Philippa Foot

1. Philippa Foot Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives

2. Outline • The distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. • Kant’s defense of the thesis that moral judgments are categorical imperatives and not hypothetical imperatives. • Foot’s argument against the Kantian position. • The sliding scale of normative force.

3. Kant on Imperatives and Their Kinds Imperatives are commands that tell one what should be done, what is good to do, or what should not be done. They are statements to the effect that something should or should not be done. Kant says the following about the difference between hypothetical and categorical imperatives: “All imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former present the practical necessity of a possible action as a means to achieving something else which one desires (or which one may possibly desire). The categorical imperative would be one which presented an action as of itself objectively necessary, without regard to any other end.”

4. Two Types of Imperatives: Hypothetical Imperatives • Hypothetical Imperatives: • If x desires d and m is a necessary condition for satisfying d, then all else being equal, x ought to do m. • Example: If Sam wants to go to the forest, and taking the bus is the only way to get to the forest, then all else being equal Sam ought to take the bus. • Hypothetical imperatives are a heterogeneous class: they can depend on momentary inclinations or long term projects, or roles.

5. Two Types of Imperatives: Categorical Imperatives • Categorical Imperatives: • No matter what x desires, x must do action a. • For all x, x must do action a. • One should do action a. • Examples: All persons should refrain from harming others. No matter what x desires’, x must refrain from killing innocents. One should not do harm.

6. Kant’s Thesis • Moral Judgments are claims such as: one should not lie or one should not steal or one should not harm. • Moral judgments are a species of categorical imperatives, and not hypothetical imperatives. • They are universal in their application. • They are necessary in their force.

7. A Kantian Argument The Kantian argument as Foot portrays it. • Moral judgments involve non-hypothetical (categorical) uses of ‘ought’. • If a kind of judgment involves a non-hypothetical use of ‘ought’, then that kind of judgment is not hypothetical in nature. • So, moral judgments are not hypothetical in nature.

8. A passage from Foot “It follows that if a hypothetical use of ‘should’ gave a hypothetical imperative, and a non-hypothetical use of ‘should’ a categorical imperative, then ‘should’ statements based on rules of etiquette, or rules of a club would be categorical imperatives. Since this would not be accepted by defenders of the categorical imperative in ethics, who would insist that these other ‘should’ statements give hypothetical imperatives, they must be using this expression in some other sense.”

9. Foot’s Initial Argument • Kant attempts to derive the non-hypothetical nature of moral judgments from the fact that we typically use and make moral judgments in a non-hypothetical manner. • There are cases in which hypothetical judgments are made in a non-hypothetical (categorical) manner. • If both hypothetical and non-hypothetical judgments can be phrased in a non-hypothetical manner, then we cannot infer from the existence of a non-hypothetical phrasing of a judgment that it has a non-hypothetical nature. • So, there is a missing link in Kant’s derivation.

10. Foot’s Argument I • Philosophers maintain that morality is different from etiquette in that the former involves categorical imperatives while the later involves only hypothetical imperatives. • The evidence for drawing this distinction comes from the fact that we feel that the force of • One should not smoke. (said in the club) • One should not steal. (said from a mother to a child) • But the fact that we feel that the force is distinct, is not sufficient to render one kind of claim hypothetical and the other categorical.

11. Foot’s Argument II • Foot’s basic point is to draw out the following question: In terms of the force of the ought of hypothetical imperatives and categorical imperatives, what exactly makes it the case that moral judgments are not simply hypothetical imperatives. • Consider the following: • ‘One ought not to smoke in the dance club’ is a etiquette judgment. It can be analyzed as ‘If one desires to be a member of the dance club, and not smoking is a necessary condition for being a member of the dance club, then all else being equal one ought not to smoke in the dance club’. • ‘One ought not to harm others’ is a moral judgment. Why can’t it be analyzed as ‘If one desires to be a member of the moral club, and not harming others is a necessary condition for being a member of the moral club, then all else being equal one ought not to harm others in the moral club’?

12. Foot’s Argument III • It is possible that one has the sensation that one is falling, even though one is in fact not falling. • It is possible that one feels that the force of a judgment of etiquette is weaker than a judgment of morality, even though there is no difference in the force. • So, how do we determine based on the fact that we feel a different force between the two judgments, that there is an actual difference in force?

13. Foot’s Argument IV • Etiquette judgments do not give reasons for acting independently from the desires, projects, and roles one has. • Moral judgments do give reasons for acting independently from the desires, projects, and roles one has. • If both kinds of judgments can be stated using a categorical imperatives, such as ‘one should not smoke’ or ‘one should not harm others’, how does the former fail to give reasons for action independently from desires, projects, and roles, while the latter succeeds at doing so?

14. Two Conceptions of Commands • Nihilism about categorical imperatives: there are no commands that we must follow that do no depend on desires. Every imperative statement can be analyzed as a hypothetical imperative. • Realism about categorical imperatives: there are some commands that we must follow that do not depend on desires. Some imperatives statements cannot be analyzed as a hypothetical imperative.

15. The Sliding Scale Account of the Force of Judgments • If we accept nihilism about categorical imperatives we could attempt to account for the difference in feeling we have about the force of moral judgments through a sliding scale. • On the weak side of the scale we have rules of various clubs and of etiquette that are hypothetical imperatives that we can opt out of. • On the other side of the scale we have moral judgments that are also hypothetical imperatives, however they are harder to opt out of because they constrainour behavior in a larger group.