stability and chaos allow for polarities to manage rather than problems to solve • Consequently, the original approach focusing on causality, reduction, deduction, and analysis must be extended with a holistic approach • Clausewitz also argued that “the vast, the almost infinite distance … between cause and its effect, and the countless ways in which these elements can be combined”demand things to be seen in a comprehensive fashion • All the characteristics of a CAS guide our thinking towards the application of appropriate METAPHORS

45. What is a Metaphor? (Holland, Saperstein, Duran, etc.) • An implied comparison or a figure of speech in which a word denoting a certain object or action is used for another in order to suggest an analogy – it enlarges our perception by producing insightful connections and interpretations • A figurative expression in which a word or phrase designating one thing is used to designate another in the form of an implicit comparison. • A qualitative leap from reasonable, prosaic comparison to identification or fusion of two objects as the resulting new entity possesses the characteristics of both • A paradoxical statement: literally false according to abstract rationality, but true according to imaginative rationality • An essential as-gates in the human cognitive process since they enable the understanding of one thing in terms of another 45

46. Levels of Metaphors (Ilachinski) • Transfer – level one means the transfer of a single term into another context in order to create new meaning • Construction – level two is the construction of analogies as part of a specific theory or a general and systematic inquiry to elucidate phenomena • Unification – level three stands for a unifying view of an entire paradigm, often symbolised by a specific term that refers to the whole frame of understanding under a given paradigm • Merger – level four can be seen as the most comprehensive in which science itself is understood as an irreducible metaphor. 46 46

47. Consequences for Conceptualisation Ends Psychological Metaphors (structures are so fleeting and instable that boundaries are not an inherent feature of reality: a tank is a tank but what is enemy psyche – even if it is real , it is never absolute) (Systemic) Reductionism (structures are so persistent and stable that they can be assumed to be real and absolute) Physical Means Destruction Influence

48. For a CAS BiologicalMetaphors Are of FirstImportance

49. Biology and War I.(Darwin) • Darwin had no intention at all to spend much time examining the nature of war. However, even he had to recognise in his book On the Origins of Species that genetic usurpation and endemic warfare share similarities. • In chapter three he drew an analogy between war, battle and natural selection and saw evolution as a “[b]attle within battle [that] must ever be recurring with varying success.” • This analogy made him conclude that “from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows.” • Biological evolution was for him a “great and complex battle of life”, which together with the ‘Law of Battle’ for survival formed a recurrent pattern also in his second epic workThe Decent of Man.

50. Biology and War II.(Boyd) • Boyd suggested that similar to biological evolution also waroscillates on a continuum that cannot be broken into discrete points or steps in time. Therefore both soldiers and ecologists try to find a mechanism that matches the ‘crude reality’ of life • Thus we regard war as a conflict between two self-organising, living and fluid-like organisms consisting of many mutually interacting and co-evolving parts that form a rich interlacing tapestry of emergent possibilities • He also pointed out that the theory of evolution by natural selection and the conduct of war are intimately related since both “treat conflict, survival, and conquest in a very fundamental way” • Based on the idea of the evolving biosphere and in order to be in lieu with the military tradition to express thoughts in metaphors we propose to conceptualise war in the framework of an ‘ORGANIC STRATEGIC ECOSYSTEM’