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Poland, Senate 28 May 2007

Poland, Senate 28 May 2007. Skugga för grön bakgr. Skugga för blå bakgr. Skugga för röd bakgr. Skugga för grå bakgr. Nord Stream And the Security Political Implications for the Baltic Sea Region. Robert L. Larsson Security Analyst Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI).

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Poland, Senate 28 May 2007

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  1. Poland, Senate 28 May 2007 Skugga för grön bakgr. Skugga för blå bakgr. Skugga för röd bakgr. Skugga för grå bakgr. Nord StreamAnd the Security Political Implications for the Baltic Sea Region Robert L. Larsson Security Analyst Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI)

  2. Point of Departure What is Energy Security? • Difference notion of RF and the EU • Not only security of supplies…

  3. Security Political Issues • Political frictions • Military-political issues • Intelligence aspects • Militarisation • Common EU policy • Integration • Trust and confidence • Transparency • Rationale and legitimacy

  4. Point of Departure • Russia’s energy policy must be understood in the light of its overall development. • Foreign policy • View on security • Market management

  5. Coercive Energy Policy Skugga för grön bakgr. Skugga för blå bakgr. Skugga för röd bakgr. Skugga för grå bakgr. • RF securitises energy issues. • This legitimises the use of extraordinary and coercive means to tackle perceived problems…

  6. Claimed Legitimacy • Not a Russo-German project but instead… • …a common European project that… • …connects Russia and Europe and… • …serves integration and interdependence

  7. Russia’s Energy Perceptions • Russia’s energy strategy -> urge to control • Aims to be strong and independent • Energy will create growth and extend influence • One sided dependence is sougth after • RF will use its energy policy as a security tool but aims to be reliable…

  8. Dividing – not connecting EU NO? Yes NO? NO Yes? NO NO Yes NO

  9. No Common EU Energy Policy? • NS is evidence of bilateralism prevailing over common priorities • More difficult to form a common EU energy strategy • Undermining the foundation of the EU

  10. Sweden’s stand • No official policy line of the government • Spokesmen from all political parties have indicated that they see problems • The majority of the public is against it: • 51% against • 24% for • 25% N/A Source: Synovate TEMO

  11. Non-alternative Routes Forgotten alternatives?

  12. Service Riser Locations

  13. Responsibility for Protection • Swedish responsibility since it is in the Swedish EEZ • Staffed by Russian citizens? • Russian rethoric on protection of its citizens is worrying. • Potential source of friction if a threat against the riser emerges

  14. Militarisation of the Baltic Sea • Anti-terrorism could be used for cooperation, but can also be a source of friction. • Putin has promised that the pipeline will be protected by the Russian navy • Securing supplies by military means can cause a re-militarisation of the Baltic Sea • No legal problem with increased military activities • Nord Stream gives Russia a reason to show flag • Increased tension could be experienced

  15. Lack of confidence in the project Official and underlying aspects

  16. SUPERVISORY LEVEL Shareholders Committee Role: board of directors functions MANAGEMENT LEVEL Managing Director Technical Directors Commercial Director Financial Director Responsibility and Structure Will there be any usage of subcontractors? 51,0 % 24,5% 24,5% Nord Stream AG

  17. Startegic Energy Policy Russia’s energy strategy is not decided by the market or by foreigners

  18. Increased Russian Leverage Leverage on connected states Leverage on transit states

  19. Leverage on Importers Several possible levers: • Control of infrastructure • Control of companies • Usage/creation of debts • Coercive price policy • “Marketisation” • Overt/covert threats • Supply interruptions

  20. What are the threats to supplies?

  21. Mother Nature is the greatest threat! Reliability can be seen in terms of: • Volumes? • Incidents? • Cut-offs? • Politics? • Politics may cause greater problems than mother nature and therefore it is essential to look at Russia’s reliability.

  22. Coercive Energy Policy Skugga för grön bakgr. Skugga för blå bakgr. Skugga för röd bakgr. Skugga för grå bakgr. Robert L. Larsson, FOI 2006

  23. Coercive Energy Policy Skugga för grön bakgr. Skugga för blå bakgr. Skugga för röd bakgr. Skugga för grå bakgr. Robert L. Larsson, FOI 2006

  24. Coercive Energy Policy Robert L. Larsson, FOI 2006

  25. Explicit Political Underpinning ”Russia may agree to lower natural gas prices for Ukraine if the country scales down its pro-Western foreign policy” Viktor Chernomyrdin Kiev 30 May 2006

  26. Is there a true interdependence? • Russia is dependent on access to markets • Russia is dependent on Western money • Russia would never do anything against NATO or the EU • Russia needs to be reliable – otherwise it gets badwill Are These Barriers High Enough to prevent cut-offs or coercive policy?

  27. Are the Barriers High Enough? Robert L. Larsson, FOI 2006

  28. International Law • If security political implications are evident… • Why is only HELCOM and the Esboo convention the only legal frameworks utilised? • Why not UN charter etc?

  29. Looking East, Heading West? • European criticism makes Russia look eastward where more “greateful” importers are. • Will this lead to European appeasement?

  30. Unknown future We have no idea who will be in charge, his agenda and Russia’s situation – not in even the near future... During 50 years, the life-span of Nord Stream, Russia will be led by 7-13 presidents…

  31. Thank you for your attention! Robert Larsson FOI 194 90 Stockholm E-mail:robert.larsson@foi.se Phone: +46 (0)8-55 50 37 60 See further: • NEW! Nord Stream, Sweden and Baltic Sea Security (Larsson). • Russia’s Energy Policy: Security Dimensions of Russia’s Reliability as an Energy Supplier (Larsson) N.B. Views and conclusions do not necessarely reflect those of the Swedish government or FOI. Disclaimers and details of the statistics will be published in a forthcoming report by FOI. Figures should not be taken at face value. Refer to the reports above for full analysis.

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