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KEEPING THE LIGHTS ON: STRATEGIES FOR COMPATIBILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY IN ELECTRIC POWER NETWORKS

KEEPING THE LIGHTS ON: STRATEGIES FOR COMPATIBILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY IN ELECTRIC POWER NETWORKS. SURVIVABILITY OF COMPLEX NETWORKS. Ira Kohlberg Kohlberg Associates, Inc. South Shore Road Reston, VA 20190. October 27, 2011.

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KEEPING THE LIGHTS ON: STRATEGIES FOR COMPATIBILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY IN ELECTRIC POWER NETWORKS

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  1. KEEPING THE LIGHTS ON: STRATEGIES FOR COMPATIBILITY AND INTEROPERABILITY INELECTRIC POWER NETWORKS SURVIVABILITY OF COMPLEX NETWORKS • Ira Kohlberg • Kohlberg Associates, Inc. • South Shore Road • Reston, VA 20190 October 27, 2011

  2. Observed EMP Anomalies During USSR Atmospheric Testing (circa 1960) Overhead Transmission Line and Telecommunications Disconnection and Damage Overhead transmission line Malfunction of radio- location Diesels found damaged, “later” Puncture, temporary disconnection of transmission line Overhead signal line Long line problems due to EMP “long tail” 1000 km Ground zero Spark gaps breakdown Safety devices burning 600 km 600 km Power supply breakdown Loss of communications; many examples 400 km 600 km Signal cable line Amplification location unit Figure presented by General Loborev, Director, Central Institute of Physics and Technology, June 1994 Power supply breakdown Threat: Historical Evidence • EMP damages and disrupts electronics—does not directly harm people

  3. Threat: Nature and Magnitude of EMP Threats HOB = 500km • Wide area coverage • A million square miles • Intensity depends on: • Weapon design • Height of burst • Location of burst • Broad frequency range • Threat to all electronics in exposure HOB = 100 km Surface Zero EMP May Produce Simultaneous, Widespread Failure Of High Reliability infrastructure

  4. Vulnerability of Power Grid Components to E1 • The US power grid is • comprised of three • interconnected • systems, the eastern • interconnect, the western, • and Texas • A relatively modest yield • burst over the eastern US • can affect 70% of the total • national power generation E1 footprint for a 30kT detonation at 100km altitude east of Chicago (unclassified version) A single relatively small weapon can have a radius of impact of nearly 1,000 miles, affecting nearly 70% of the population and industrial production of the USA and Canada, the financial centers and seat of governments.

  5. But Everything Depends on Everything Else:Vulnerability of US National Infrastructure One or a few high-altitude nuclear detonations can produce EMP, simultaneously, over wide geographical areas Unprecedented cascading failure of our electronics-dependent infrastructures could result Power, energy transport, telecom, and financial systems are particularly vulnerable and interdependent EMP disruption of these sectors could cause large scale infrastructure failures for all aspects of the Nation’s life Both civilian and military capabilities depend on these infrastructures Without adequate protection recovery could be prolonged—months to years

  6. SCOPE OF PRESENTATION • MODELING THE INTERACTION BETWEEN POWER AND TELECOMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURES FOR A HEMP ATTACK

  7. Electromagnetic terrorism and potential infrastructure failures has become an extremely serious matter that may be viewed as embracing three major issues: • Terrorist targets of interest • Effect on civilian and military populations • National response

  8. Effect on Civilian and Military Populations • Civilian • Susceptibility of Infrastructures • Survivability of Infrastructures • Response of Infrastructures • Military • Survivability of hardware • Communication survivability

  9. PHASE SPACE REPRESENTATION OF POWER AND TELECOMMUNICATION RESPONSE TO HEMP INITIAL STATE OF SYSTEM 1.0 STATE OF POWER AND TELCOM AFTER HEMP NORMALIZED POWER DENOTES POSSIBLE TRAJECTORIES AFTER HEMP POWER AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS PLANE 0.0 1.0 NORMALIZED TELECOMMUNICATIONS

  10. The following set of vu-graphs show the theoretically derived conditions for the return to equilibrium.

  11. The following set of vu-graphs show the breakdown of a large network (power and or telecommunications) caused by a HEMP attack. For illustrative purposes we show this as an evolutionary process although it could happen relatively rapidly.

  12. The following set of vu-graphs show the recovery/ breakdown of Probability-of-Call Blocking and electric power from of a theoretical model of combined power and telecommunication networks.

  13. POWER AND TELECOMMUNICATION INTERDEPENDENCY a b PTN PTN PDN Telecommunications Line FUEL SOURCE c b PDN e d POWER CONTROL ELECTRICAL POWER GENERATION PDN e SCADA PDN f f d POWER TRANSMISSION PDN c g PDN PDN a POWER DISTRIBUTION Telecommunications Line Power Line

  14. market price update operator –initiated/ manual control ULTC voltage control AGC governor control underfrequency load shredding exciters and PSS FACTS protective system 10-2 10-1 1 10 100 1000 response time after the onset of an event in seconds 1 cycle Electric Power Response Time After the Onset of an Event Data Source: Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions (CERTS) Grid of the Future White Paper on Real Time Security Monitoring and Control of Powers Systems

  15. CONCLUSION • Modeling the response of large networks that are heavily dependent on electromagnetic effects is still in the formative stage. • Theoretical models can provide much insight into key factors that influence resilience to terrorist attacks • Ultimately, detailed models supported by experimental data that predict component and subsystem behavior will be required.

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