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Smart Grid Projects

Smart Grid Projects. Andrew Bui. Discussion Topics. Goal Problem(s) Solution Conclusion. Goal. The goals of the Smart Grid are to allow increased energy sources, more power to demand, and to support market driven by consumers.

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Smart Grid Projects

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  1. Smart Grid Projects Andrew Bui

  2. Discussion Topics • Goal • Problem(s) • Solution • Conclusion

  3. Goal • The goals of the Smart Grid are to allow increased energy sources, more power to demand, and to support market driven by consumers. • Enhanced efficiency and reliability are also key goals of the Smart Grid

  4. Goal (continue) • Enhanced efficiency The Smart Grid will use information technology to facilitate two-way communications among all the components of the grid • Reliability • a smart grid must have new and highly sophisticated adaptive generation and distribution control algorithms.

  5. Goal (continue) • Smart Grid Legislation • December, 2007, the U.S. Congress passed, and the President signed, the Energy Independence and Security Act • DOE develop a smart grid research and development program. • State regulators consider requiring and funding smart grid investments

  6. Goal (continue) • Smart Grid Components: • Intelligent appliances • Smart power meters (automatic billing data collection) • Smart substations ( transformer, breaker) • Smart distribution (superconducting long distance cable) • Smart generation (auto Maintain voltage, power)

  7. Goal (continue) • Smart Grid Technologies • Integrated Communications ( electronic devices) • Sensing and Measurement .(auto meter reading) • Advanced Components (microgrids, superconductivity) • Advanced Control Methods (devices and software algorithm that predict grid condition)

  8. Goal (continue) • Smart Grid Benefit • Self-Healing ( auto detect routine , and recovery) • Resist Attack( security) • Build less new infrastructure • "plug-and-play" interconnection to multiple and distributed sources. (e.g., wind, solar, battery storage, etc.)

  9. Image Courtesy: North American Synchrophasor Initiative (NASPI)

  10. Synchrophasors • Measures the electrical waves on an electricity grid to determine the health of the system • Measured using Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) Image Courtesy: Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories

  11. Phasor Network consists of: • Phasor measurement units (PMUs) • Phasor Data Concentrators (PDCs) • Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) System • PMUs deliver 10–30 reports per second • GPS time stamping provides the necessary ±500ns accuracy.

  12. Phasor Measurement Unit Block Diagram (R.F. Nuqui, “State Estimation and Voltage Security Monitoring Using Synchronized Phasor Measurements”, Doctorate Dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Blacksburg, VA, July 2, 2001.)

  13. Problem Attacks on Synchrophasor Measurements • Network attack on the communication to data concentrator • Locally change analog input to distort phasor measurement • Locally jam and/or falsify GPS signals to modify synchronicity of measurements

  14. Problem Attacks on Synchrophasor Measurements • Network attack on the communication to data concentrator • Locally change analog input to distort phasor measurement • Locally jam and/or falsify GPS signals to modify synchronicity of measurements • Resulting corrections can destabilize grids causing massive blackouts

  15. Simulations • Clearly experiments cannot be carried out on actual grids • Must rely on simulations to determine extent of damage as well as measures for prevention, detection and recovery • To gauge effect on real equipment, simulations must be real-time, and allow for hardware-in-the-loop

  16. RTDS • Real Time Digital Simulation for power industry • By RTDS Technologies Inc., Winnipeg, Canada • Uses theoretical manipulation, dedicated parallel high speed processing and signal communication to achieve real time constraints

  17. Computation • Uses Dommelalgorithm to separate the computation into Network Solution and Component Solution • All component computations are performed in parallel, and forwarded to the network solution processor • Limits number of nodes that can be handled

  18. RTDS Offers • Hard real-time simulation required for hardware-in-the-loop testing • Ability to exchange large amounts of data via extensive IO capabilities • Ability to undertake batch simulations • Ability to interface multiple devices simultaneously

  19. Application • Two ways to use RTDS in simulating attacks on PMUs: • Interface single/multiple external PMUs, to tie in to a wide area grid simulated in the software, perhaps along with other control hardware, then attack the PMUs • Simulate PMUs along with the grid inside the software, which take in external GPS signals, and modify these external signals

  20. Application • Two ways to use RTDS in simulating attacks on PMUs: • (1) Interface single/multiple external PMUs, to tie in to a wide area grid simulated in the software, perhaps along with other control hardware, then attack the PMUs Can be handled by current RTDS equipment Requires PMUs, and hardware necessary to falsify GPS signals

  21. Application • Two ways to use RTDS in simulating attacks on PMUs: • (2) Simulate PMUs along with the grid inside the software, which take in external GPS signals, and modify these external signals Less hardware required, notably PMUs which are expensive The IO card needed for interfacing GPS signals is still under development by RTDS

  22. Physical Attacks • How to avoid paying electric bill? • Hack the internal code • Connect the input and output of the meter Smart Meter Malicious code Smart Meter

  23. Conclusion • Phasor Measurement Units are already in place in anticipation of Smart Grids • Security of these units is essential and often overlooked or assumed • Several different attacks are possible • Real-time, HIL simulation needs to be undertaken to gauge the effects of attacks and devise countermeasures

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