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Y.J. Yang, J.Y. Zhou, R.H. Deng, F. Bao Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore

Computationally Secure Hierarchical Self-Healing Group Key Distribution for Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks. Y.J. Yang, J.Y. Zhou, R.H. Deng, F. Bao Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore. Agenda. Introduction Heterogeneous WSN Architecture

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Y.J. Yang, J.Y. Zhou, R.H. Deng, F. Bao Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore

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  1. Computationally Secure Hierarchical Self-Healing Group Key Distribution for Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks Y.J. Yang, J.Y. Zhou, R.H. Deng, F. Bao Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore

  2. Agenda • Introduction • Heterogeneous WSN Architecture • Basic Hierarchical Self-healing group Key Distribution Scheme • Extended Scheme • Conclusion

  3. Introduction • Heterogeneous WSN Architecture • Basic Hierarchical Self-healing group Key Distribution Scheme • Extended Scheme • Conclusion

  4. Wireless Sensor Networks • Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)

  5. Self-healing Group Key Distribution • Key Distirubtion & Management is Fundamental to Other Security Issues • Pairwise key distribution • Group key distribution • Self-healing group key distribution especially suits WSNs’ lossy channel.

  6. Homogeneous WSNs • All Existing Work Consider Homogeneous WSNs • Homogeneous WSN • All sensor nodes have the same capability • Homogeneous WSNs have scalability problem. Theoretical and empirical studies have corroborated this

  7. Hierarchical Self-healing Key Distribution • Motivated to Study Self-healing Group Key Distribution for Heterogeneous WSNs • Hierarchical Self-healing Group Key Distribution • Adapting to the heterogeneous WSN architecture

  8. Introduction • Heterogeneous WSN Architecture • Basic Hierarchical Self-healing group Key Distribution Scheme • Extended Scheme • Conclusion

  9. Heterogeneous WSNs • Heterogeneous WSNs Are A Better Alternative to Homogeneous ones • The network is partitioned into groups, and each group is placed a group manager • Group managers have better capability than sensor nodes • A group manager acts an intermediary between sensor nodes and the base station

  10. Heterogeneous WSNs

  11. Introduction • Heterogeneous WSN Architecture • Basic Hierarchical Self-healing group Key Distribution Scheme • Extended Scheme • Conclusion

  12. Key Hierarchy

  13. Key Generation rK = [rk1, rk2] mKi = [mk1, mk2] =[h(Gi,rk1), h(Gi,rk2)] gKi = …

  14. Key Generation reverse hash chain foward hash chain gKi[j] = kR[m-j+1]+kF[j] kR[j] = hRj(mk1) = hR(hR(hR(…hR(mk1)))) kF[j] = hFj(mk2) = hF(hF(hF(…hF(mk2))))

  15. Key Distribution gKi[j] = kR[m-j+1]+kF[j] • mk2 is given to each sensor as seed sF for the forward hash chain • At the start of each session, the group manager generates kR[m-j+1] using mk1 as seed for the reverse hash chain, and broadcasts to sensors within its group • The broadcast scheme is essentially the Dutta et al.’s scheme, with a slight modification to rectify its weakness

  16. Key Distribution • The reverse hash chain is used to achieve self-healing property • The forward hash chain is used to achive forward secrecy, i.e., sensors joined later cannot compute group keys of earlier sessions

  17. Introduction • Heterogeneous WSN Architecture • Basic Hierarchical Self-healing group Key Distribution Scheme • Extended Scheme • Conclusion

  18. Untrusted Group Manager Untrusted Group Manager • For the basic scheme, group managers are assumed trusted. • However, group managers cannot be guaranteed trusted. • We consider some group managers are compromised in the extended scheme

  19. Secret sharing of mk1 Secret sharing of mk1 • In basic scheme, if mk1 is compromised, all sessions are compromised • We are left to secret sharing of mk1 among group managers; and compute kR[m-j+1] in a distributed way • The point is that hR() can be computed in a distributed way

  20. Choice of hR() • Normal hash function cannot be used as hR() • We define hR() hR(): ZN QRN hR(x) = x2 (mod N) • mk1 is partitioned into t shares mk1 = s1.s2…st-1.st (mod N) hRj(mk1) = (s1)2^j (s2)2^j(st)2^j (mod N)

  21. Introduction • Heterogeneous WSN Architecture • Basic Hierarchical Self-healing group Key Distribution Scheme • Extended Scheme • Conclusion

  22. Conclusion Conclusion • Heterogeneous WSNs have better scalability and performance, as the introduction of powerful group managers provides shortcut for data transmission from sensors to base station • We proposed hierarchical self-healing group key distribution tailored to heterogeneous WSNs • Our constructions are based Dutta et al.’s idea

  23. Q&A Thank You!

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