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The Interwar Period: A Strategic Interaction Case Study. Strategic Elements. Personality/reputation of actors Use of incentives First mover advantage Sequential Chicken Salami Tactics “Last clear chance” dilemma Reputation effects. Hitler's Personality.
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Strategic Elements • Personality/reputation of actors • Use of incentives • First mover advantage • Sequential Chicken • Salami Tactics • “Last clear chance” dilemma • Reputation effects
Hitler's Personality • Centralized leadership in Germany casts strategic interactions much more with an individual (Hitler) than with a state as a whole • Rationality of Irrationality -contest of military might transformed to a significant extent into a contest of wills with a player who seemed all too open to risking all-out conflict -also made prediction of exact actions a challenge
Stresa Conference • Major European powers meet in 1935 -Discussed is Germany's abandonment of the restrictions on military forces imposed by Treaty of Versailles -Negotiations broke down before action was taken against Germany • Why? -Germany offered naval agreement to Britain, forcing a strategic decision on the worth of the incentive
Fait Accompli & The Blitz • By conducting short, decisive military actions Germany was able to make the first strategic move in most interactions • This forced the rest of Europe to be reactive, or (as was mostly the case) de facto non-interactive
Chicken • Familiar classic game of sequential play chicken • Germany enjoys significant first-mover advantage • In this case, we are playing iterated sequential play chicken, so the expanded form looks more like this:
Chicken (cont.) • Germany can commit to always choosing “straight” • Clearly, in sequential play this is the dominant strategy for Germany, thus Europe can predict this will be the path choosen
Chicken (cont.) • Why bother with committing when not swerving is clearly the dominant strategy? -Because you can threaten to use your dominant strategy and win without even playing -This threat is highly credible -Over iterations of the game this might become more attractive then continuing to risk “punitive” mutual disaster
Salami Tactics • The last clear chance to avoid mutual disaster is foisted upon Europe • Slice by slice territories are annexed by Germany, and the decision to be made comes down to: -Is this territory worth sparking a conflict that can very easily expand beyond our control? -Do we have the resources to successfully engage in conflict?
Militarization of Rhineland - 1936 • German movement of troops in violation of Locarno Pact • France's developing ties to the Soviet Union was the pretext for this move • Rejoining the League was a carrot dangled for Europe allowing this move -ironically offered at a time when the League was exhibiting its failure to resolve conflict in Ethiopia
Munich - 1938 • Germany directs its aggressive intentions at Czechoslovakia • Britain was extremely averse to war -and was not sure that it could successfully defend Czechoslovakia in any case • Heavily defended border region of Sudetenland given to Germany to foment “peace in our time” (Chamberlain)
Munich (cont.) • This is an example of Germany using its established reputation to allow pre-play communication to gain the prize without even having to truly play • The irony is that an invasion of the Sudetenland by Germany stood a significant chance of failure, but by loosing this highly defensible region to agreement, Czechoslovakia was now open to future attack -which is exactly what occured
Poland, The Tipping Point - 1939 • Poland can be held up as an example of the downside of an established reputation of interaction • Repeated unswerving commitments eventually make clear that conflict is now inevitable • All offering concessions at this stage does is delay the inevitable (and likely make conflict resolution more challenging)