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WLAN 보안. WLAN Security. Requirements for Secure Wireless LANs Authentication Access Control Data Privacy Data Integrity Protection Against Replay. WLAN Attack. Wardriving Driving around looking for unsecured wireless networks. term coined by Pete Shipley 워드라이빙 :
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WLAN Security • Requirements for Secure Wireless LANs • Authentication • Access Control • Data Privacy • Data Integrity • Protection Against Replay
WLAN Attack • Wardriving • Driving around looking for unsecured wireless networks. • term coined by Pete Shipley • 워드라이빙 : • 이동수단을 이용하여, 무인증 무선네트워크를 찾아다니는 행위 • 해킹 경유지의 순차적 추적 불가능 • 무선 AP에는 접속 로그 미존재 • 실시간 추적시에도 무선 AP로부터 접속자 위치 확인 불가능 • 실시간 이동 공격자에 대한 추적 대책 미흡 (핸드폰 위치추적기술과 같은 방법 개발 필요)
MAC address Authentication Attack • Strengths (장점) • MAC 주소를 기반으로 AP에 접속하고자 하는 Station들을 제어 • Weaknesses (단점) • MAC 주소는 쉽게 위조 가능 • 무선랜 네트워크를 모니터링(sniffing)함으로써 쉽게 MAC 주소를 획득 • 공격자들은 무선랜 통신을 계속 감시 가능 • MAC 주소의 Brute-force 공격이 가능 • Man in the middle attack 기술로 네트워크가 공격에 노출 • TOOL • Windows • AiroPeek : Wireless Network Management Tool • SMAC : MAC address Changer • -Linux • Kismet : Wireless Network Sniffing Tool • macchanger : MAC address Changer
Rogue AP – Spoofing Attack • Station은 항상 가장 신호가 센 AP로 접속 • Attacker는 목표 AP와 동일한 SSID를 사용 • Attacker는 목표 AP보다 강한 신호를 발생시켜 • Victim이 접속하기 가장 용이한 AP로 위장 • Victim은 아무런 의심없이 AP에 접속 • Attacker는 정상적인 홈페이지를 위장한 가상홈페이지를 열어놓고 ID와 PW 입력 유도
802.11 Passive Monitoring Access Point Username: dziminski Password:cleartext Station Attacker Passive Monitoring Captures data
802.11 DOS Attack Access Point X Connection is broken Station Attacker spoofs 802.11 Disassociate frame
802.11 Man in the Middle Attack • Attacker broadcasts spoofed AP SSID and MAC Address • Station unknowingly connects to attacker • MIM attacks can always be established • But if strong authentication and encryption are used, attacker will be nothing more than a bridge. Station Access Point Station MAC Address Attacker AP MAC Address Station MAC Address AP MAC Address
Authentication and Encryption Standards Credentials Certificate Username/Password TLS PEAP Authentication Protocols EAP 802.1x Encryption Algorithms RC4 RC4 AES Encryption Standards WEP WPA-TKIP 802.11i WEP: Wired Equivalent Privacy , WPA: Wi-Fi Protected Access, TKIP: Temporal Key Integrity Protocol PEAP: Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol; uses server-sidepublic key certificates to authenticate the server
Evolution of WLAN Security • WEP: not adequate • IEEE formed a Task Group “i” to develop 802.11i standard • Objective: to produce a detailed specification to enhance the security features for WLANs IEEE 802 Working group IEEE 802.11 WLAN WG IEEE 802.11i WLAN security RSN TSN Robust Security Network Transitional Security Network
Evolution of WLAN Security • Responses from Wi-Fi Alliance • The industry cannot wait for the 802.11i standard. It is demanding a more secure wireless environment right now • Wi-Fi Alliance, together with IEEE, developed Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) to offer a strong interoperable security standard to the market • 802.11i contributed TKIP (encryption) and MIC (integrity) algorithms, which were being developed for RSN but applicable to WPA Wi-Fi Alliance IEEE 802.11i WPA TKIP + MIC Temporal Key Integrity Protocol Message Integrity Check Wi-Fi Protected Access
RSN Designed from the start, without regards to existing WEP systems Will require new hardware to support new methods of encryption Supports options for encryption (privacy) TKIP AES High-level Differences BetweenRSN and WPA • WPA • Designed with constraints around existing WEP systems • Objective: use same hardware and upgrade software only • Only supports one encryption standard: TKIP Essentially, the two approaches are very similar and built around the same security architecture
WEP Encryption 24 bit IV clear text integrity check IV Payload CRC-32 Encrypted with 40 or 104 bit key. RC4 Algorithm. • WEP has several problems • IV is too small. At 10,000 packets per second IV repeats in 0.5 hours. • - For 24 bits, an IV will be reused after 16777216 packets if IV • value is incremented by 1 each time. For a device sending 10,000 packets per second • 24-bit IV takes half an hour to rollover • There are several “weak keys”. Those are especially vulnerable. • No key update mechanism built in. • Message replay attacks. DOS.
WPA • Key features to address WEP vulnerabilities • Access Control and Authentication: • Implements 802.1X EAP based authentication to enforce mutual authentication • Encryption • Applies Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) on existing WEP to impose strong data encryption • Integrity • Uses Message Integrity Check (MIC) rather than CRC-32 for message integrity • WPA also presents some potential security issues • There are still potential encryption weaknesses in TKIP. Fortunately, the successful crack is expected to be heavy and expensive. • Performance may be sacrificed potentially due to a more complex and computation intensive authentication and encryption protocols. Note: The ultimate wireless security solution is still 802.11i RSN. All products are supposed to comply with RSN standard since it is released, often under the name WPA2.
Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) TKIP-Encryption • Wi-Fi Protected Access is an interim standard created by the Wi-Fi alliance (group of manufacturers). • WPA-TKIP fixes problems with WEP. • IV changes to 48 bits with no weak keys. 900 years to repeat an IV at 10k packets/sec • Use IV as a replay counter • Message integrity • Per-packet keying • Supported on many wireless card and on Windows XP (after applying 2 hot fixes). • Uses 802.1x for key distribution. • Can also use static keys.
802.11i RSN • Key features to address WEP vulnerabilities • Access Control and Authentication • Implements 802.1X EAP based authentication to enforce mutual authentication (same as WPA) • WRAP: RSN includes a Wireless Robust Authentication Protocol. Uses AES in offset codebook mode (OCB) for encryption and integrity. • Encryption • TKIP: In order to support legacy device, the 802.11i chooses TKIP as one of the encryption options • AES: Stands for Advanced Encryption Standard, which is a much stronger encryption algorithm. AES requires a hardware coprocessor to operate • Integrity • Uses Michael Message Integrity Check (MIC) for message integrity • Other security features: Secure IBSS (Ad Hoc mode), secure fast handoff, secure de-authentication and disassociation. • Supports Roaming • Is referred to as WPA2 by the Wi-Fi Alliance IBSS: Independent Basic Service Set
802.11i AES-encryption • Ratified by the IETF in June of 04. • Uses the AES algorithm for encryption and 802.1x for key • distribution. • Backwards compatible with TKIP to support WPA clients. • 802.11i not in many products yet.
Access Control and Authentication – 802.1X / EAP • Initially designed for wired networks but is now applicable to WLANs. • Provides port-based access control and mutual authentication between client and APs via an authentication server. • 802.1X standard is comprised of three elements • A supplicant: the client (laptop, PDA,…) who wants to be authenticated • An authenticator: the AP, which acts as an intermediary between a supplicant and an authentication server. • An authentication server: such as a RADIUS (Remote Access Dial-In User Service) server. Access Point Authenticator Station Supplicant RADIUS Server Authorizer
Access Control and Authentication – 802.1X / EAP • EAP • EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol): protocol that 802.1X uses to manage mutual authentication. • Initially developed for use with PPP (RFC2284) • Several EAP types depending on the authentication method (passwords, PKI certificates,…) • EAP-MD5 • EAP-TLS • EAP-TTLS • PEAP • LEAP • EAP-SIM • The authenticator does not need to understand the details about authentication methods. It simply package and repackage EAP packets, usually between Supplicant and RADIUS
802.1x EAP-TLS Authentication Client digital cert From XYZ CA Access Point Authenticator Station Supplicant RADIUS Server Authorizer Server Digital cert From XYZ CA
802.1x PEAP authentication Phase 1: Authenticate AP. Secure tunnel to AP using TLS Digital cert From XYZ CA Access Point Authenticator Station Supplicant RADIUS Server Authorizer Username Dan Password: encrypted Phase 2: Password authentication with directory server Success/Fail Directory Server
LEAP (Lightweight Extensible Authentication Protocol) • LEAP Characteristics • Primarily developed by Cisco for Aironet WLAN deployments. • Cisco is now licensing the software, other vendors are now beginning to support LEAP in their wireless LAN adapters. • Encrypts data transmissions using dynamically generated WEP keys and supports mutual authentication. • No certificates are required • Uses bi-directional challenge-response with user password as shared secret • Transaction sent in clear text (dictionary attacks !)