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The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the television news scheduling game. Jean Gaszewicz Didier Laussel Michel Le Breton.
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The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the television news scheduling game Jean Gaszewicz Didier Laussel Michel Le Breton
Cancian, Bergström and Bills (1995) :Hotelling location problems with directional constraints: an application to television news scheduling, Journal of Industrial Economics, 43, 121-124, studied the following game: • Two stations trying to maximize audience choose the time at which they broadcast their evening news • Viewers go back home at different times, watch the first news broadcast after they return
CCB showed that this game has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium: If station j broadcasts its news before the median time the best reply of its competitor is to broadcast its own news as late as possible I f station j broadcasts its news after the median time the best reply of i is to broadcast its news just before j
Our model • CBB’s model + viewers are uniformly distributed on [0,1] + • Fraction γ of viewers missing the last news record (and then watch) randomly one of them (γ=0 corresponds to the exact CBB model) • Analysis of the mixed strategy equilibrium of this model where each firm selects an absolutely continuous distribution function (since the model has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium).