Explaining the European Union’s Eastern Enlargement

1. Explaining the European Union’s Eastern Enlargement

3. EC/EU Objectives • Promote domestic economic and political reforms in Eastern Europe • Promote international stability and peaceful resolution of conflicts • Goals remained constant, but means have varied

4. Widening vs. Deepening • France: deepening favored over widening • Great Britain: deepening favored over widening • Germany: deepening and widening

5. France • Why deepening? • Contain Germany within a political union • Why not widening? • Enlargement would shift balance of power in favor of Germany • Reduce France’s benefits from the CAP • Not as vulnerable to consequences of instability • Policies • Monetary union (and political union?) • Slow down enlargement

6. Great Britain • Why widening? • Widening would make deepening more difficult • Why not deepening? • Reluctance to give up sovereignty • Policies • Stay out of EMU • Support enlargement to the East

7. Germany • Why deepening? • Bind present and future governments to (Western) Europe • Win French support for German unification • Why widening? • Promote stability in Eastern Europe • Policies • EMU and enlargement

8. What’s Being Explained • Decision to enlarge to the East • 1993 Copenhagen European Council accepts enlargement contingent on political and economic reforms • Timing of the decision to enlarge • Reconsideration of the enlargement strategy at December 1999 Helsinki European Council

9. Enlargement Strategy • July 1997: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia judged to have met political and economic conditions • Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria did not meet the economic conditions. Slovakia did not meet political conditions • Membership negotiations open with the five front-runners in March 1998

10. Three Explanations • Liberalism (liberal intergovernmentalism) • Economic interests • Sociological institutionalism • Identity and norms • Geopolitics • Promoting stability in Eastern Europe • Maintaining relative influence within the EU

11. Liberalism • Policymaking dominated by sectoral interests • Logic • Those who would benefit most from increased economic interdependence should favor it

12. Liberalism’s Predictions • Limited concessions • Those bordering Eastern Europe should favor enlargement

13. Empirical Support for Liberalism • Explains • opposition to enlargement • trade and cooperation agreements and Europe Agreements • Does not explain • Shift in favor of membership in 1993 • 1999 decision to open up negotiations with those excluded in 1997

14. Sociological Institutionalism (SI) • Identity and norms explain • Enlargement • Conditionality • Logic • Becoming a member of an organization means adopting the collective identity of the organization • EU: adopt liberal values and norms

15. Predictions of SI • Accession conditions reflect the EU’s liberal values and norms • Countries selected for accession talks should • Match EU members • Be different from those not invited to talks

16. Empirical Support for SI, I • Explains • Accession conditions does reflect the EU’s liberal values and norms • The new members do share the EU’s collective identity • 1997 decision to open accession talks with the five frontrunners • Different from those not invited

17. Empirical Support for SI, II • Does not explain • Shift in policy in 1993 • 1999 decision to open talks with the other five associates

18. Geopolitics • Geopolitical considerations • Need to promote stability in Eastern Europe • Maintain influence and power in the EU • These considerations explain • Decision to enlarge as well as its timing • Conditions attached to membership • Reconsideration of enlargement strategy in 1999

19. Hypotheses • Hypothesis 1: High threat  Favor deeper/costlier engagements with Eastern Europe • Hypothesis 2: States whose influence will increase will favor enlargement, those whose influence will decrease will oppose it • Hypothesis 3: Major geopolitical events that reveal new information  shifts in preferences and policies

20. Before 1993 • Threat low enough that concerns about influence within EC predominated • France: favors deepening over widening (bind Germany) • Great Britain: favors widening over deepening (weaken supranational aspects) • Germany: favors both (stability and self-binding) • Difference between France and Germany is consistent with hypothesis 1: threat higher for Germany • All three positions consistent with hypothesis 2

21. The Decision to Enlarge • New information • Rise of protectionist pressures in Eastern Europe • Conflicts on the Balkans, particularly Bosnia-Herzegovina • Increases threat of instability, which changes the calculus, particularly France’s • Membership offered to promote and lock in reforms and provide stability (hypotheses 1 & 3)

22. Kosovo and the Shift in Enlargement Strategy • Italy, Sweden, and Denmark argued in 1997 that strategy would create dangerous political divisions • Argument rejected: limited intake would reduce costs (EU reforms) • Kosovo crisis: threat reassessed • Countries kept out would become disillusioned, reforms might be reversed • 1999 Helsinki European Council: accession negotiations would begin with Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania (and Malta) • Evidence consistent with hypotheses 1 & 3

23. Summary of Findings • Support for hypotheses 1 and 3: • France supports enlargement as result of increased threat to stability after break-up of Yugoslavia (also Eastern European protectionism) • Shift in enlargement strategy after Kosovo: increased threat • Support for hypothesis 2: • French position on enlargement driven in large part by desire to maintain influence in EU, constrain Germany • British position: enlargement will weaken supranational aspects • German position: consistent with hypotheses 1 & 2