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Mobile encryption for laptop data protection (MELP). Source: IET Information Security, 2012 , Vol. 6, Iss. 4, pp . 291–298 Authors: Y.-W. Kao,X . Zhang,A . Studer,A . Perrig Speaker : Yeh-Chieh , Chou Date: 2013/06/06. Outline. Introduction Proposed scheme Notation
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Mobile encryption for laptop data protection (MELP) Source: IET Information Security, 2012, Vol. 6, Iss. 4, pp. 291–298 Authors: Y.-W. Kao,X. Zhang,A. Studer,A. Perrig Speaker: Yeh-Chieh, Chou Date: 2013/06/06
Outline • Introduction • Proposed scheme • Notation • Registration phase • Offline • Analysis • Security Analysis • Performance Analysis • Conclusion
Introduction Encryption files Decryption files Request Get encryption key ID,Password Constrained Channel Protect by password Decryption key
K Symmetric key • EK,DK Asymmetric key • Ea(), Es() Encryption function • Da() Sign function • h() Hash function • Ext Extension function
Select secret key <, > Etmp=Es(, ) Delete Select secret key <, > <, > =<es , Ns> =<ds , Ns> Select secret key <, > Generate =<em ,Nm> =<dm ,Nm> Composed of the exponent part and modulus part
Mobile Phone registration , User =<es , Ns> =<ds , Ns> Mobile Phone =<em ,Nm> =<dm ,Nm> Server ID, Psd Ea(||h(Psd)||ds||(Ext(h(Psd))⊕dm) , ) =Phone#||ID||es||em||Ns||Nm|| Check ID Es(h(h(Psd)),) Eds=Es(ds||Ns,) Edm=Es(Ext(h(Psd))⊕dm,) =Da(||Result,) , es, Ns, em, Nm ds Ext(h(Psd)) ⊕dm =Result ||
Laptop registration User Laptop Server , , ID, Psd’ Es(h(h(Psd)),) Ea(|| ||h(Psd’), ) =ID||Laptop name|| Decrypt h(h(Psd’)) from h(h(Psd’))?=h(h(Psd)) =Result||es||em||Ns||Nm =Da(),) =|| =|| , (mod Nm)mod Ns Delete
, , es, Ns, em, Nm ds Ext(h(Psd)) ⊕dm (mod Nm)mod Ns =((mod Nm)mod Ns =ID||Laptop name|| =Da(h(),) =|| =((mod Nm)mod Ns =Da(h(),) =|| =mod Nm =Laptop name|| =Da(h(), ) =(mod Nm =ID||Laptop name|| =Da(h(), ) =|| =|| =|| =Ea(||h(Psd’), ) =ID|| =Da(h(),) =(mod Nm = =<em ,Nm> =<dm ,Nm> =<es , Ns> =<ds , Ns>
(mod Nm)mod Ns Encrypt by password =<ds , Ns> =<dm ,Nm>
[ 4 ]Studer, A., Perrig, A.: ‘Mobile user location-specific encryption (MULE): using your office as your password’. Proc. ACM Conf. Wireless Network Security (WiSec), March 2010, pp. 151– 162 [12]Corner, M.D., Noble, B.D.: ‘Zero-interaction authentication’. Proc. Eighth Annual Int. Conf. Mobile Computing and Networking (MobiCom’02), 2002, pp. 1 –11 [13]Finkenzeller, K.: ‘RFID handbook: fundamentals and applications in contactless smart cards, radio frequency identification and near-field communication’ (Wiley & Sons, 2010, 3rd edn.), ISBN-10: 0470695064, ISBN-13: 978- 0470695067 [14]Haselsteiner, E., Breitfuss, K.: ‘Security in near field communication (NFC) strengths and weaknesses’. Workshop on RFID Security, 2006, pp. 1– 11 [15]Michahelles, F., Thiesse, F., Schmidt, A., Williams, J.R.: ‘Pervasive RFID and near field communication technology’, IEEE Pervasive Comput., 2007, 6, (3), pp. 94–96
Conclusion • The author proposed a scheme that can protect data. • Offline decryption. • Online to close the decryption function.