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Externalities and Property Rights

Externalities and Property Rights. External Costs and Benefits. External Cost (negative externality) A cost of an activity that falls on people other than those who pursue the activity. External Costs and Benefits. External Benefit (positive externality)

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Externalities and Property Rights

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  1. Externalities and Property Rights

  2. External Costs and Benefits • External Cost (negative externality) • A cost of an activity that falls on people other than those who pursue the activity Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  3. External Costs and Benefits • External Benefit (positive externality) • A benefit of an activity received by people other than those who pursue the activity Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  4. External Costs and Benefits • How Externalities Affect Resource Allocation • Externalities reduce economic efficiency. • Solutions of externalities may be efficient. • When efficient solutions to externalities are not possible, government intervention or other collective action may be used. Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  5. External Costs and Benefits • How Externalities Affect Resource Allocation • Does the honeybee keeper face the right incentives? (Part I) • Bees pollinate the apple orchards. • The honeybee keeper may not consider the external benefit to the apple growers when considering the optimal number of hives. Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  6. External Costs and Benefits • How Externalities Affect Resource Allocation • Does the honeybee keeper face the right incentives? (Part I) • If the external benefit is not considered, the bee keeper’s optimal number of hives will be less than the socially optimal number of hives. Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  7. External Costs and Benefits • How Externalities Affect Resource Allocation • Does the honeybee keeper face the right incentives? (Part II) • If the hives are located near a school and nursing home, additional hives will cause more people to get stung by the bees. • For the students and nursing home residents, the bee hives create an external cost. Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  8. External Costs and Benefits • How Externalities Affect Resource Allocation • Does the honeybee keeper face the right incentives? (Part II) • If the external costs are not considered, the optimal number of hives for the beekeeper will be greater than the socially optimal number of hives. Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  9. External Costs and Benefits • How Externalities Affect Resource Allocation • When an activity does not create an externality, the optimal level of the activity for the individual will equal the socially optimal level of the activity. Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  10. External Costs and Benefits • How Externalities Affect Resource Allocation • When an activity generates a negative externality, the level of the activity will be greater than the socially optimal level. Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  11. External Costs and Benefits • How Externalities Affect Resource Allocation • When an activity generates a positive externality, the level of the activity will be less than the socially optimal level. Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  12. Social MC = Private MC + XC 2,300 XC = $1,000/ton PrivateMC 2,000 Private MC 1,300 1,300 D D Deadweight loss caused by pollution = $2mil/yr 12,000 8,000 12,000 Social optimum Private equilibrium How External Costs Affect Resource Allocation Production with external cost Production without external cost Price ($/ton) Price ($/ton) Quantity (tons/year) Quantity (tons/year) Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  13. Without external benefits QPVTis the social optimum XB • With external benefits the private D < social D and the private optimum is less than the social optimum MBPVT + XB MC MBSOC MBPVT Social demand = Private Demand + XB Private Demand Qpvt QSOC Deadweight loss from positive externality A Good Whose Production Generates a Positive Externality for Consumers Price Quantity Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  14. External Costs and Benefits • The Coase Theorem • When a market leaves cash on table there is usually a response to capture the unrealized value. Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  15. External Costs and Benefits • Example • Will Abercrombie dump toxins in the river (Part I) Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  16. External Costs and Benefits • Example • The Market • Abercrombie’s company produces a toxic waste. • If the waste is dumped into the river, Fitch cannot fish the river. • Should Abercrombie install a filter? • Assume there is no communication between Abercrombie and Fitch Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  17. Costs and Benefits of Eliminating Toxic Waste (Part 1) With filter Without filter Gains to Abercrombie Gains to Fitch • The Market • Without filter: Total Gains = $130 + $50 = $180 • With filter: Total Gains = $100 + $100 = $200 • MC of the filter = $30 & MB of the filter = $50 • Loss in economic surplus = $20 Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  18. Costs and Benefits of Eliminating Toxic Waste (Part 2) With filter Without filter Gains to Abercrombie Gains to Fitch • Assume • Fitch and Abercrombie can communicate at no cost • Fitch offers Abercrombie $40 to use the filter • Economic surplus increases by $20 Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  19. External Costs and Benefits • The Coase Theorem • If at no cost people can negotiate the purchase and sale of the right to perform activities that cause externalities, they can always arrive at efficient solutions to problems caused by externalities. Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  20. External Costs and Benefits • Question • Why should Fitch pay Abercrombie to filter out toxins that would not be there in the first place if not for Abercrombie’s factory? Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  21. External Costs and Benefits • Example • By law Abercrombie cannot dump without Fitch’s approval. • Fitch and Abercrombie can negotiate without cost. Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  22. Costs and Benefits of Eliminating Toxic Waste (Part 3) With filter Without filter Gains to Abercrombie Gains to Fitch • Economic surplus = $200 w/filter & $220 w/o filter • Fitch would gain $30 with the filter but the outcome is inefficient • Abercrombie pays Fitch $40 to operate without the filter • Economic surplus = $110 + $110 = $220 & both gain $10 • Allowing pollution increases economic surplus Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  23. External Costs and Benefits • When polluters are liable: • Polluter’s income is lowered. • Those injured by pollution will have higher income. Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  24. Will Ann and Betty Share an apartment? Benefits of Shared Living Total cost of separate apartments Rent savings From sharing Total cost of shared apartment (2)($400/month) $600/month $200/month = $800/month Costs of Shared Living Least costly Problem Ann’s cost of Betty’s cost of solution to solving problem solving problem the problem Ann’s phone usage Curtailed Tolerate phone Betty tolerates phone usage: usage: $150/mo. Ann’s phone usage: $250/mo. $150/mo. Gain in Surplus from Shared Living Rent savings Least costly accommodation Gain in surplus ($200/month) to shared living problems $50/month ($150/month) The Gain in Surplus from Shared Living Arrangements Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  25. Benefits of Shared Living Total cost of separate apartments Rent savings From sharing Total cost of shared apartment (2)($400/month) $600/month $200/month = $800/month Costs of Shared Living Least costly Problem Ann’s cost of Betty’s cost of solution to solving problem solving problem the problem Ann’s phone usage Curtailed Tolerate phone Betty tolerates phone usage: usage: $150/mo. Ann’s phone usage: $250/mo. $150/mo. Gain in Surplus from Shared Living Rent savings Least costly accommodation Gain in surplus ($200/month) to shared living problems $50/month ($150/month) The Gain in Surplus from Shared Living Arrangements How much should Ann and Betty pay if they agree to split their economic surplus equally? Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  26. External Costs and Benefits • Legal Remedies for Externalities • When negotiation is costless: • Efficient solutions to externalities can be found. • The adjustment to the externality is usually done by the party with the lowest cost. Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  27. External Costs and Benefits • Legal Remedies for Externalities • When negotiation is not costless: • Laws may be used to correct for externalities. • The burden of the law can be placed on those who have the lowest cost. Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  28. Legal Remedies for Externalities • Economic Naturalist • What is the purpose of speed limits and traffic laws? Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  29. Legal Remedies for Externalities • Economic Naturalist • Why do most communities have zoning laws? Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  30. Legal Remedies for Externalities • Economic Naturalist • Why do many governments enact laws that limit the discharge of environmental pollutants? Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  31. Legal Remedies for Externalities • Economic Naturalist • What is the purpose of free speech laws? Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  32. Legal Remedies for Externalities • Economic Naturalist • Why does government subsidize the planting of trees on hillsides? Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  33. MC (increasing opportunity cost) Optimal amount of pollution: MC = MB MC = MB MB (diminishing marginal utility) Q The Optimal Amount of Negative Externalities is Not Zero MC/MB Quantity of Pollution Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  34. Private equilibrium without pollution tax Private equilibrium with pollution tax Social MC = Private MC + XC Private MC + Tax 2,300 XC = $1,000/ton Tax = $1,000/ton 2,000 2,000 Price ($/ton) Price ($/ton) Private MC Private MC 1,300 1,300 D D 8,000 Social optimum 12,000 Private equilibrium 8,000 12,000 Quantity (tons/year) Quantity (tons/year) Taxing a Negative Externality Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  35. Private equilibrium without subsidy 14 MC Price ($/ton) 10 Social demand = Private demand + XB 8 Private demand 1,200 1,600 Quantity (tons/year) Quantity (tons/year) Subsidizing a Positive Externality Private equilibrium with subsidy Social optimum XB = 6 Subsidy = 6 14 MC 10 Subsidized demand = Private demand + tax 8 Private demand 1,200 1,600 Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  36. Property Rights and the Tragedy of Commons • The Problem of Unpriced Resources • When no one owns property, the opportunity cost of using it is not considered. • Use of the property will increase until MB = 0. Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  37. Price per 2-year-old steer ($) Number of steers on the commons Income per steer ($/year) • 1 126 26 • 2 119 19 • 3 116 16 • 4 113 13 • 5 111 11 The Relationship BetweenHerd Size and Steer Price • A village has: • 5 residents • Each has savings = $100 • Each villager can buy a bond paying 13%/yr or a steer and sell it in a year • Investment decisions are individual and public • Will there be a socially optimal outcome? Act individually to maximize income • Individual choice • 4 steers = $52 • 1 bonds = $13 • Total Income = $65 Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  38. Marginal Income and theSocially Optimal Herd Size Income per steer ($/year) Total cattle Income ($/year) Marginal Income ($/year) Price per 2-year-old steer ($) Number of steers on the commons • 1 126 26 26 26 • 2 119 19 38 12 • 3 116 16 48 10 • 4 113 13 52 4 • 5 111 11 55 3 Act individually to maximize income Act collectively to maximize village income • Socially optimal choice • 1 steer = $26 • 4 bonds = $52 • Total Income = $78 • Individual choice • 4 steers = $52 • 1 bonds = $13 • Total Income = $65 Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  39. Property Rights and the Tragedy of Commons • The Problem of Unpriced Resources • When no one owns the commons, the opportunity cost of using it is not considered. • Use of the commons will increase until MB = 0. • One person’s use of the commons imposes an external cost on the others by making the property less valuable. Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  40. Property Rights and the Tragedy of Commons • The Effect of Private Ownership • Example • How much will the right to control the village commons sell for? Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  41. Property Rights and the Tragedy of Commons • The Effect of Private Ownership • Assume • Villagers can borrow and lend at 13%. • The villagers decide to auction off the rights to the commons. • One steer is the optimal number Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  42. Property Rights and the Tragedy of Commons • The Effect of Private Ownership • Assume • Income from one steer = $26. • Pay $100 for the commons • The $26 profit covers the cost of the loan to buy the steer at the opportunity cost of $100 or $13 • Economic surplus of the village will be: • (4 x $13) + $26 = $78 or • (4 x $13) + $13 rent + $13 highest bidder = $78 Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  43. Property Rights and the Tragedy of Commons • The Effect of Private Ownership • Observations • When the land is auctioned, the highest bidder will have an incentive to consider the opportunity cost of grazing additional steers. • Common property is not used efficiently. Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  44. Property Rights and the Tragedy of Commons • The Effect of Private Ownership • Observations • Zoning laws and other regulations restrict the use of private property. • The laws can be used to maximize economic surplus. Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  45. Property Rights and the Tragedy of Commons • The Effect of Private Ownership • Observations • The laws can also be used to achieve an individual goal (reelection) by reducing the economic surplus. • Private ownership may be impractical. Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  46. Property Rights and the Tragedy of Commons • Economic Naturalist • Why do blackberries in public parks get picked too soon? • Why are shared milkshakes consumed too quickly? Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  47. Property Rights and the Tragedy of Commons • When Private Ownership is Impractical • Harvesting timber on remote public land • Harvesting whales in international waters • Controlling multinational environmental pollution Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  48. Positional Externalities • Payoffs That Depend on Relative Performance • In a competitive situation: • There is an incentive to take an action to increase the odds of winning. • The overall gain to the players as a group will be zero. Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  49. Positional Externalities • Payoffs That Depend on Relative Performance • In a competitive situation: • When the payoff depends on relative performance, incentive to invest in performance activities will be excessive from a collective point of view. Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

  50. Positional Externalities • Economic Naturalist • Why do football players take anabolic steroids? • Smith and Jones are competing for a single position and a $1 million contract. Chapter 12: Externalities and Property Rights

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