Challenges for Russia’s Democracy

1. Challenges for Russia’s Democracy Robert Orttung Resource Security Institute

2. Three Goals • Make sense of recent developments in Russian politics • Key trends in Russian political development • Federal elections • Governors’ elections • Local elections • Recent reform proposals • Make sense of recent efforts to make sense of developments in Russian politics • Future scenarios

3. Freedom House NIT Russia Scores

4. Changes in Electoral Law • Constant fine tuning to increase control • Presidential, parliamentary terms extended • Parliamentary elections based on party lists • Threshold moved to 7% from 5% • Only registered parties (now down to 7)

5. Changes in Electoral Law (cont.) • “Against all” choice eliminated • Minimum turnout also eliminated • Duma parties don’t have to collect signatures • Elimination of option to put up cash to get on ballot • Parties get money per vote • Parties winning less than 3% have to reimburse free publicity

6. Elected Governors, 1996-2004 • Powerful regional leaders • Luzhkov, Shaimiev, Rakhimov, Nazdratenko, Lebed • Reformers • Nemtsov, Prusak, Titov • Communists • Businessmen • Trutnev, Khloponin, Ilyumzhinov

7. Elected Governors • Rogues’ gallery of leaders • No shining examples of democracy • Provided a balance to federal government • Gave locals some ways to hold leaders accountable • Started to build a culture of democracy

8. Kremlin and Governors, 2004 - • After Beslan, president appoints governors • No regional legislature challenges Putin or Medvedev • At first, mainly kept on old governors • Main objective was stability • Fired only those who had lost control • Now making more appointments of loyalists • No apparent logic behind appointments: some removed for scandal, others not (Darkin, Mari-El) • Removing Yeltsin-era heavyweights (Rossel, Shaimiev)

9. Appointed Governors • Governors are now focused on pleasing Moscow rather than locals • Regions are more manageable from Moscow • Less dependent on business groups • Elected leaders would be more flexible in reacting to regional problems; serve local interests • No good system of recruiting leaders in Russia • United Russia plays nominal role • 57 percent of Russian voters support the return to gubernatorial elections, 20 percent prefer the current practice and 23 percent had no opinion (Levada Center)

10. Kaliningrad Demonstration

11. Demonstration • Possible sign of trouble for regime? • Moscow now responsible for everything that happens in the country • Logical thing to do is remove governor • Putin does not like to act under clear public pressure • Strongly supports Boos • Could open the way for more protests

12. October 2009 Elections • Of the 42,361 regional and local offices filled that day, United Russia won 29,687 or 70% • Opposition walkout from Duma • Denied registration: 0.5% United Russia; 54% Patriots of Russia; 26% Right Cause; 33% Yabloko (Central Electoral Commission) • Medvedev: Outcome reflects the real balance of forces in the country

13. March 2010 Elections • United Russia won 68% of the seats up for election • However, won less than 50% of the seats in 4 of 8 regional legislatures • Denied registration: United Russia: 0.17%; Yabloko 15.3% • “Fake pluralism” rather than “shameless fix” – Brian Whitmore

14. Reform Proposals • Boos called for reinstating “against all” so authorities can judge their popularity; retracted • Yurgens, Gontmaker report – reinstate many of the things taken away (terms, Duma districts, 5% barrier, governors’ elections) • Meeting of Security Council on political reform • Putin told the meeting there is no need for reform • Medvedev praises October local elections • Only reform is to give parties winning 5-7% representation in legislatures

15. Explanation I – Hybrid Regime • Hybrid Regime – Overmanaged Democracy (Petrov, Lipman, Hale) • Putin wins votes because voters agree with him; leadership qualities; projects competence. Putin/Medvedev must appeal to the electorate to beat opposition (Colton/Hale)

16. Explanation II – Non-democratic Consolidation • Vote only confirms decisions made elsewhere, no opposition (Gel’man)

17. Explanation III – Authoritarian State Building • Building and continuing Russia’s authoritarian regime means applying means of repression, ensuring elite unity, and maintaining a ruling party that shapes the political environment (Way)

18. Explanation IV – Virtual Politics • With passive electorate, elite controls information flows in absence of international intervention (Andrew Wilson).

19. Explanations V – Why Vote? • Ritual support for myth of stability; people realize elections are falsified, but want to go on believing • People “turn up and cast their votes because campaigns are always accompanied by certain hand-out of gifts and promises.“ -- Aleksei Grazhdankin of the Levada-Center

20. Explanation VI - Fraud Oblasts Republics • 10 million suspect votes in the 2004 and 2007 elections; 2008 was not even an election (Myagkov/Ordeshook/Shakin) • Conditions placed on OSCE prevent monitoring

21. Conclusions • Authoritarian regime • No opposition, though people can register discontent • Irkutsk mayor • PR is increasingly central feature of regime • President • Parliament • Policies (corruption, modernization) • Information processing

22. Future Challenges • Unstable point for the elite – can’t address the problems people are complaining about; yet afraid to introduce substantive political reforms • Possible causes for change • Duma elections in 2011/Presidential elections in 2012 • Economic problems • Energy prices • Incompetent response to natural disaster • North Caucasus • Decline in police discipline • Fewer feedback links = greater fragility