170 likes | 271 Views
Nonproliferation & Export Control Update Briefing Steven Clagett Director Missile and Nuclear Technology Control Divisions. Trends in Export Control and Nonproliferation Policy after 9/11.
E N D
Nonproliferation & Export Control Update Briefing Steven Clagett Director Missile and Nuclear Technology Control Divisions
Trends in Export Control and Nonproliferation Policy after 9/11 • The Multilateral Nonproliferation Regimes remain focused on the fundamental goal of preventing the spread of technologies that may contribute to the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). • The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Australia Group (AG) recognize the increased need for effective multilateral export controls. • Regime members continue to update and modify the lists of controlled commodities and implement “catch all” controls.
U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Export Controls • Proposals to modify the Multilateral Export Control Regime Guidelines & Annexes (Control Lists) • NSG proposal to notify Partners of approvals for controlled nuclear items to non-partners • Support for multilateral initiatives, such as the International Code of Conduct (ICOC) against Ballistic Missile Proliferation • Ensure effective implementation of “catch all controls” for all commodities to end users (countries, companies, or individuals) of concern • Provide multilateral notifications of U.S. denials to utilize the “no undercut” policies
U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Export Controls • Sanctions • Consultations with foreign governments and commercial entities • Outreach efforts with U.S. industry to stress the importance of export control compliance • Strong enforcement of the law against violators • International outreach programs to assist other nations implement a effective export controls
MTCR Update • Plenary: September 2002 Warsaw, Poland • Technical Experts Meeting (TEM) to discuss changes to Annex controls • Update on the new International Code of Conduct (ICOC) Against Missile proliferation • Focus on regional nonproliferation issues. • MTCR Plenary has added an Enforcement Experts component.
NSG Update • Plenary convened May 2002 in Prague, Czech Rep. • Enforcement experts meeting held in conjunction with the Plenary. • Member States continued discussions on sharing NSG license approval data and proposed notification requirements. • Regional nonproliferation issues.
Missile Technology Applications Processed (2001) Received: 1036 Value: $2.2 billion Nuclear Technology Applications Processed (2001) Received: 949 Value: $154.3 million
Distribution of Missile Technology Licenses by Country (2001)
Distribution of Nuclear Technology Licenses by Country (2001)
EPCI “Catch All” Controls • The Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) is designed to: • Strengthen multilateral non-proliferation efforts; • Prevent the export of technology that could contribute to missile, chemical, biological, and nuclear-weapons proliferation; and • Minimize the impact on legitimate commerce. • EPCI places export controls on end use and end users rather than a particular item.
EPCI • License may be denied if destined for missile, nuclear, or CBW activities or facilities. • License must be obtained if the exporter knows the commodities will be used in CBW or missile activities or facilities. • BIS may inform exporters at anytime that a license is required for a specific end-user if there is a possibility of nuclear, CBW, or missile activities. • Any U.S. participation in nuclear, CBW, or missile activities or facilities requires a license.
Evaluation Factors • Country • Commodity • End-Use • Significance for Missile/Nuclear Development • Non-Proliferation Credentials • Assurances and Guarantees • Risk of diversion • Sanctions
Missile Technology Projects and Countries of Concern • Listed in Supplement #1 in Part 740 of the EAR • Programs in Countries: • China -- M-series, CSS-2 • India -- Prithvi, Agni, SLV-3, Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV), Polar Satellite LV (PSLV), Geostationary Satellite LV (GSLV) • Iran -- Surface-to-surface, Scud • No. Korea -- No Dong, Scud • Pakistan -- Hatf-series missiles • Other Countries: (Mostly Middle East) • Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen
Entities List • The Entities List notifies exporters of a requirement for exports/reexports to specified end users. • See Supplement Number 4 to part 744 of the EAR.
India/Pakistan Sanctions • On September 22, 2001, President Bush lifted missile sanctions placed on India and Pakistan. • On October 1, BIS reinstated a case-by-case license review policy for exports of MT and NP commodities to India and Pakistan and removed a significant number of entities from the Entity List. • Entities affiliated with Indian and Pakistani missile development and their nuclear programs remain listed entities. • The United States does not support Indian unsafeguarded nuclear power industry or the satellite launch vehicle development programs.
PRC Issues • Ongoing missile and nuclear proliferation concerns with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). • All commodities controlled for missile proliferation concerns - except inertial navigation systems for commercial aircraft - require presidential certification prior to export. • The U.S. continues to conduct missile talks with the PRC in an effort to decrease Chinese proliferation activities. • Success of these talks could affect U.S. export licensing in the future.
Questions? Steve Clagett Director, Missile and Nuclear Technology Divisions 202-482-4188 SClagett@bis.doc.gov www.bis.doc.gov