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Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching

LABORATORIES. Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching. Ari Juels RSA Laboratories 10th CACR Information Security Workshop 8 May 2002. Fingerprint scanning. Iris scanning. Voice recognition. Face recognition. Body odor. Many types of biometric authentication. Authenticating.

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Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching

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  1. LABORATORIES Fuzzy Vaults: Toward Secure Client-Side Matching Ari Juels RSA Laboratories 10th CACR Information Security Workshop 8 May 2002

  2. Fingerprint scanning • Iris scanning • Voice recognition • Face recognition • Body odor Many types of biometric authentication... Authenticating... • Many others...

  3. A Comparison Among Biometric Architectures

  4. Alice Registration Alice Template

  5. Alice Template is stored

  6. Alice Alice Authentication

  7. Alice Authentication ?  It’s Alice!

  8. The big questions • Where is the match performed? • Determines architecture • How is the template protected? • Critical because….

  9. First password Second password Limited password changes

  10. Alice Alice Templates represent intrinsic information about you Theft of a template is theft of identity

  11. An Important Note • Biometrics no more secure than PINs! • Static values • False acceptance rates imply, e.g., 1/100,000 security (i.e., perhaps 17 bits) • Thus, it is at present unwise to protect cryptographic systems with biometrics alone • Biometrics are a good second factor, i.e., PIN replacement

  12. The Three Architectures:Server-side, Client-side, andOn-device

  13. Alice Server-side matching Client Server

  14. Alice Alice “access granted” Server-side matching Client Server 

  15. Server-side matching: Drawbacks • Risk of template compromise en bloc • Hundreds of thousands of fingerprints make an excellent hacker target • Privacy, liability concerns considerable • Architecturally complex • Matching is CPU-intensive for server

  16. Alice “It’s Alice!” “Hi, Alice!” Client-side matching Server 

  17. Client-side matching • Most convenient and simple to build • Fine for, e.g., locking desktop with screen saver • Not secure for remote authentication... client can be made to lie!

  18. Alice “It’s Alice!” “It’s Alice!” “Hi, Alice!” Client-side matching Server

  19. Alice Alice SecurID On-device matching

  20. Alice Alice Alice SecurID On-device matching 

  21. On-device matching • On-device security provides full privacy and integrity • With smartcard, biometric unlocks card, thus no need for modification of client or server software But...

  22. On-device matching • But Alice must always have her smart card with her -- portability lost • At present, true on-device match available only with expensive (i.e., $200) units • Most “on-card” matching systems process data on PC, reducing security

  23. “Fuzzy Vault”:A New Architecture

  24. h h(“password”) “password” UNIX protection of passwords “password” “password”

  25. Alice Alice Alice Template protection? h h( )

  26. Alice Fingerprint is variable • Differing angles of presentation • Differing amounts of pressure • Chapped skin Don’t have exact key! So hashing won’t work...

  27. We want “fuzzy” vault • Differing angles of presentation • Differing amounts of pressure • Chapped skin

  28. Alice  We want “fuzzy” vault My PIN

  29. How do we do it? • Fuzzy vault is just a piece of encrypted data • Uses error-correcting codes • Technology used to eliminate “noise” in telecommunications, CD players, etc. • We make counterintuitive use of error-correcting codes • Jettison the message space!

  30. Alice Fingerprint (features) not stored in clear What do we get?

  31. Client Directory Fuzzy vault Vault can be stored in directory and unlocked on client My PIN

  32. Fuzzy vault: Caveats Basic fuzzy vault: • Does not achieve security of on-card matching • Not secure against Trojan horses • Still provides adequate security as second factor, e.g., PIN replacement

  33. Fuzzy vault pros • Provable security characterization • Similar (dubious) schemes lack proofs • No need for biometric server • No need for smart card • Fuzzy vault can be placed on smart or dumb card for added flexibility, though • Can build secure readers without crypto • All the benefits of secure, client-side match!

  34. When can I buy a fuzzy vault? • Fuzzy vault is a research concept • Validated in early prototype • Needs development on biometrics side • RSA Labs is looking for research partner

  35. To learn more... • Fuzzy vault I -- Suitable for iris? • “A Fuzzy Commitment Scheme”, ACM CCS ‘99 • Joint work with Martin Wattenberg, IBM • Fuzzy vault II -- Suitable for fingerprints? • “A Fuzzy Vault Scheme”, ISIT ‘01 • Joint work with Madhu Sudan, MIT • Patents pending • Papers at www.ari-juels.com • Ari Juels at ajuels@rsasecurity.com

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