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Optimal Stipend Policy for Science and Engineering

Optimal Stipend Policy for Science and Engineering. Richard Freeman NBER, SEWP June 18, 2004 NSF Washington DC. What does Science Workforce Policy Seek to Maximize?. Numbers of Graduates Quality of Graduates Field allocation Current science output Minimal Time to Degree

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Optimal Stipend Policy for Science and Engineering

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  1. Optimal Stipend Policy for Science and Engineering Richard Freeman NBER, SEWP June 18, 2004 NSF Washington DC

  2. What does Science Workforce Policy Seek to Maximize? • Numbers of Graduates • Quality of Graduates • Field allocation • Current science output • Minimal Time to Degree • Demographic distribution • Well-being of Graduates

  3. Economics View: • High quality labor to advance science and engineering for economic benefit of country • High quality labor for national security • AS CHEAPLY AS COUNTRY CAN GET IT

  4. Stipends have potential impact on Supply-side Front end rewards can have large impact on decisions bcs signal and discounting Gov’t fellowships limited to citizens/ residents can affect US supply Can alter # and $ of awards  can affect quality and quantity; can affect TTD, attrition

  5. Quality and Quantity Quality measures – rather poor for early decisions  random selection into grad schools?? Quantity – Established programs have not increased much, so growth is in newer “lower quality” NSB and other discussion has been about quantity But huge effort to allocate on basis of quality

  6. Two models of quality 1) Math jocks can do nothing else raise $  quality no change raise #s  quality down; quantity up; 2) Math jocks are superstars raise $  quality up; raise #s  quality fall (universities accept rejectees)

  7. Poor Measures of Quality Need to know who is on the margin – who might have come if better opportunity From attrition data, seems that marginal leavers and completers rather similar Our evidence – unclear BUT these are GRE, GPA, etc very imperfect for measuring “true quality”

  8. Complexities on Stipends as Tool Govt does not control stipends nationally; influences only NSF does not control govt stipends Budget constraints  #s $s tradeoff Alternative forms of support Post-Doc RA pay Universities/nonprofits Taxation Medical Coverage

  9. Complexities of Stipends in Market If stipend values increase RA, TA pay can have demand effect puts strain on universities If grad students become more expensive, substitute post-docs, pay greatly affected by NRSA

  10. Some Possibilities Differentiate $ by field or area cost of living Alter the timing: 5 years and out Link to post-PhD career awards to increase post-doc independence Give students a schedule that they could choose: $200K for your PhD education if graduate in 5 years, 40K; if graduate in 4 years 50K Pilot experiments – review university/non NSF experiences

  11. Conclusion IF SERIOUS ABOUT INCREASING US #s, STIPENDS ARE IMPORTANT TOOL KEY IS TO IMPROVE CAREER ATTRACTIVENESS FRONTLOADING PAY HAVE TO PAY TO INCREASE SUPPLY

  12. Radical thought COSTS ARE MINUTE COMPARED TO OTHER GOVT SPENDING\ BENEFITS ARE POTENTIALLY IMMENSE

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