Kompleksni karteli

1. Kompleksni karteli • “Single overall infringement” - ECJ - Anic: • "When ... the infringement involves anticompetitive agreements and con­certed practices, the Commission must in particular, show that the undertaking intended to contribute by its own conduct to the common objectives pursued by all the participants and that it was aware of the actual conduct planned or put into effect by other undertakings in pursuit of the same objectives or that it could reasonably have foreseen it and that it was prepared to take the risk."

2. Sklepi združenj podjetij

3. Združenje podjetij • Trgovska združenja • Poklicna združenja (odvetniška zbornica) • Ni potrebna pravna osebnost • Ni potreben formalni statut

4. BNIC v. Guy Clair: • “[Article 81] of the Treaty applies to agreements between undertakings and decisions by associations of undertakings. The legal framework within which such agreements are made and such decisions are taken and the classification given to that framework by the various national legal systems are irrelevant as far as the applicability of the community rules on competition are concerned. An inter-trade agreement made by two groups of traders must therefore be regarded as an agreement between undertakings or associations of undertakings within the meaning of [Article 81] even if they meet within an organization which the national courts have held to be governed by public law.”

5. Sklep združenja podjetij • Sklep o določitvi rabata • Ni potrebna formalna veljavnost oz. ob veza • Vpliv na ravnanje članov! • Neobvezijoča priporočila glede cen (Fenex) • Tudi če določitev cen naloži/odobri država • Certifikati (SCK & FNK) • Tudi statut je lahko sklep

6. Kazen • Združenje • Posamezni člani

7. Usklajeno ravnanje • Neforrmalno sodelovanje • Skrivanje, uničenje dokazov • Razlika med usklajenim ravnanjem in naravno reakcijo na tržne razmere • Različni proizvodni stroški

8. Definicija - ECJ Dyestuffs (ICI): • »… a form of coordination between undertakings which, without having reached the stage where an agreement properly so-called has been concluded, knowingly substitutes practical cooperation between them for the risks of competition.«

9. Definicija ECJ - Sugar Cartel (Suikerunie) • “The concept of a 'concerted practice' refers to a form of coordination between undertakings, which, without having been taken to the stage where an agreement properly so-called has been concluded, knowingly substitutes for the risks of competition, practical cooperation between them which leads to conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal conditions of the market, having regard to the nature of the products, the importance and number of the undertakings as well as the size and nature of the said market.”

10. Organizacija distribucijskih omrežij - Pioneer • “ A company whose purpose is to import and organize the sale of products in several member states and which to that end attempts to find a distributor in each of the member states in question , offers it an exclusive distributorship agreement , divides the products imported amongst the national distributors and seeks to coordinate their sales efforts, inter alia by holding regular meetings , is obliged, on account of its central position, to display particular vigilance in order to prevent concerted efforts of that kind from giving rise to practices contrary to the competition rules, even if those activities do not necessarily confer on it a decisive influence on the conduct of each of the distributors.”

11. Pri UR ni bistvo v razlikovanju med sporazumom in UR ampak v razlikovanju med UR in dopustnim paralelnim obnašanjem na trgu, ki ne nasprotuje konkurenčnopravnim pravilom!!! • Lahko problem v situaciji oligopola

12. Oligopol • Malo prodajalcev • Težko dostopen trg • Malo diferenciacije proizvodov • Transparentnost stroškov in cen • ‘Naravno’ nižanje cen • Problem je struktura trga in ne ravnanje udeležencev

13. UR in paralelno ravnanje • ICI (Dyrestuffs) • Sugar (Suiker Unie) • Züchner v. Bayerische Bankprovizije za transfer sredstev med DČ • Asturienne&Rheinzink • Woodpulp

14. Suiker Unie • " … each economic operator must determine independently the policy which he intends to adopt on the common market including the choice of the persons and undertakings to which he makes offers or sells. … this requirement of independence does not deprive economic operators of the right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing and anticipated conduct of their competitors,

15. Suikerunie • “… it does, however, strictly preclude any direct or indirect contact between such operators, the object or effect whereof is either to influence the conduct on the market of an actual or potential competitor or to disclose to such a competitor the course of conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or contemplate adopting on the market.«

16. Züchner v. Bayerische Bank - • Ali so se stiki nanačali na provizije v preteklosti ali v prihodnosti? • Ali bi bile provizije v situaciji konkurence različne? • Število in pomen bank, ki so aktivne v transferjih denarja med DČ • Volumen transferjev kjer se je uporabila enotna tarifa v primerjavi s skupnim številom transferjev.

17. Cement • Obljuba konkurentu, da ne bo konkuriral na določenem trgu • Izmenjava info med konkurentoma na podlagi prošnje enega od njih • “ …did not make itinconceivable that the Italian undertaking, despite everything, allowed the information … to influence its export prices".

18. Drugačna razlaga ravnanja možna • Asturienne&Rheinzink • Woodpulp

19. Namen ali učinek - omejevanje konkurence • Kaj je omejevanje konkurence? • Horizontalne in vertikalne omejitve • Absolutna teritorialna zaščita • Tudi pozitivni učinki • Dva možna pristopa: • Široka razlaga 81/1 in uporaba možnosti izjem • Ožja razlaga 81/1 in manj potrebe po izjemah

20. Namen ali učinek – omejevanje konkurence • STM • Alternativno • Kriteriji pri ekskluzivnih klavzulah • Consten & Grundig • “hard core restrictions” (omejitev per se)

21. Omejitev per se • a) neposredno ali posredno določajo nakupne ali prodajne cene ali druge pogoje poslovanja; • b) omejujejo ali nadzorujejo proizvodnjo, trge, tehnični razvoj ali naložbe; • c) določajo razdelitev trgov in virov nabave; • d) uvajajo neenake pogoje za primerljive posle z drugimi trgovinskimi partnerji in jih tako postavljajo v podrejen konkurenčni položaj; • e) pogojujejo sklepanje pogodb s tem, da sopogodbeniki sprejmejo dodatne obveznosti, ki po svoji naravi ali glede na trgovinske običaje nimajo nikakršne zveze s predmetom takšnih pogodb.

22. Zadosten učinek na konkurenco • De minimis doktrina (Völk v. Vervaecke • Mreže sporazumov (network agreements (Brasserie De Haecht) • Sporočilo Komisije 2001

23. Völk v. Vervaecke • “If an agreement is to be capable of affecting trade between member states it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or of fact that the agreement in question may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between member states in such a way that it might hinder the attainment of the objectives of a single market between states. Moreover the prohibition in article [81(1)] is applicable only if the agreement in question also has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market.

24. Those conditions must be understood by reference to the actual circumstances of the agreement. Consequently an agreement falls outside the prohibition in [Article 81] when it has only an insignificant effect on the markets, taking into account the weak position which the persons concerned have on the market of the product in question. Thus an exclusive dealing agreement, even with absolute territorial protection, may, having regard to the weak position of the persons concerned on the market in the products in question in the area covered by the absolute protection, escape the prohibition laid down in article [81(1)].

25. Brasserie De Haecht – kumulativni učinki • “…regard must be had to such effects in the context in which they occur, that is to say, in the economic and legal context of such agreements, decisions or practices and where they might combine with others to have a cumulative effect on competition. In fact, it would be pointless to consider an agreement, decision or practice by reason of its effects if those effects were to be taken distinct from the market in which they are seen to operate and could only be examined apart from the body of effects, whether convergent or not, surrounding their implementation.

26. Thus in order to examine whether it is caught by Article [81(1)] an agreement cannot be examined in isolation from the above context, that is, from the factual or legal circumstances causing it to prevent, restrict or distort competition. The existence of similar contracts may be taken into consideration for this objective to the extent to which the general body of contracts of this type is capable of restricting the freedom of trade. ...The existence of similar contracts is a circumstance which, together with others, is capable of being a factor in the economic and legal context within which the contract must be judged.”