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“Essence of Decision”

“Essence of Decision”. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis February 14 th , 2006. Rational-Unitary Actor Approach. Cuban Missile Crisis as “Hard Case” Rational-Unitary Actor identifies interests considers options Do Nothing Diplomatic Pressure on Khruschev Secret Approach to Castro

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“Essence of Decision”

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  1. “Essence of Decision” Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis February 14th, 2006

  2. Rational-Unitary Actor Approach • Cuban Missile Crisis as “Hard Case” • Rational-Unitary Actor • identifies interests • considers options • Do Nothing • Diplomatic Pressure on Khruschev • Secret Approach to Castro • Invasion • Air Strike • Blockade • chooses optimal option

  3. Organizational Outputs • Date of Discovery -- October 14th • SOPs explain why not earlier or later • USIB – “September estimate” • CIA SOP re: transmission time • SOP re: processing intelligence information • U-2 flight directive issued on Oct.4

  4. Organizational Outputs • Range of Options • preferred option was airstrike • surgical airstrike not option • MRBM classified as “mobile” • Tactical Air Forces could only guarantee 90% effectiveness • MRBM reclassified as “moveable” only after first week (e.g. October 20/21)

  5. The Bureaucratic Politics Model • Date of Discovery • 10 day delay before October 14th U-2 flight • Air Force vs. CIA • failed Air Force mission on Oct.9 • co-operative mission – Oct. 14

  6. The Bureaucratic Politics Model • Range of Options • the President • RFK • the Armed Forces • Air Force • Navy • the Secretary of Defense

  7. The Bureaucratic Politics Model • the Outcome • blockade -- not the first choice of any one of the relevant actors • Implementation of blockade • Navy vs. Presidential preferences for blockade • based on Navy SOPs • inititial public account that President preferences prevailed • reality – blockade operated from Navy-specified distance • result – one (possibly several) Soviet ships passed through blockade after it was operational • crisis peak (October 27) • U-2 shot down over Cuba • US Air Force neglects to enforce Presidential order banning any further overflights

  8. The Denouement... • blockade effective on October 22 (through November 20) • Kruschev response (Oct. 26, Oct.27) • demand the US agree not to invade Cuba • accepted publicly by JFK • demand that Jupiter missiles removed from Turkey • accepted secretly by RFK

  9. Three Conceptual Lenses and the Cuban Missile Crisis • applying the lenses to the Soviet government • was the USSR acting as a rational-unitary actor? • organizational structure model • the Arkhipov incident – Russian naval SOPs • bureaucratic politics model

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