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The constitutional implications of “insignificant” rules. Anne Meuwese (*) & Claudio Radaelli (**) (*) Senior Lecture in Law, Tilburg (**) Professor of Political Science, Exeter CONFERENCE ON COMPARING DEMOCRACIES FLORENCE, 10-12 JUNE 2010. Structure of the paper. Research questions.
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The constitutional implications of “insignificant” rules Anne Meuwese (*) & Claudio Radaelli (**) (*) Senior Lecture in Law, Tilburg (**) Professor of Political Science, Exeter CONFERENCE ON COMPARING DEMOCRACIES FLORENCE, 10-12 JUNE 2010
Research questions RQ1 Explaining the institutionalisation of regulatory reform in the US and the EU [Regulatory oversight as dependent variable] RQ2 What are the implications of this institutionalisation? [Regulatory oversight as independent variable]
Tackling research question 1 • Politics of delegation – control of bureaucracies
Comparing institutionalisation • Presidential action • Judicial review • APA • Tight constitutional demarcation of the role of regulatory oversight • In short, control of bureaucracy • The “principal” in a mixed polity • MS action • EP initiative • Infra-organizational politics • In short, control of bureaucracy + learning USA EUROPEAN UNION
Constitutional implications (RQ2) • Status of constitutional values • Institutional balance • Position of the executive • Internal and external accountability
Conclusion and way forward • So what? • Constitutional changes triggered by regulatory reform have not settled yet, especially in the EU. They are more settled in the US • Turning point for the EU...? • TFEU entered into force • The TFEU provisions • ECJ • Reflection Group
Thank you • Paper available • Radaelli’s research for this paper was funded by the European Research Council, Advanced Grant on Analysis of Learning in Regulatory Governance (ALREG, 2009-2012) • Comments to C.Radaelli@ex.ac.uk