Amending the Party-List Law

1. Amending the Party-List Law Points for Consideration Agustin Martin G. Rodriguez Empowering Civic Participation in Governance

2. PL as Electoral and Political Reform • Political because it establishes a politics of programs that allows the marginalized direct representation in Congress • Electoral because it introduces a system of proportional representation that is supposed to encourage the electorate to vote for parties

3. Its Objectives • To establish a system of proportional representation that allows marginalized groups direct and genuine representation • To encourage the electorate to vote for parties based on programs and encourage the formation of parties based on platforms and programs

4. Dismal Implementation • In 1998, only 33.5% voted for the PL with only 14 seats filled • In 2001, only about 40% voted for the PL with only about 5 to 7 seats filled • Thus party-list groups have only token representation in Congress

5. The Heart of the Problem • The lack of a clear allocation formula • No clarity whether the party-list system is a sectoral or proportional system • Or if a hybrid, what this hybrid aims at • No clarity regarding who should be accredited • Led to fiasco of 160 accredited groups

6. Cap of 3 seats encourages party splits • Lack of an effective education campaign • The 2% threshold seems is far too high for many marginalized groups to hurdle • Almost ensures that the most marginalized and unorganized groups will not win representation • This leaves most the party-list to be the domain of well-organized development NGO coalitions and ideological groups

7. Dismal Results for 2001 • As it has evolved, the party-list system has become the domain of the organized civil society groups • Groups with the least resources and capacities to conduct a national campaign • A situation exacerbated by the lack of unity among the groups

8. One can view the domination of civil society groups as a positive development for genuine representation of the marginalized • In fact, in the 11th Congress, they were able to bring to legislative discourse the issues of their constituents • This backed by consultation and research

9. However, party-list groups seem unable to translate their good work into votes • In fact, the results of 2001 seems to indicate the collapse of many of the more representative and effective of these party-list groups

12. Notable Points • MAD and Bayan Muna had phenomenal outcome with 20% of the vote between them • APEC which came closest only got 5.37% • Only 5 of the 10 qualifiers are incumbents

13. Most of the incumbents that are composed of civil society groups were edged out of the qualifying 10 • Only Lakas and NPC qualified of the established parties • The anti-drug and anti-corruption issues seemed to get votes for MAD and CIBAC

14. Despite the optimism of the incumbents they failed to win enough votes to qualify • Many fell bellow the top 20 spot • This is because: • They failed to awaken the votes of their constituencies • They even failed to gain significant votes, many even losing votes in the tens or hundreds of thousands • Some parties seemed to have collapsed

15. Many of these problems seem to indicate the need for civil society groups to act with greater consolidation • It may also indicate the need for civil society groups to critically engage political parties • These issues may not be addressed by legislation alone, however there are some amendments that are essential

16. The Proposed Amendments • Installing an allocation formula Number of seats x total votes of groups Total Votes of Qualifying Groups • This ensures proportional representation because • It takes into account the number of seats to de distributed • And ensures a proportional distribution of seats • Raising the 3 seat cap to between 5 and 10

17. Retaining the 2% quota to ensure a substantial constituency • However, one proposal is to use the 2% quota from the previous election to allow smaller groups to prepare and plan more effectively • Others propose that the quota be abolished since the results of the elections will yield an natural threshold

18. Implementing an education campaign in consultation with civil society groups • Fixing the criteria for accreditation and fixing the accreditation process to ensure that only the representatives of the marginalized are accredited

19. The Issue of Sectoral Representation • Some sectoral blocks will argue that the spirit of the party-list representation is not fulfilled by the current system because the marginalized sectors will never be able to win representation • Thus they propose that some seats be reserved for the marginalized sectors

20. 12 or 14 seats will be reserved for the basic sectors, the rest of the seats will be left open to proportional representation • One seat for each sector will be reserved • And the group that garners the highest vote in their sector will occupy the sectoral seat • However a threshold will still be installed • But groups will have to indicate under which system they will run

21. Two schemes of voting are proposed: • One vote per voter • Two votes per voter: • One for the proportional system • One for the sectoral seat • (Although Rep. Marcos proposes 13 votes per voter)

22. Advantage of this proposal • Sectors are assured representation • Disadvantage • Will not encourage consolidation and will not encourage engagement of political parties • However, the reality of Philippine politics does not allow the margins to have direct representation any other way

23. Points for Discussion • Should the party-list system be primarily a purely proportional or sectoral system or representation? Or a clear mix? • Which system should be adapted? • Should the 2% threshold be retained as such?

24. How do we ensure representation for the marginalized and underrepresented? • What are the criteria for accreditation? • Will the proposed ban on the top 5 political parties be fruitful? • How many seats should the cap be?