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Aid effectiveness in crisis settings: Lessons from Afghanistan

Aid effectiveness in crisis settings: Lessons from Afghanistan. Belinda Bowling, Afghanistan Programme Manager, UNEP. Afghanistan in crisis. Insecurity and a blossoming insurgency Ongoing and recurring humanitarian crises Illicit poppy-driven parallel economy Rampant corruption.

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Aid effectiveness in crisis settings: Lessons from Afghanistan

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  1. Aid effectiveness in crisis settings: Lessons from Afghanistan Belinda Bowling, Afghanistan Programme Manager, UNEP

  2. Afghanistan in crisis • Insecurity and a blossoming insurgency • Ongoing and recurring humanitarian crises • Illicit poppy-driven parallel economy • Rampant corruption Development must be seen within this broader geopolitical landscape of competing issues

  3. Q: “Do you think things are going in the right direction or the wrong direction?” Source: The Asia Foundation, 2009

  4. Q: “Would you say that today your family is more prosperous, less prosperous or about the same as under the Taliban?” Source: The Asia Foundation, 2009

  5. Facts and figures on aid (2008) • 90% of public expenditure is ODA. • Over 50% of aid is tied. • More than 60% of aid bypasses the Govt. • 40% of aid goes back to donor countries in corporate profits/ salaries. • Afghan Government does not know how 30% of aid since 2001 has been spent. • US military spends $100m p/d; aid volume is only $7m p/d. • $57 per capita vs $679 (Bosnia)/ $233 (Timor) • Less than 40% of TA is coordinated with the Government. • $1billion of aid spent by the UNCT annually. Source: ACBAR report “Falling Short”, 2008

  6. Development framework Bonn Agreement, 2001 National Development Framework, 2003 Afghanistan Compact, 2006 Afghanistan National Development Strategy/ PRSP, 2008

  7. Aid effectiveness and the UN Strengthening MDGs/ NDS - UN supported Afghanistan becoming a signatory to the MD. • UN was a key facilitator of the ANDS process, including building government capacity to lead and own the process. • UN provided key support to development of most sectors. Aligning aid with priorities - ANDS used as CCA. - New UNDAF cycle. • Strong sector support, especially agriculture, rural development, education, health. • Donor coordination efforts on 5 sectors in 2009.

  8. Aid effectiveness and the UN Harmonization • Trust funds. • Joint programmes (6 existing, more planned). • Jointly programmed development packages for most needy provinces in terms of UNDAF. • Lead in the JCMB political process. • HACT initiated. • Common facilities in some regional offices. Accountability • Dedicated aid effectiveness unit in UNAMA. • Capacity building support to line ministries and public financial management institutions. • Pressure on donors to provide info to Govt (DAD). • Improving transparency, especially procurement.

  9. UNAMA’s coordination role Paris Donor Conference on ANDS, June 2008 The international community agreed to provide increased, more predictable, transparent and accountable assistance. They agreed that all their development assistance would be delivered in a more coordinated way. It will be increasingly channeled through the national budget as strengthened, and accountable government institutions acquire greater capacity for management. The international community also committed itself to providing aid in a way that promotes local procurement and capacity-building. We agreed that the benefits of development must reach all provinces equitably. We also agreed to focus on state building efforts and avoid parallel structures. UNAMA’s role is to break bad donor habits re: aid effectiveness. The vacuum that existed in 2002 no longer exists. • Capable local institutions exist with improved local capacity (from Parliament to district councils) • The private sector has developed to meet many of the demands of the international community First DPKO mission to be given this mandate, so still at the experimental stage. Not yet welcomed by donors locally, but is welcomed in the capitals. First DPKO mission to be given this mandate, so still at the experimental stage. Not yet welcomed by donors locally, but is welcomed in the capitals.

  10. Key lessons learnt • Direct budgetary support is not the answer in fragile states like Afghanistan. • Tying aid to the provinces in which the donor’s international forces are operating results in inequity and promotes insecurity in otherwise peaceful provinces. • Aid should promote local ownership, sustainable poverty reduction and longer-term capacity building – too much aid in Afghanistan seeks rapid results at the cost of these goals. • The widespread use of military actors and contractors to implement assistance programs has contributed to a blurring of the distinction between security forces and aid agencies. • Less aid should be channelled through private contractors. • Rampant corruption is undermining public trust in the Afghan government and hindering its effectiveness. Donors should act decisively against corruption from word go. • Procurement should be local as far as possible.

  11. UNAMA contact details Mark Ward, Special Advisor on Development to the SRSG: ward3@un.org Resident Coordinator’s Office: rco_afg@un.org

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