Chapter 2 Morality: Relative or Objective

1. Chapter 2�Morality: Relative or Objective? In some parts of the world the practice of bribing government/business officials is standard practice. They seem to treat it much like we treat tips for waiters and waitresses. But in most industrialized countries bribery is considered both immoral and illegal. When we ask about the morality of such practices we have to wonder if there is a single universal answer, or if our answer in some sense depends on our perspective. Many people seem to think that �morality is relative� in some sense (i.e.�to the individual, to the culture, etc.) Perhaps bribery is okay in countries where it is expected, but immoral in countries where it is not.

2. Normative Ethics vs. Metaethics Last time we talked about normative ethics. That is, questions about the moral assessment of particular things (applied ethics) or the general standards of right and wrong (ethical theory) The question of whether or not ethics is relative or objective is a metaethical question. That is, it is a question about the underlying foundation and structure of morality itself.

3. Classical Moral Relativism Moral relativism holds that �moral appraisals are essentially dependent upon the standards that define a particular moral code, the practices and norms accepted by a social group at a specific place and time.� Hence, no single moral code has universal validity. Harris breaks down �Classical Moral Relativism� into three theses: The Diversity Thesis The Relativity Thesis The Toleration Thesis

4. The Diversity Thesis We simply have to acknowledge that moral beliefs vary drastically from culture to culture. EX�Abortion is thought to be impermissible in Ireland, permissible in Japan, controversial here in the U.S. Moreover, our particular moral beliefs are almost always a function of the culture we grow up in. If we grew up elsewhere we would believe different things. What moral authority other than society can there be? Morality is just like fashion in clothes, beauty in persons, and legality in action. All of these are relative to and determined by the standards of a particular culture.

5. Sometimes Diversity Can Be Explained Away Sometimes what LOOKS like moral relativity is actually just a difference in circumstance, or other non-moral beliefs. EX�Betty grows up in a society where there is a special obligation to care for one�s aunts and uncles in their old age. Sarah grows up in a society that doesn�t share this custom. It seems like Betty might have an obligation that Sarah doesn�t, in virtue of the fact that they live in different societies. But we don�t have to be relativists to make sense of this.

6. There Are Other Explanations In a society that presumes an obligation, people develop expectations. If those expectations are thwarted, bad consequences may follow. Perhaps these bad consequences account for why Betty has an obligation that Sarah doesn�t. Both have an objective obligation to avoid bad consequences. To fulfill this obligation, Betty has to take care of her aunts and uncles; Sarah does not need to do this to fulfill her obligation. But can such factual/conceptual differences account of ALL cases of cultural difference?

7. The Relativity Thesis From the fact of moral diversity many people thinks the relativity thesis follows: Moral beliefs are true only relative to some group. (a.k.a.�metaethical moral relativism) This thesis DOES NOT hold that there are no true moral beliefs. There are, on this view, many such beliefs. But all of those beliefs are only true with reference to a certain framework.

8. The Cultural Differences Argument Does the relativity thesis follow directly from the diversity thesis? The arguments seem to work like this: The Japanese see nothing wrong with abortion. The Irish believe abortion is wrong. Therefore infanticide is neither objectively moral or immoral. The general argument looks like this: Different cultures have different moral codes. Therefore there is no objective �truth� about moral codes.

9. Is The Cultural Differences Argument Sound? No, it�s not sound because it�s not valid. Even if the premises are true, the conclusion is not guaranteed to follow The premise is about what people believe; the conclusion is about what is actually the case. People may disagree over whether or not the earth is round or flat; that doesn�t mean there isn�t a fact of the matter. We�ve already seen that we can�t derive moral conclusions based solely on factual premises. Even thought the argument isn�t sound, the conclusion may still be true, nonetheless. We need to augment the Cultural Differences Argument.

10. Moral Skepticism Things get better if we combine the cultural differences argument with the notion of moral skepticism: The idea that there is no way to know which, if any, moral beliefs are true. But this still won�t prove that morality is relative. Just because we can�t prove something (i.e.�a particular moral framework) doesn�t mean it isn�t true. Neither cultural disagreement in a field, nor inability to prove a particular perspective in that field entails there are no objective facts in that field.

11. How do we account for cultural relativity? But whenever there is a disagreement in a given field we can ask what explains that disagreement. In science, for example, we can explain disagreement by pointing out different standards of evidence, rules of inference, operating assumptions, etc. This won�t seem to work for ethical disagreements. Moral codes seem to follow from cultural practices, rather than operative or methodological rules. Moreover, if we cannot, even in principle, prove that one moral perspective is superior to another, then what does it mean to say that one perspective is �true� and that the others are false? Aren�t we just asserting our opinions at that point?

12. Mackie�s �Argument from Queerness� J.L. Mackie asks us to assume, for the sake of argument that there are objective moral values. Just what sort of things would they be? And how would we know about them? They would have to be completely unlike than any other things in the universe. They would be �queer.� Clearly we don�t �see� (or �hear,� �touch,� etc.) moral values in the normal sense of the term. Do we have a special faculty of �moral perception?� But what could that be? (Mackie says �moral intuition� isn�t going to work, it�s too variable.) If we can�t perceive them, if they are �queer� in this way, then what reason do we have to think they exist? Why not just do away with them?

13. The Toleration Thesis Moral relativism is often associated with the toleration thesis: Because there is no objectively true moral perspective, we should not pass judgment on other cultures, or forcibly chance the beliefs of other cultures. There is an immediate problem with this thesis: it seems to contradict moral relativism. If there is no objectively true morality then how can it be �wrong� of us to pass judgment on other cultures? The toleration thesis looks like an objective norm. But the toleration thesis might work, if our particular moral code happens to accept it. Yet, how could one argue that it ought to accept it? On what basis could we make such an argument?

14. Problems with Moral Relativism Moral Relativism faces a series of difficult problems. No one of these problems are, by themselves, decisive, but together they make things very difficult for the relativist. These problems are: The Problem of Cultural Conflict The Problem of Cross Cultural Criticism The Problem of Civil Disobedience and Moral Progress The Problem of Consensus The Problem of Defining �Society� The Problem of Moral Discourse The Problem of Impartiality

15. The Problem of Cultural Conflict The problem with the toleration thesis leads us right into our first criticism of classical relativism, the problem of cultural conflict. If moral principles only apply within a society, then there are no principles that govern how one society should treat another. Think about war: when two cultures go to war what moral principles should we use to evaluate the conduct of the war? Is each army subject to their own principles? That means that we can�t condemn �unjust wars,� unless they violate the principles of the suspect country.

16. The Problem of Cross-Cultural Criticism We all want to say that what the Nazis did was wrong. We want to say that slave-owners in the antebellum South were wrong. But if relativism is right, then we can�t say this. So long as those societies were living up to their own moral codes (and it�s by no means clear that they were), we can�t criticize them on moral grounds.

17. The Problem of Civil Disobedience & Moral Progress We all think that abolitionists in the antebellum South were doing the right thing. We think MLK and those in the civil rights movement did the right thing by helping to change our racist laws and cultural consciousness. But if relativism is right, then these �progressive� thinkers were really doing the wrong thing, relative to their societies.

18. The Problem of Consensus What proportion of society has to think something is wrong for it to be wrong? 90%? 75%? 51%? Any number seems arbitrary. What if one year 51% of people think abortion is permissible, and the next 51% think it�s impermissible. Does this mean abortion was morally permissible last year, but is morally impermissible this year? Rebuttal: why think ethics has to be black and white, either/or? Why can�t we adopt a graduated scale? But how would we determine such a scale? Do we just take a poll? Do we give more weight to people who have strong opinions about an issue? Again, any answer seems arbitrary.

19. The Problem of Defining �Society� How do you determine exactly what group ethics is relative to? Is it the nation? The state? The local community? (Why not the whole world?) It�s not just geographical, either: religious communities and the like can be geographically discontinuous. Many individuals belong to several overlapping �societies.� As a Catholic, I may think homosexuality is wrong, but as a San Franciscan, I may think it�s okay. How do I negotiate such disagreements?

20. The Problem of Moral Discourse When we talk about morality, we often asks for reasons. When someone says �incest is wrong,� we are entitled to say back �why is it wrong?� If someone refuses to give reasons and says �it�s just wrong,� we�re inclined to think he�s just expressing disgust, rather than a moral judgment. Moreover, only certain sorts of reasons seem acceptable. If someone says �it�s wrong because it�s disgusting� or �it�s wrong because God says so,� then all argument grinds to a halt. Moral relativism can�t account for this. We can�t give �reasons� for our differing moral perspectives because all disagreement is the result of having different frameworks. Indeed, if relativism is right then there ARE NO ETHICAL DISAGREEMENTS! (At least not across societies.)

21. The Problem of Impartiality In chapter 1 we saw that in order for a principle to be a moral principle it has to apply impartially, across the board, the same for everyone. Any system that failed this criteria isn�t a genuine moral system. But relativism seems to defy this requirement. If ethics is relative then one action that is right for you (relative to your society) might be wrong for me (relative to mine.) If our discussion of impartiality in chapter 1 is correct, then it relativism seems to imply that there are no genuine moral systems!

22. The Relativists� Rebuttal Most of these objections rely on certain intuitions about what is right and wrong. Of course WE think genocide, racism, sexism, religious persecution, etc. are wrong�that�s what our culture�s moral code says! If we lived in a different society we may think differently about these things. In asserting these things we are just engaging in �cultural chauvinism.� (But why is that bad? What is the foundation for that criticism?)

23. But Notice What ISN�T Relative Even though cultures disagree about what is right and wrong, most cultures agree that right and wrong IS absolute. Most every culture thinks there IS a true moral code (usually their own.) This is something they don�t disagree about. Why should disagreement about applied ethics lead us to conclude that our shared metaethical view is mistaken? Why not think our agreement about second-level views means (some of our) first-level views are mistaken?

24. Limited Moral Relativism To try and address some of these problems, David Wong has suggested what he calls �limited moral relativism�: While there is no single true moral code, there are limitations on what counts as an acceptable candidate for a moral code. �The universal limits on adequate moralities do not narrow the range of such moralities to one.�

25. Five Kinds of Moral Values Wong says there are five kinds of moral values. Specific Obligations (i.e.�to our children, family) Rights (i.e.�freedom of speech, etc.) General public welfare Perfectionist ends (i.e.�intrinsically valuable ends; art, science, etc.) Personal projects and goals These values often conflict with each other, and various civilizations value them differently. There may be no way to say which kind of values a civilization should prioritize.

26. Limits to Moral Diversity But there are limits to what counts as a genuine moral system, including: Internal consistency: the values can�t contradict themselves or each other. External consistency: the values can�t contradict facts/common sense. Functional Adequacy: does the system do what we want a moral system to do? Does it regulate conflicts between people? Does it embody/reflect the values of the society? We can use these test to find a �reflective equilibrium� in our moral systems.

27. Limits to Moral Diversity Not every candidate-moral-code will pass these tests. As the world becomes more interconnected and we are confronted with a wider variety of people fewer and fewer moral codes will be able to survive. This gives limited moral relativism a way to make sense of moral progress, cross-cultural conflicts and perhaps meet the impartiality criteria.

28. Problems with Limited Moral Relativism We still don�t know how to define �culture.� Who defines what �we� want a moral code to do? What if we care about functions other than regulating conflict, etc.? How exactly do we apply these guidelines? What if we disagree about which codes meet them the best?

29. Religion as the Foundation of Objective Morality Probably the most common basis for the claim that morality is objective comes from religion. The connection between religion and morality takes many different forms. Let�s look at a few People often argue that religion is necessary to motivate people to do the right thing. Doing the right thing is often hard. Without the thought of God looking over us, rewarding us for doing good and punishing us for doing bad, it would be too easy for us to transgress. Or, one might argue that in order to really commune with God, we need to live a moral life, as He has ordained for us.

30. Does Religion Really Motivate Us? The problem with such arguments is that there are many things that motivate us to do the right thing. We�re motivated by the thought of civil penalty, feelings of guilt and regret, etc. Moreover, sometimes doing the right thing ISN�T hard. We just do it without even thinking about transgressing. Most of the time, religion doesn�t really play a factor in our decision making. Thus, it seems these other motives are more the sufficient to motivate moral behavior, even for the irreligious.

31. Moreover, Is Such A Morality Really �Moral?� Let�s say I find someone�s wallet and return it to them because I expect a reward. I did the right thing, but not for the right reason. I wasn�t being moral, I was being selfish. It seems like for an act to be moral it has to be motivated, not by personal gain, but because it�s the right thing to do. But the religious motivation described above is nothing more than a way of motivating us to do the right thing by making it in our own interest to do so. We aren�t being moral, we�re being prudential�We don�t want to burn in hell!

32. Maybe We Need Religion To KNOW What Is Right and Wrong Moral questions are very complex; we can never hope to solve the on our own. We need religion to help us. But how is religion supposed to help us? Which religion do we turn to? How do we know that�s the right one? Even if we decide on, say, the Judeo-Christian-Islamic God, we would still have to determine what such a God wants from us. That is, we need to rely on revelation.

33. Two Forms Of Revelation Some say that true revelation is when God speaks to you directly, gives you the answers (ex-the 10 Commandments). Others say that true revelation is not the words of God, but the acts of God (ex-leading His people out of Egypt.) Which of these two accounts of Revelation should we accept? Can there be a principled, rational way of deciding this?

34. �For The Bible Tells Me So� Even if we agree upon a given authoritative form of revelation, such as the scripture, we still have problems. People have notoriously divergent readings of divine scripture. The bible has been used to justify war, torture, genocide, etc. Others say the bible commits us to pacifism. Ditto with the Qur�an, the Talmud, the Upanishads, etc. How can we adjudicate between these interpretations? Frequently, morality influences the hermeneutic, rather than the other way around If people want to find a justification, they�ll find one.

35. Divine Command Theory This all seems to miss the point. When most people think of the relationship between God and morality, they mean something deeper. Perhaps God is necessary for there to be any morality in the first place. On this account the reason why, say, murder, is wrong is because God says it�s wrong. Thus, this idea is called �Divine Command Theory� Remember the problems of cross-cultural criticism/moral progress: relativism makes it really hard to criticize the Nazis. But if God dictates what�s right and wrong we have an objective means of condemning Hitler. God isn�t the only way to objectively ground ethics Reason, human nature are two other ways. But God certainly seems to do the job.

36. But What Does �God�s Command� Really Mean? How are we to understand the claim �Murder is wrong because God says it�s wrong.� Clearly this isn�t a definitional point. �Murder is wrong� doesn�t just mean �God commands us not to murder.� Whole societies have had moral codes/prohibitions on murder with no reference to God. So to unpack this connection we have to look deeper.

37. Euthyphro�s Dilemma In Plato�s Dialogue �Euthyphro,� Socrates poses a very difficult problem for Divine Command Theory. Is �the good� loved by God because it�s good, or is it �the good� because God loves it? In other words, does the goodness explain why God loves it, or does God loving it explain why it�s good? In other words still: does God decide what�s good, or does he recognize what�s good? Does God have a reason for making murder wrong, or is God the reason? Either way, the divine command theorist answers these questions, they�re in trouble.

38. If God Decides What is Good� Then �the good� is determined entirely by the caprice of God. There is no reason why God chose to make murder wrong, it just so happens that God chose it that way. If God had chosen otherwise (or if God changed his mind) then murder might have been good, morally required, even. Saying that God (and morality) is arbitrary in this way is only uncomfortable. It almost seems to fall prey to the same problems that made us reject relativism. This would also make claims like �God is Good� utterly meaningless. They would reduce to �God does what God commands.� In a strange way, this seems like a strange version of �might makes right��it�s just that God has the �might� to determine what is right.

39. If God Recognizes What is Good� Then, first off, it seems there is a limitation on God�s power. If he has a reason to think murder is wrong, then this reason has power over Him. God can�t make murder good, so he�s not really all powerful. But more to the point, it seems like this makes God role in grounding ethics superfluous. We don�t need God to tell us what�s right and wrong, we just need to see the same reasons that God sees. This dilemma greatly undermines the divine command theory. It has, nonetheless, thrived.

40. Rationality vs. Truth Maybe we haven�t been asking the right question. Perhaps instead of asking �which moral theory is true?� we should be asking �which moral theory is the most rational?� As we continue on into the next several chapters we will analyze and assess the moral theories we look at in terms of: How rationally defensible they are, How well they make sense of our common sense moral intuitions, and How well they fit with our general understanding of the world.