Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty

1. Do We Need a Philosophical Account of Human Rights? Rorty ER 11, Gov E-1040 Spring 2012

2. Pragmatism: anti-foundationalist, practice-oriented movement in (American) philosophy

3. [T]he tangible fact at the root of all our thought-distinctions, however subtle, is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice. To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. (William James, Pragmatism)

4. Pay a visit…?

5. Rorty on Human rights • Pragmatism applied to search for foundations for human rights • “disagreement about foundations makes no practical difference anyway, so might as well not have it”

6. Rorty on Human rights • Pragmatism applied to search for foundations for human rights • “disagreement about foundations makes no practical difference anyway, so might as well not have it”

7. Against foundations in ethics “We pragmatists argue from the fact that the emergence of the human rights culture seems to owe nothing to increased moral knowledge and everything to hearing sad and sentimental stories, to the conclusion that there is probably no knowledge of the sort Plato envisaged. We go on to argue: Since no useful work seems to be done by insisting on a purportedly ahistorical human nature, there probably is no such nature, or at least nothing in that nature that is relevant to our moral choices.” (p 118)

8. So argument is: • Foundational inquiries do not explain emergence of human rights culture. • If X is not needed to explain emergence of Y, but we care about maintaining Y, we need not inquire about X. • Therefore, we need not make foundational inquiries about human rights.

9. To blame: Plato

12. Ethics: all wrong-headed, following Plato? • Moral philosophy focused on “rather rare figure of psychopath” – who (a) grew up without moral sentiments, and (b) can be rationally persuaded to adopt them • much more common: person whose treatment of narrow range of people is impeccable, but who remains indifferent to others

13. (…) [T]he rational egoist is not the problem. The problem is the gallant and honorable Serb who sees Muslims as circumcised dogs. It is the brave soldier who loves and is loved by his mates, but who thinks of women as dangerous, malevolent whores and bitches.” (p 124)

14. Leave “foundationalism” behind! • concentrate energies on “sentimental education” • acquaint people with one another so that they are less tempted to think of others as only quasi-human

15. Expand reference of terms such as “our kind of people” and “people like us”

16. Wrong audience?

17. Wrong audience?

18. Instead --

19. Instead, indeed --

20. Progress of sentiments • would think of immoral people not as irrational but deprived • “thinking of the spread of the human rights culture not as a matter of becoming more aware of the requirements of the moral law, but rather as what [the philosopher Annette] Baier calls ‘a progress of sentiments.’”

21. Why should I be moral? New responses “Because this is what it is like to be in her situation – to be far from home, among strangers” “Because she might become your daughter-in-law” “Because her mother would grieve for her” People will be more readily inclined to adopt this attitude if they live securely enough to develop sympathies with others

22. Fourth strategy for grounding human rights • Natural rights/Kant/Griffin • Rorty: not focusing on rational argument, but putting people in position to show sympathies • raise them in such a way that they understand moral life as richer than morally deprived life

23. What we can grant to Rorty • Given resistance we offered to Kant/Gewirth approach, we can grant that a certain approach to morality is asking too much • Griffin approach does not tie rationality and morality in the way Rorty criticizes • centrality of education for “progress of sentiments” is undeniable

24. The hardest task

25. Objecting to Rorty: power of ideas • Rorty underestimates power of ideas • Opposing standpoint: “Thought achieves more in the world than practice; for once the realm of imagination has been revolutionized, reality cannot resist” (Hegel) • Remember emancipation movements

26. Objecting to Rorty: power of ideas • Rorty underestimates power of ideas • Opposing standpoint: “Thought achieves more in the world than practice; for once the realm of imagination has been revolutionized, reality cannot resist” (Hegel) • Remember emancipation movements

27. Why inquire about foundations? • questioning dominance of human rights discourse in evaluation of moral success • understanding one’s own approach to an assessment of other cultures

28. We use human rights language to justify interventions – they better have good foundations!

29. Education is essential, but intellectual engagement is required as well for success

30. Recall the argument: • Foundational inquiries do not explain emergence of human rights culture. • If X is not needed to explain emergence of Y, but we care about maintaining Y, we need not inquire about X. • Therefore, we need not make foundational inquiries about human rights. [First premise is doubtful, second premise is false.]