Smart Grid Cyber Security: Support from Power System SCADA and EMS

1. Smart Grid Cyber Security: Support from Power System SCADA and EMS Frances Cleveland fcleve@xanthus-consulting.com

2. What caused the blackout? • Power Equipment Failures? • Mistakes by People? • Information Flow Design Flaws? Cyber Security and the Smart Grid –Why is it important? What does this blackout have to do with Security? And Information Flow Design Flaws? Are those Smart Grid Security Issues? Yes, given how dependent the Smart Grid has (and will increasingly) become on information, “All Hazards” security mandates the need for a reliable and secure information infrastructure What is this picture? August 14, 2003 Northeast Blackout – (enhanced photo)

3. What is Security? Some Key Concepts • For power systems, keeping the lights on is the primary focus. Therefore the key security requirements are Availability and Integrity, not Confidentiality (AIC, not CIA) • Encryption, by itself, does not provide security. • Security threats can be deliberate attacks ORinadvertent mistakes, failures, and natural disasters. • The most dangerous “attacker” is a disgruntled employee who knows exactly where the weaknesses are the easiest to breach and could cause the worst damage. • Security solutions must be end-to-end to avoid “man-in-the-middle” attacks or failed equipment from causing denial of service • Security solutions must be layered, so that if one layer is breached, the next will be there. Security is only as strong as its weakest link. • Security will ALWAYS be breached at some time – there is no perfect security solution. Security must always be planned around that eventuality. • Security measures must balancethecost of security against the potential impact of a security breach

4. Operators, Planners & Engineers Central Generating Step-Up 2. Communications and Information Infrastructure Station Transformer Distribution Receiving Distribution Control Center Cogeneration Turbine Gas Substation Station Substation Turbine Distribution Substation Micro- turbine Commercial Diesel Fuel Engine cell Cogeneration Storage Industrial Wind Power Commercial Residential To maintain power system reliability, need to manage both the Power System Infrastructure and its supporting Information Infrastructure 1.Power System Infrastructure Photovoltaic systems

5. Traditional “IT” Security Measures Cannot Meet All Power System Security Requirements • Two key security issues for utilities are power system reliability and legacy equipment: • Power systems must continue to operate as reliably as possible even during a security attack. • It is financially and logistically impractical to replace older power system equipment just to add security measures. • Layered security is critical not only to prevent security attacks, but also to detect actual security breaches, to survive during a security attack, and to log all events associated with the attack. • Most traditional “IT” security measures, although able to prevent and/or detect security attacks, cannot directly help power systems to continue operating. • For legacy systems and for non-critical, compute-constrained equipment, compensating methods may need to be used in place of these traditional “IT” security measures.

6. Use of Power System SCADA and Energy Management Systems for Certain Security Solutions • One method for addressing these problems is to use existing power system management technologies as a valid and very powerful method of security management, particularly for detecting, coping with, and logging security events. • Add sensors, intelligent controllers, and intrusion-detection devices on “critical” equipment • Utilize and expand existing SCADA systems to monitor these additional security-related devices • Expand the SCADA system to monitor judiciously selected power system information from AMI systems. • Expand Power Flow analysis functions to assess anomalous power system behaviors such as unexpected shifts of load and generation patterns, and abnormal power flow contingency analysis results to identify unexpected situations.

7. Service Provider Markets 12 Energy Market Clearinghouse Energy Service Providers 2 Aggregators and Energy Market-based Providers 6 Distribution 33 Sensors 34 Collectors Transmission SCADA/EMS 36 RTUs or IEDs ISO/RTO 1 28 24 35 3 9 Distributed Intelligence Capabilities 4 Distribution SCADA 23 Metering & Billing Geographic Information System AM/FM Distribution Field Crews, Mobile Computing 8 21 29 14 5 15 AMI Headend DMS power system modeling functions: DOMA, VVWS, FLIR, CA, MFR, OMS, WMS Customer Information Sys 25 7 19 13 22 20 31 AMI Network Distribution Operator 17 ESI/Gateway 27 26 16 Metering Load Management System 18 30 11 Distribution Engineering ESI/ Gateway Customer EMS Operations Distribution Grid Management Use Cases: Logical Interfaces Used by NIST for Security Assessments 32 10 DOMA: Distribution Operations Model & Analysis VVWS: Volt-Var-Watt FLIR: Fault Location, Isolation, Restoration MFR: Multi-Feeder Reconnection OMS: Outage Management System WMS: Work Management System Customer appliances, DER, PEV, Electric Storage Customer

8. ¿Questions? Frances Cleveland fcleve@xanthus-consulting.com