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US-Russian Relations: Nuclear Arms Race and Disarmament

US-Russian Relations: Nuclear Arms Race and Disarmament. Matt Rosenstein Associate Director Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS) at UIUC REES 200 October 30, 2006. “Pop Quiz”. 1. What are the greatest threats to U.S. national security today?.

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US-Russian Relations: Nuclear Arms Race and Disarmament

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  1. US-Russian Relations: Nuclear Arms Raceand Disarmament Matt RosensteinAssociate Director Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS) at UIUC REES 200October 30, 2006

  2. “Pop Quiz” 1. What are the greatest threats to U.S. national security today? 2. What are the greatest threats to Russian national security today?

  3. Objectives for This Session Arms Race • What hath we wrought? (“Results” of the US-Russian arms race) • How did it come to this? (motivations and policies that explain the build-up) Disarmament and Nonproliferation • What steps did the US and Russia take to reduce risk of nuclear war and # of arms? • What are the salient security concerns today with respect to US and Russian nuclear arms?

  4. What Hath We Wrought? Only country in the world to carry out a nuclear attack? • United States, on Japan, WWII • Hiroshima (August 6, 1945) and Nagasaki (August 9, 1945) Fat Man and Little Boy

  5. The Destructive Potential of Nuclear Arms: In Perspective Event Iraq war 9/11 Vietnam war Casualties (approx.) 2,800 3,000 47,000 Hurricane Katrina Pakistani earthquake Indian Ocean tsunami 1,800 80,000 275,000

  6. Hiroshima and Nagasaki • Estimated that between 115,000-170,000 were killed immediately • Twice as many more died over time (radiation poisoning) • 95% of deaths were civilian

  7. Hiroshima and Nagasaki • Little Boy: 13,000 tons of TNT equivalent • Most nuclear warheads today: yield between150 kiloton-1 megaton • “Tsar bomba”: Soviets exploded a50-megaton bomb in test (1961) • Spasm attack by US or USSR would result in 40-75 million Soviet and110-150 million US deaths (RAND, 1960)

  8. US and Soviet Nuclear Strategic Forces, 1950-2000 US USSR/Russia Year Launchers Warheads Launchers Warheads 1950 462 400 22* 84* 1960 1,559 3,127 144 354 1970 2,100 5,239 1,985 2,216 1980 2,022 10,608 2,545 7,480 1990 1,903 12,477 2,500 10,271 2000 1,407 7,519 1,266 6,094 2005 1,225 5,966 981 4,732 Source: Arms Control Association, Fact Sheets (2005) *=1956 totals

  9. Characteristics of US and Soviet Nuclear Strategic Forces • Both US and USSR created “nuclear triad” forces: • Ground (ICBM) • Sea (SLBM) • Air (Bombers)

  10. Military Fissile Material Stocks Country Pu (tonnes) HEU (tonnes) Israel 0.51-0.65 ?? Pakistan 0.02-0.06 1.0-1.3 India 0.3-0.5 0 UK 3.2 21.9 France 5.0 30.0 China 4.8 20.0 US 47.0 580.0 Russia 95.0 773.0 Source: Albright and Kramer, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (Nov-Dec 2004)

  11. The Arms Race: Why? • Territorial integrity and national sovereignty • Ideological struggle • Capitalism vs. communism • Liberal democracy vs. authoritarian rule • Military prowess: nukes as visible symbol of power • USSR could not keep up economically • MAD = Mutually Assured Destruction • Deterrence • Bargaining power / leverage in multilateral bodies

  12. US-Russia Arms Race: A Brief Chronology 1942 US initiates Manhattan Project 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki 1949 Soviet explosion of nuclear device 1957 Sputnik 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis

  13. US-Russia Disarmament: A Brief Chronology • 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty • End of atmospheric testing • “Hotline” • Halt proliferation to other states • 1969-1972 SALT I • Set numerical limits on missile launchers (not warheads-->MIRVs) • 1972-1979 SALT II • Broader limits than SALT I…but Afghanistan spoiled negotiations

  14. US-Russia Disarmament: A Brief Chronology • 1972 ABM Treaty • Limited each to two ABM sites (no nationwide defense) • Prohibited sea-, air-, space-based systems • Limit on qualitative improvement • Problematic: “Star Wars”, US pull-out in 2001-2 1972 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

  15. US-Russia Disarmament: A Brief Chronology • 1991 START I Treaty • Negotiated almost 10 years • Reductions in launchers (max. 1,600) and warheads (max. 6,000) • 1993 START II Treaty • Further reductions; never ratified by US Senate and Russian Duma

  16. Belarus ICBMs: ICBM Launcher Pads: Warheads: 94 54 ~225 Ukraine 258 176 36 ~1,984 ICBMs: ICBM Launchers: HBs: Warhead: Russia 1,340 1,924 87 ~11,296 ICBMs: SLBMs: HBs: Warheads:: Kazakhstan ICBMs: ICBM Launchers: HBs: Warhead: 115 104 40 ~1,462 SSBN Base ICBM Base (Silo) Mobile ICBM Base Production Facilities Non deployed ICBMs Heavy Bombers Major Destruction & Dismantlement Site Chemical Weapons & Support Facility Soviet Nuclear Assets at Time of Break-Up

  17. Bioweapons Programs • 1960s: both US and USSR were developing bioweapons programs • 1972: BWC: US, USSR (other actors, such as UK) agreed to halt bioweapons research • 1992: several Russian scientists reported work with smallpox from 1970s-1990s • Bio program cheaper than nukes • Grew smallpox in large quantities • Various research efforts: aerosolizing the virus; placed on ballistic missile warheads…

  18. After the Break-Up:Proliferation and “Brain Drain” • Concerns over safeguarding nuclear technologies and materials • Dysfunctional military: command and control? • ~150,000 scientists, engineers, technicians employed in weapons-related work • 1990s economic crisis meant low wages (or back wages owed…) --> “nuclear entrepreneurs” • Sell their knowledge?Seek employment in countries with nuclear aspirations?

  19. Cooperative Threat Reduction • Mil-mil program initiated in 1992 (Nunn-Lugar) • Objectives: assist FSU states in dismantling WMD; secure WMD materials, technology, facilities and structures; reduce threat of proliferation • Cooperation • US Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) • 1993-2003: US spent avg. of $402 million/yr (~0.18% of total US defense budget); $4.4 billion total during that time

  20. Cooperative Threat Reduction in Russia Silo Launcher Elimination Heavy Bomber Elimination Solid Propellant ICBM/SLBM and Mobile Launcher Elimination Liquid Propellant ICBM/ SLBM Elimination SSBN/SLBM Dismantlement & Elimination SS-24/SS-25 Mobile Launcher Elimination

  21. Cooperative Threat Reduction in Russia Keeping out the terrorists at Vector (biotechnology facility, Koltsovo, Russia)…

  22. Cooperative Threat Reduction: Accomplishments • More than 6,000 nuclear weapons destroyed • Thousands of launchers, missiles, devices • Removed all weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan • Employed thousands of former weapons scientists • Also destroying chemical and biological weapons

  23. The ABM Treaty: A Bump in the Road? • In Dec. 2001, Bush administration gave 6-month notice that US would withdraw from treaty • Why? US wants to develop NMD to protect against WMD threats from terrorists, “rogue states” • Putin regime protested vehemently-->felt it would limit their deterrence capabilities (made START II levels undesirable) • Failure of Russian diplomacy?

  24. The ABM Treaty: A Bump in the Road? • SORT (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty), or “Moscow Treaty” signed in May 2002 • Cut warheads to 1,700-2,200 by 2012 • Ratified in 2003 by Duma and Senate

  25. US-Russian Arms Race Legacy: Ongoing Concerns • Potential for technology, materials, knowledge transfers • “Setting a bad example”—weapons stockpiles and fissile materials stocks are disincentives for India, Pakistan, Israel(?), Iran, N. Korea, etc.

  26. US-Russian Arms Race Legacy: Ongoing Concerns • Whither the United States? • National Missile Defense • Earth-penetrating nukes, mini-nukes • Nuclear primacy? • Whither Russia? • Superpower nostalgia • Maintain credible deterrence • Relations with China, Iran vs. with US, EU

  27. Perceived National Security Threats Today U.S. national security • Terrorism • Proliferation of WMD • Rogue states (harbor terrorists, foment extremism) • Regional conflicts Source: National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006

  28. Perceived National Security Threats Today Russian National Security Concept (2000) • Focus on domestic security concerns: weak economy, organized crime, etc. • Erosion of multilateral security institutions (UN, OSCE) • Weakening of Russia’s political, economic, military influence • Strengthening of military alliances (NATO enlargement)

  29. Perceived National Security Threats Today Russian National Security Concept (2000) • Foreign military bases near Russia’s borders • Proliferation of WMD • Weakening of integration in CIS • Conflicts near CIS member states’ borders • Territorial claims against Russia

  30. Perceived National Security Threats Today Russian national security concerns (2006) • Domestic issues: economic growth, financial stability, demographic problems • Terrorism • Local conflicts (ethnic, religious) • Proliferation of WMD • Lack of military readiness Source: Putin’s Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, May 10, 2006

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