Russia and the Newly Independent States: Nonproliferation Policies and Concerns

1. Russia and the Newly Independent States: Nonproliferation Policies and Concerns Elena K. Sokova Assistant Director James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies

2. Outline • US-Russian relations and nonproliferation • Nuclear weapons, arms control and disarmament • Nuclear security and anti-terrorism efforts • Traditional nonproliferation and nuclear trade

3. U.S.-Soviet Nonproliferation Cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s • Extraordinary level of cooperation despite otherwise extreme stress in the relationship • Parallelism and similarity in key areas • IAEA safeguards system • Regulation of nuclear exports (national and multinational level) • Strengthening of NPT regime • Arms control • Regular high-level bilateral consultations on nonproliferation!

4. Post-Soviet US-Russian Cooperation • New cooperative mechanisms—Cooperative Threat Reduction and similar program (G-8 Global Partnership) • Unprecedented access to each other’s facilities and collaborative projects at scientists’ level • Nuclear security and anti-terrorism cooperation On the other hand - Regress or stagnation in traditional areas of nonproliferation cooperation- Economic and security considerations prevail at the expense of nonproliferation principles- Divergent threat perceptions and different standards towards “bad” and “good” proliferators- Complicity in some, unfortunately damaging to NPT, areas (changing nuclear trade and export control rules for India)- Diminished influence of organizational advocates and absence of regular bilateral meetings with focus on nonproliferation

5. Moving forward • Re-setting US-Russian relations • Renewed focus on arms control, START-I replacement • Continued cooperation in the areas of nuclear security and combating WMD terrorism (Bratislava-2) However: • Unresolved stress factors in theUS-Russian relationship: NATO expansion,missile defense in Europe; conventionalarms imbalance • Still no US-Russian agreement(123 agreement) on cooperation innuclear area; WTO membership not achieved; Jackson-Vanik amendment notremoved • CTR-type programs near completion(sustainability of security upgrades and decreasing avenues for cooperation are of concern)

6. START I Replacement Expires in December 2009 Putin proposed replacement – June 2006 Rice-Lavrov statement – July 2007 Obama Prague speech – April 2009 Medvedev immediately responds with support -- START I: “lighter,” more flexible than START I, more restrictive than SORT -- Likely limit of 1,500 warheads -- Simplified verification/data exchange system from START I -- Unlikely to deal with bigger issues (uploading capability; delivery systems vs. warheads; conventional warheads and capabilities, etc.)

7. Nuclear Security Cooperation • Securing Nuclear Weapons, Facilities, Materials and Preventing Transfer of WMD knowledge • Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) or Nunn-Lugar program (1991) • Materials Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A), Second Line of Defense programs and others • HEU-LEU downblending (Megatons to Megawatts) • Pu reactors closure • Nuclear Cities Initiative, ISTC • Much of the work to secure the most dangerous materials and weapons has been accomplished or nears completion (2012) • Other, non-weapons sites or materials, still require attention

8. Nuclear Terrorism and Nuclear Security – areas of mutual interest • Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, Moscow, 1996 • Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2004) – Russia’s initiative • UNSC Resolution 1540 • Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiatives (2005) – working group on cooperation in nuclear security • Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (G-8 summit in St. Petersburg, July 2006) launched jointly by the US and Russia • After some hesitation, joined the Proliferation Security Initiative

9. Weapons Disposition and Weapons Security Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan are nuclear weapons free Weapons deactivated and destroyed:6,312 nuclear warheads; 537 ICBMs; 459 ICBM silos ; 11 ICBM mobile missile launchers ; 128 bombers; 708 nuclear air-to-surface missiles; 408 submarine missile launchers; 496 submarine launched missiles; 27 nuclear submarines 35% of Russian chemical weapons destroyed Weapons Sites Secured: 60 nuclear warhead storage sites received security upgrades 49 former biological weapons facilities convertedFour chemical destruction facilities were built

10. US National Intelligence Council Report, 2003 “An unauthorized launch or accidental use of a Russian nuclear weapon is highly unlikely as long as current technical and procedural safeguards built into the command and control system remain in place and are effectively enforced.” “Russia’s nuclear material protection, control, and accounting practices have been slowly improving over the last several years, but risks remain.” “We find it highly unlikely that Russian authorities would have been able to recover all the material reportedly stolen. We assess that undetected smuggling has occurred, and we are concerned about the total amount of material that could have been diverted or stolen in the last 13 years” Weapons and Nuclear Materials Security

11. Loose Nukes Suitcase Nukes

12. Podolsk, Russia 1.5 kg 90% HEU HEU and Pu Trafficking in Russia and the NIS Paris, France 0.5 g 72% HEU Andreeva Bay, Russia 1.8 kg 36% HEU Tbilisi, Georgia 0.4 g of Pu Sadahlo, Georgia 170 g 90% HEU St. Petersburg, Russia 3 kg 90% HEU Ruse, Bulgaria 4 g 72% HEU Tbilisi, Georgia 79.5 g 90% HEU Munich, Germany 363 g Pu-239 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 Sukhumi, Georgiaup to 2 kg of 90% HEU 1992-97 Chelyabinsk, Russia 18.5 kg of HEU, report of thwarted theft attempt, December ‘98 Moscow, Russia (Elektrostal) 1.7 kg 20% HEU Vilnius, Lithuania 100 g 50% HEU Elektrostal, Russia 3.7 kg 21% HEU Prague, Czech Republic 17 &.415 g 87.7% HEU Sevmorput, Russia 4.5 kg 20% HEU Tengen, Germany 6.15 g Pu Prague, Czech Republic 2.7 kg 87.8% HEU

13. 1991-1995 • Perpetrators - amateurish insiders, often acting alone, low-level employees, or servicemen • Supply-driven, no real buyer or middleman • Thieves arrested during attempts to sell in Russia or as result of sting operations in Europe • No organized crime involvement, no links to terrorist activities • Material seized on its way to Western Europe (perceived buyer is in Europe) • Material of primarily Russian origin, usually from civilian facilities or naval storages. Small amounts (no more than 3 kg)

14. 1990s Nuclear workers protests in Moscow and in regions Snezhinsk nuclear laboratory director suicide

15. 1996-1999 • no incidents reported to the IAEA database, but two incidents of concern need to be noted • 2 kg of HEU (90% U-235) went missing between 1992 and 1997 from the Physics and Technology Institute in Sukhumi, Georgia. Material was never recovered. The case is known but still not reported to the IAEA. • 1998 - Attempted theft of 18.5 kg of HEU from a nuclear facility in Chelyabinsk Oblast, Russia, by a group of employees

16. Interpretation of the Statistics Security improvements work VS. • Thieves are more sophisticated • Demand-driven nuclear black market engaging well-established routes, higher-level employees • “Invisible” black market that goes undetected

17. Most recent incidents of concern • 2003 seizure of 170 grams of HEU (~90% U-235) on Georgian-Armenia border • Armenian smuggler Garik Dadayan claims he planned to provide the material to “a Muslim Man” Sadik in Turkey • Russian-origin material reportedly obtained from the Novosibirsk nuclear fuel fabrication facility • Seizure was a result of an anonymous tip to police and border guards

18. 2006 HEU Seizure in Georgia • Involves 79.5 g of ~ 90% U-235 (two plastic bags, uranium oxide powder) • Sting operation (smuggler was lured to Tbilisi). Undercover policeman posed as a representative from “a respectful Muslim organization” and spoke Turkish • Material is suspected to be from the Novosibirsk facility (nuclear fuel fabrication facility) in Russia, but has different characteristics than 2003 material • Material was processed more than 10 years ago

19. 2006 HEU Seizure in Georgia • Smuggler – Oleg Khintsagov, Russian citizen, resident of North Ossetia and 3 Georgian accomplices (including a guard at the Georgian Parliament) • involved in illicit trafficking of commercial goods • Had an accomplice (cousin) who previously worked at customs and helped with crossing of Russian-Georgian border • Maintained he had another 2-3 kilograms of similar quantity HEU in his apartment in Vladikavkaz • Involvement of the US agencies in the planning and investigation (CIA, FBI, DOE)

20. Post-1999 Incidents • Three out of six post-1999 HEU and Pu incidents involved Georgia • Materials seized were usually marketed as samples. Those peddling the materials indicated that larger amounts were available • Typically only middlemen have been implicated. Neither the thieves nor the end users have been identified/arrested • “Muslim countries/organizations” are suspected destinations. Among alleged destinations, Turkey and Iran are most often named by apprehended smugglers • In several cases, the contraband is “old” (stolen or otherwise acquired in the early-mid 1990s).

21. Continuing Concerns • Underdeveloped nonproliferation/security culture • Insecurities remain, particularly at civilian facilities using HEU • Physical inventory of nuclear materials is not complete • Borders in the region continue to be vulnerable to smuggling • Ungoverned territories/separatist regions in the region • Political tensions hamper cooperation in the prevention, detection, and response to nuclear smuggling incidents

22. Changed World and Changed Russia • Proliferation of technology; WMD programs are more “affordable” • Energy deficit, interest in nuclear power on a rise • International system less manageable and no longer bipolar • Russia has competing demands, needs to balance interests • Foreign policy is more pragmatic and economy-driven

23. White Paper on WMD Nonproliferation:Official Russian Government Priorities and Concerns • Russia is concerned primarily about state-driven proliferation. Acquisition of WMD by terrorists seen as a threat, but less likely • Supports traditional nonproliferation (NPT, MTCR, CWC, BWC). Criticizes the US for blocking the development of verification mechanisms • Attitude toward counterproliferation changing. Still uncomfortable about supporting the use of force; more positive toward PSI • Export control as primary means of stemming proliferation. Russian export control system regarded as adequate and robust; could be enhanced through greater cooperation with other post-Soviet states.

24. Reform of Russian nuclear industry: creating a profit-generating corporation • Consolidation of key assets for construction of reactors, production of fuel • Nuclear fuel cycle facilities are integrated into one holding – Rosatomprom • Restoration of former Soviet links, i.e. uranium supplies from Central Asia • Ambitious domestic program (2-3 reactors a year starting with 2012-2015) • Aggressive export plans, including reactors, fuel and other technologies • Main foreign markets: Southeast Asia, China, India

25. Nuclear Exports • Existing contracts with Iran, China, and India amount to $5 billion over the next 6-7 years. New contract with Bulgaria. Supplying fuel to these reactors during their estimated 40-year life span is expected to generate another $350-400 million. • In 2008 Russia concluded about a dozen of agreements on possible construction of NPPs with countries all over the world (from Venezuela to Belarus) • Primary technology marketed VVER-1000 • Also marketed small and medium reactors, including so-called floating nuclear power plants

26. Iran Russia continues construction of the Bushehr NNP (expected completion: end of 2009?). Concluded an agreement with Iran to take back spent nuclear fuel. Given interests to Russian technology in the Middle East and other countries, wants to be seen as a reliable supplier. Because of Iran, Russia is more aware of proliferation consequences. Trade is more selective: excesses of 1990s (planned sale of laser separation enrichment plant to Iran) are in the past • Supports limitations on spread of sensitive nuclear fuel cycles technologies • Supports multinational nuclear approaches and nuclear fuel supply assurances (offered to host a nuclear fuel bank) • Launched the International Uranium Enrichment Center (Angarsk). • Supports development of the next generation reactors with built-in safeguards

27. Suspicious of US nonproliferation policy goals • War in Iraq under pretext of WMD proliferation by Saddam Hussein • US overlooks nuclear status of Israel and Pakistan and rewards India • North Korea: a crisis of US making • Iran. US refused (until recently) to improve relations with Iran and have direct negotiations • Lately, Russia is pursuing a more sober approach towards DPRK and Iran, though still favors diplomatic solutions over military and does not believe in the effectiveness of economic sanctions

28. Prospective Areas of Cooperation • Arms control and disarmament, including multinational (CTBT, FMCT, Global Zero) • Nuclear security and anti-terrorism • Nuclear trade and cooperation • International safeguards • Universality of Additional Protocol • Application of safeguards in NWS • Application of safeguards to multinational facilities • Human resources development • Development of technology, including safeguards by design and proliferation-resistant technology

29. Nonproliferation Concerns in the NIS Security of nuclear and other WMD and dual-use materials and technologies • Illicit trafficking in N&R materials Export/import and border controls • Export of WMD and dual-use technologies • Transit of WMD • Implementation varies; in some Central Asian countries it is almost non-existent • Secessionist territories • High level of crime, corruption and dire economic situation in several countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus

30. Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (CANWFZ) Signed by all five Central Asian States in 2006. Supported by Russia. China is ambivalent. However, the U.S., UK, and France do not support the CANWFZ. Entered into force in early 2009. Requires Additional Protocol Article 12: CANWFZ “does not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties under other international treaties which they may have concluded prior to the date of the entry into force of this Treaty.” Reference to 1992 Collective Security Treaty (Tashkent Treaty)?

31. Few highlights on the NIS • Emergence of Shanghai sphere:Central Asia, Russia, China. Iranwants to join. Originally SCO focused on economiccooperation then added security cooperation (counterbalance to NATO?) • Ukraine and Georgia (or at least their current leadership) are eager to become NATO members • US loses some influence in Central Asia (Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan forced US military bases out of their territory) .