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Political Determinants of Violence in the Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires. Alberto Föhrig UdeSA. October 2014. Research Questions , Hypothesis , Methods.
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Political Determinants of Violence in the Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires Alberto Föhrig UdeSA October 2014
ResearchQuestions, Hypothesis, Methods This paper intends to provide some evidence and analysis about the links between politics, the police, and crime in the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires. It intends to provide criteria to explain significant variability in municipal crime rates. Why violence? Dependent variable: crime against individuals excluding car accidents Are political factors related to increases in violent crime? What is the relationship between stability –measured as re-election rate for mayor´s – and fragmentation –measured as increased effective number of parties and intra-party fragmentation – with violence? Hypothesis: The increasing number of political and drug trafficking groups competing for territory produce unstable agreements and tend to increase violence. Mixed method approach. Panel data model with fixed effects and clustered errors combined with the qualitative study of court cases involving relationships between politics, police and crime.
Theoreticalbackground: crime, thepolice and politics • Different authors (Saín, 2002; Tokatlian, 2011; Auyero 2012) have underscored the increasing links between certain political actors with criminal organizations in Argentina. • Gambetta (1996), Villareal (2002), Wilkinson (2004), Garay (2013), Osorio (2012), studied the relationship between politics and crime in different contexts. Snyder and Duran Martinez (2009) theorize under what conditions criminal groups are able to use state sponsored protection rackets to develop their activities. • Fajnzylberet.al. (1998) produced a classic study on the determinants of crime in Latin America in which they concluded that inequality more than poverty as well as GDP per capita rates had a significant impact on crime rates.
Theoreticalbackground: Fragmentation as a MultilevelGame • Politics and crime are both territorially defined and structured in multi level layers • Consensus on fragmentation of the Argentine political system: • Decreasing levels of party nationalization (Jones and Mainwaring 2003, Leiras 2006) • Increased ENP and Territorialization (Calvo and Escolar 2005, Leiras 2006) • Lack of Congruence between the national and provincial party systems (Gibson and Suarez Cao 2010) • Intra-party fragmentation (Föhrig 2011, Föhrig and Post 2007) • Mayor´s linked to the police in a variety of informal dimensions: • Influence police officers’ careers: they lobby the governor and may in fact veto the appointment of police authorities in their districts given their previous records. • Influence their promotions and exonerations. • In operative terms they provide police with money and equipment. Operationally influence the allocation of police resources given their monitoring capacities provided by surveillance cameras. • Mayors authorize commercial ventures to operate within the boundaries of their municipalities • Have privileged access to a key political asset: information. Bridge informational gaps.
Context • The Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires concentrates a quarter of the country´s population and is the second most violent area in the country (Lodola and Seligson, 2012: 128). • Significant increases in crime rates, concentration of crime, and organized crime activities. • The context in which this paper tests it empirical hypothesis is one in which the police informal regulation of criminal activity started to crumble as a consequence of the expansion of the drug market. The new market and institutional incentives in place generated the emergence of new organized crime organizations on the ground. • Partysystemchange: simultaneousinfluence of fragmentation and partypredominance.
Drug´s Market Cocaine Seizures in Argentina (kg. per year) Drug Consumption by School Children Source: OAS, 2013 Source: UNODC, various years. Local Processing: 80 facilities producing different phases of drugs were shut down by enforcement agents between 2000 and 2006 (Sedronar, 2011). Sinthetic Drugs: 600.000 pills production facility discovered in Mar de Ajo (2013) doubled total seizures in Ezeiza Airport since 2004.
Crime rate and effective number of parties Graph. Distribution of Crime Against Individuals Graph. Distribution of the Effective Number of Parties.
Methodology • Panel data model with fixed effects and clustered errors. • 336 annual observations, comprising the 24 municipalities in metropolitan area of Buenos Aires between 1995 and 2008. • Dependent variable • Crime rate against individuals excluding car accidents • Independent variables • Energy rate consumption • Number of students per inhabitant • Margin of victory • Effective number of parties • Cocaine seizure • Reelection • Intra party fragmentation • Variables are expressed in logs.
QualitativeAnalysis: Court Cases and LegislativeInquiriesinvolving PPC • Candela case: • Kidnapping and murder of a 11 yearoldby a police/drugdealersmixedgang. LegislativeInquiry • Ephedrine case: • Triple homicide of Gral. Rodriguez. 2. Conviction of Martinez Espinosa (Maschwitzdrugprocessingfacility) 3. Involvement of high ranking stateofficials 4. Illegalfinancing of president Cristina Kirchner electoral campaign 2007
Mechanisms Scenarios of bilateral monopoly between criminal organizations and political actors which produced stable agreements over time are broken. Both politics and drug trafficking involve a territorial and multilayered dimension. Drug traffickers need specific territories in order to transport, elaborate and sell drugs. In order to do so they require “safe” portions of land which enable them to develop these activities with low risks of being caught by authorities. Because of geography, transportation difficulties, and communication costs criminal organizations act locally.
Mechanisms (II) Drug market forces increased the number of criminal organizations on the ground. As a consequence, the number of players on the market side increased over the last years. Process of fragmentation: party factions that compete against each other in territorial disputes fighting for party power in a multilevel game. Relationships between party factions and criminal groups at the local level within the context of political competition influence increases in violence. Re-election and fragmentation are simultaneously maintained through electoral system design: “listas colectoras” and “listas espejo” (Mustapic, 2013). The increasing number of political and drug trafficking groups competing for territory within scenarios of either cooperation or competition between the two distinct activities produce unstable agreements and tend to increase violence.
Mechanisms (III) • Senate endorses judges and prosecutorsappointments • Governorsappoint, remove and rotate in differentsettingspoliceagents. • Policedoesnotenforceinternaloversight • Mixedmembersgangs: police and drugdealers
Conclusions The models presented in this paper show the significance of political variables to analyze crime. Political variables on fragmentation and re-election of mayors show an impact over violence. The longer actors stay on the ground, the greater their ability to develop ties of reciprocity, trust and reputation with the police and criminal groups. Re-election for mayors without restrictions seems to be a measure with negative effects over crime. When scenario of stability for mayors (party predominance) and fragmentation of the political system coexists with market pressures for new organizations into the market, violence increases.
THANK YOU @afohrig
