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Explore the causes of high industrial rates, compare historical data, and potential solutions in the electricity market.
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CMTA Summer Energy ConferenceJuly, 2004 Industrial Rates in a Reformed Electricity Market: Is Relief In Sight? William H. Booth, Counsel to CLECA
Industrial Rates in a Reformed Electric Market • Are industrial rates too high presently? Too high in relation to what? • If they are too high, what can be done about it? What are the causes? • Do decisions regarding market structure affect the outcome for industrial rates? • What can be achieved politically, and over what time frame?
Are California Industrial Electric Rates Too High? YES, By Several Measures. • Ask the purchasing manager. Look at electric costs as a percentage of production costs. • Compare CA rates to those in other states. • Compare current industrial electric rates to those in effect before the energy crisis. • Compare class average rates to utility system average rates over time. • Compare class average rates to cost of service.
The CPUC Set 1996 Rates Based on Then Current Cost of Service • “In today’s decision, we reaffirm our commitment to the policy of marginal cost-based ratemaking. The decrease in Edison’s revenue requirements affords us an opportunity to align rates closer to costs while keeping bill impacts at a reasonable level.” CPUC Decision 96-04-050 • “Marginal costs should be the starting point and the central focus of revenue allocation and rate design for setting Edison’s rates.” D.96-04-0540
Direct Access Rates Are Also High, and Can Exceed Bundled Rates • Energy Cost – Spot/2 yr block 3.5-5.5 • ISO Costs 0.5 • Utility T&D (Trans. Customer) 1.0 • Capped CRS 2.7 • Total 7.7-9.7 • Note that Edison’s bundled rate for transmission customers is currently 7.6 cents and PG&E’s is 8.8 cents.
Return to Bundled Service Is Not A Great Option For DA Customers • 6 mos. notice with market pricing in the interim, plus 2.7 cent CRS • 3-yr commitment to bundled service • Full CRS undercollection repayment begins in a few years ($460 MM for SCE, $250 MM for PG&E through 12/31/03) • Bundled rates plus repayment of CRS undercollection at up to 2.7 cents/kWh
Industrial Rates Are Clearly Too High, But What Can Be Done About It? • As a result of the energy crisis, CA has added billions to utility revenue requirement • DWR undercollections of $8 billion in 2001 • DWR contract portfolio is at least $15 billion over market levels through 2011 • Utilities granted recovery of billions of procurement undercollections and “get well “ costs • Edison’s system average rate is up 22% and PG&E’s is up 36% from pre-crisis levels
Much of the Higher Revenue Requirement is Locked in, at Least Through 2012 • DWR undercollection is bonded through 2022 at 5 mills/kWh • DWR contract portfolio runs through 2012 at a current average cost of 9 cents/kWh • PG&E’s $2 billion regulatory asset is set for 9 years at roughly 6 mills/kWh • Edison QF contract portfolio has an average cost of 7.9 cents
Are There Real Opportunities to Reduce Utility Rev Req? • Will natural gas prices fall? • Refinancing PG&E’s Reg Asset with a DRC will reduce its cost to 4.5 mills/kWh • Many QF contracts terminate over the next several years • Further restructuring of DWR contracts? • Possible supplier refunds? • Recall how CA handled the $1 billion DWR bond refund in October 2003.
What About Cost Allocation Changes/Reform? • Both Edison and PG&E have pending allocation proceedings before CPUC • Decisions are due in early and mid 2005 • Returning PG&E’s E-20 class average rate to its historic relationship to SAR would drop it from 10.6 cents to 8.8 cents • PG&E’s E-20T rate would drop from 8.8 cents to 6.4 cents
PG&E and Edison Propose Just Slight Reductions for Large Industrial Rates • PG&E’s E-20 rate would fall from 10.6 to 9.7 cents (E-20T from 8.8 to 8.6 cents) • Edison’s TOU-8 rate would drop from 10.3 to 9.95 cents • But, Edison’s TOU-8-Sub rate would actually increase from 7.6 to 8.0 cents • A return to the 1996 relationship would drop this rate from 7.6 to 5.5 cents
What Constrains Further Reductions In Industrial Rates? • Perceived need to reduce commercial rates • SCE proposes 0.9 cent reduction for GS-2 • PG&E proposes 1.9 cent reduction for A-10 • Perceived need to limit residential rate increases • SCE proposes 14.6% residential class increase • PG&E proposes a 12.2% residential increase
Will the CPUC Permit Even These Modest Residential Increases? • AB 1X exempted all residential usage below 130% of baseline from any rate increase for duration of DWR contracts. • 65% of resid. load and 25% of utility bundled load. • Exemption worth roughly $600 million for each of the SCE and PG&E resid. groups in June 2001 increase. • Approval of SCE’s proposed 15% resid. increase requires a 45% increase for the top 35% of resid. usage. • Residential and Agricultural customers will demand caps on class increases, say 5%.
Other Constraints On Rate Reductions Through Cost Allocation ? • The nature of the underlying cost increases • DWR commodity energy purchases • Bond charges spread uniformly per kWh • Higher natural gas costs • Increased PPP and CARE costs spread uniform cents • Unbundling of rate elements changes the CPUC’s traditional cost allocation technique from Equal Percentage of Marginal Cost (EPMC) to functional marginal cost allocation • Industrial customer load factors decline when large customers leave for DA service
Does the Structure of the Electric Market Affect Industrial Rates? • Current hybrid market means some industrials are bundled and some DA • DA customers pay exit fees to make bundled customers “indifferent” • The Indifference calculation is complex and sensitive • DA customers pay for DWR power they don’t receive • Capped CRS is “financed” by bundled commercial -industrial customers at a cost of 4 mills/kWh • CPUC rules permit coming and going subject to limitations (6 mos notice and 3 year term)
Would Core/Non-Core Help? • Opening DA to new load could mean higher CRS • DA is not economic at today’s CRS levels • Movement of load to DA can increase Indifference fee • Core/Non-Core could mean stricter rules re: movement between bundled and DA • 5 year term or one-time election • Uncertainty re Core/Non-Core complicates utility procurement and potentially adds costs • How much load are utilities to purchase for? • Who is the provider of last resort?
In The End, These Are Political Questions • Policymakers are more concerned about electric reliability than about cost of service. • Are these goals best served by: • Moving to a Core/Non-Core Structure? • Adding energy efficiency, renewables and demand side management? • Is electricity unique, such that market solutions do not apply? • How does California value its business climate? • Should California favor residential (voters) over business electric customers?