Karteli

1. Karteli • Dogovarjanje cen • Quinine, Dystuffs (ICI), Cement Cartel, Sugar Cartel • Omejitve proizvodnje/prodaje (kvote) • Qinine, Belasco • Delitev trgov (načelo domačega trga) • Cement Cartel, Peroxygen, SAS/Maersk • Dogovarjanje glede ponudb na javnih razpisih (bid rigging) • Heating pipes • Omejevanje reklamiranja ipd. • Milchforderungfonds • Leniency

2. Zastopanje, distribucija, franchising, licenca • Lastna distribucija ali vertikalna integracija, • zastopanje, • Pristno in nepristno zastopanje (alokacija rizikov) • Distribuciske pogodbe • Ekskluzivna distribucija (STM) • Selektivni distribucijski sistemi (Metro, BMW)

3. Ekskluzivna distribucija (STM) • “…it is appropriate to take into account in particular • the nature and quantity, limited or otherwise, of the products covered by the agreement, • the position and importance of the grantor and the concessionnaire on the market for the products concerned, • the isolated nature of the disputed agreement or, alternatively, its position in a series of agreements, • the severity of the clauses intended to protect the exclusive dealership or, alternatively, • the opportunities allowed for other commercial competitors in the same products by way of parallel re-exportation and importation.”

4. Selektivna distribucija Metro: • “… selective distribution system accords with [Article 101(1)], provided that: • resellers are chosen on the basis of objective criteria of a qualitative nature relating to • technical qualifications of the reseller and his staff and • the suitability of his trading premises and • that such conditions are laid down uniformly for all potential resellers and are not applied in a discriminatory fashion.”

5. Franchising • Pronuptia, Yves Rocher • Specifična skupinska izjema4087/88 • Sedaj splošna glede vertikalnih razmerij 2790/99

6. Namen ali učinek - omejevanje konkurence • Kaj je omejevanjekonkurence? • Horizontalne in vertikalneomejitve • Absolutnateritorialnazaščita • Tudipozitivniučinki • Dvamožnapristopa: • Širokarazlaga101/1 in uporabamožnostiizjem • Ožjarazlaga101/1 in manjpotrebepoizjemah

7. Namen ali učinek – omejevanje konkurence • STM • Alternativno • ekskluzivne klavzule • Consten & Grundig • “hard core restrictions” (omejitev per se)

8. Object or effect (STM) “The fact that these are not cumulative but alternative requirements, indicated by the conjunction 'or,' leads first to the need to consider the precise purpose of the agreement, in the economic context in which it is to be applied. Where, however, an analysis of the said clauses does not reveal the effect on competition to be sufficiently deleterious, the consequences of the agreement should then be considered and for it to be caught by the prohibition it is then necessary to find that those factors are present which show that competition had in fact been prevented or restricted or distorted to an appreciable extent.”

9. Consten & Grundig • “Since the agreement thus aims at isolating the French market for Grundig products and maintaining artificially, for products of a very well-known brand, separate national markets within the community, it is therefore such as to distort competition in the common market. • It was therefore proper for the contested decision to hold that the agreement constitutes an infringement of [Article 101(1)]. No further considerations, whether of economic data (price differences between France and Germany, representative character of the type of appliance considered … • and no possible favourable effects of the agreement in other respects, can in any way lead, in the face of the abovementioned restrictions, to a different solution under [Article 101(1)].

10. Ekonomska analiza (STM) “The competition in question must be understood within the actual context in which it would occur in the absence of the agreement in dispute. In particular it may be doubted whether there is an interference with competition if the said agreement seems really necessary for the penetration of a new area by an undertaking. Therefore, in order to decide whether an agreement containing a clause 'granting an exclusive right of sale' is to be considered as prohibited by reason of its object or of its effect, it is appropriate to take into account in particular:

11. the nature and quantity, limited or otherwise, of the products covered by the agreement, • the position and importance of the grantor and the concessionaire on the market for the products concerned, • the isolated nature of the disputed agreement, or, alternatively, its position in a series of agreements, • the severity of the clauses intended to protect the exclusive dealership or, alternatively, • the opportunities allowed for other commercial competitors in the same products by way of parallel re-exportation and importation. "

12. Omejitve per se - 101(1) • a) neposredno ali posredno določajo nakupne ali prodajne cene ali druge pogoje poslovanja; • b) omejujejo ali nadzorujejo proizvodnjo, trge, tehnični razvoj ali naložbe; • c) določajo razdelitev trgov in virov nabave; • d) uvajajo neenake pogoje za primerljive posle z drugimi trgovinskimi partnerji in jih tako postavljajo v podrejen konkurenčni položaj; • e) pogojujejo sklepanje pogodb s tem, da sopogodbeniki sprejmejo dodatne obveznosti, ki po svoji naravi ali glede na trgovinske običaje nimajo nikakršne zveze s predmetom takšnih pogodb.

13. Zadosten učinek na konkurenco • De minimis doktrina (Völk v. Vervaecke) • Mreže sporazumov (network agreements (Brasserie De Haecht) • Sporočilo Komisije 2001 • Horizontalni 10% • Vertikalni 15%

14. Völk v. Vervaecke • “If an agreement is to be capable of affecting trade between member states it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or of fact • that the agreement in question may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, • on the pattern of trade between member states in such a way that it might hinder the attainment of the objectives of a single market between states.

15. Those conditions must be understood by reference to the actual circumstances of the agreement. Consequently • …an agreement falls outside the prohibition in [Article 101] when it has only an insignificant effect on the markets, taking into account the weak position which the persons concerned have on the market of the product in question. • Thus an exclusive dealing agreement, even with absolute territorial protection, may, having regard to the weak position of the persons concerned on the market in the products in question in the area covered by the absolute protection, escape the prohibition laid down in article [101(1)].”

16. Mreže sporazumov • Kumulativni učinek • Brasserie de Haecht • Delimitis

17. Brasserie De Haecht – kumulativni učinki • “…regard must be had to such effects in the context in which they occur, that is to say, in the economic and legal context of such agreements, decisions or practices and where they might combine with others to have a cumulative effect on competition. • … pointless to consider an agreement … taken distinct from the market in which they are seen to operate …”

18. Thus in order to examine whether it is caught by Article [101(1)] an agreement cannot be examined in isolation from … • the factual or legal circumstances causing it to prevent, restrict or distort competition. • The existence of similar contracts may be taken into consideration for this objective to the extent to which the general body of contracts of this type is capable of restricting the freedom of trade. ... • The existence of similar contracts is a circumstance which, together with others, is capable of being a factor in the economic and legal context within which the contract must be judged.”

19. ECJ v Delimitis: “... the cumulative effect of several similar agreements constitutes one factor … consequently, in the present case it is necessary to analyse the effect of a beer supply agreement, taken together with other contracts of the same type, on the opportunities of national competitors or those from other Member States, to gain access to the market for beer consumption or to increase their market share … "

20. SporočiloKomisije “de minimis” • Horizontalnisporazumi 10% • Vertikalnisporazumi 15% • Kumulativnučinki: • 5% individualno • 30% skupaj

21. Učinek na trgovino med DČ

22. Čezmejna trgovina • Razmejitev pristojnosti med ES in DČ • Minimalen čezmejni učinek • Sporočilo K 2004 • Tudi glede NUVK in sodišč • ‘Trgovina’ Zajema vsako ekonomsko aktivnost • ‘Vzorec trgovanja’ (pattern of trade) med DČ • Struktura trgovanja v ES (zlasti eliminacija gospodarskega subjekta)

23. Vzorec trgovanja (STM) • »… it must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of objective factors of law or of fact that the agreement in question may have an influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States. • The influence thus foreseeable must give rise to a fear that the realization of a single market between Member States might be impeded.«

24. Faktorji • Faktorji, za katere posamično ni nujno, da so odločilni • Narava sporazuma c.a. • Narava proizvodov na katere se sporazum nanaša • Položaj in pomen udeleženih podjetij

25. Povečanje volumna trgovanja • Consten & Grundig • Ni pomembno

26. Delitev trgov • Horizontalni sporazumi • Vertikalni sporazumi • Teritorialne omejitve • Prepoved prodaje zunaj teritorija • Sporazumi, ki se nanašajo na tretje države

27. Sporazumi glede ene DČ • Delimitis • Ekskluziva in “access clause” • Pronuptia • Cementhandelaren (VCH) • “compartmentalisation”

28. Pronuptia • " . .. distribution franchise agreements which contain clauses effecting a partitioning of markets between franchisor and franchisees or between franchisees are per se capable of affecting trade between Member States, even if they are concluded between enterprises established in the same Member State, • to the extent that they prevent the franchisees from setting themselves up in another Member State."

29. Cementhandelaren • “An agreement extending over the whole of the territory of a Member State by its very nature has the effect of reinforcing the compartmentalization of markets on a national basis... • in particular, the by the association on all sales to resellers who are not authorized by it make it more difficult for producers or sellers from other Member States to be active in or penetrate the Netherlands market.« «

30. Zadostenučineknamedržavnotrgovino • SporočiloKomisije • Kriteriji: • Naravasporazuma • Naravaproizvodov • Tržnipoložajudeleženihpodjetij • Delež < 5% • Letnipromet < 50 mio EUR

31. Sankcija101(2) PDEU • Ničnost ex lege • Možnost delne ničnosti (nac. pravo) • Consten & Grundig • Odškodninski in opustitveni zahtevki(“private enforcement”)

32. Namen izjem po 101/3 • Interpretacija 101/1 • Proti- in prokonkurenčni vidiki sporazuma • Učinkovitost • Boljši produkti, nižje cene • Tehtanje • Socialno-politični faktorji (kontekst)

33. 4 pogoji iz 101/3 • Kumulativno • Dokazno breme podjetje • Navodila Komisije OJ (2004) C101/97

34. Izjemepo 3. odstavku101. člena • Prispevek k napredku proizvodnje ali distribucije blaga ali k promociji tehničnega ali gospodarskega napredka • Omogočanje poštenega deleža ugodnosti potrošnikom • Pogodba ne sme naložiti podjetjem omejitev, ki niso nujne • Pogodba ne sme podjetjem omogočiti možnosti za izključitev konkurence glede znatnega dela proizvodov • Kumulativno!!

35. Prispevek k napredku proizvodnje ali distribucije blaga ali k promociji tehničnega ali gospodarskega napredka • Povečanje učinkovitosti • Volkswagen/Ford • Synthetic fibres • European Council of Manufacturers of Domestic Appliances • Drugi učinki • Zaposlovanje in sociala • Volkswagen/Ford • Okolje • Exxon/Shell

36. Pošten delež potrošnikom • Širok pojem potrošnikov (odjemalci) • Vsaj kompenzirati negativne učinke sporazuma • Kriterij ni bil izpolnjen: • VBBB & VBVB • SPO and Others v. Commission

37. Nujnost omejitve • Dvojni test: • Nujen sporazum kot tak • Nujne tudi posamezne omejitve • Ali se cilj lahko bolj učinkovito oseže z omejitvami konkurence • ‘hard core restrictions’ načeloma ne izpolnjujejo

38. Omejitev ne izključuje konkurence • Varovanje konkurence ima prednost pred evt. pozitivnimi učinki • Analiza učinkov omejitev (Navodila Komisije)

39. Uporaba izjem • Do 1.4.2004 • Odloča Komisija (CFI in ECJ) • Ovezna priglasitev • Po reformi: • Odločajo nacionalni uradi (nacionalna sodišča) • Lahko tudi Komisija • Ni več priglasitve

40. Odločbe Komisije - stari sistem • Comfort letter (neformalna poravnava) • Začasna odločba • Negativni izvid (negative clearance) • Ugotovitev kršitve • Individualna izjema • Skupinska izjema (uredba)

41. Odločbe Komisije - novi sistem • Ugotovitev kršitve • Sprejem zaveze podjetja • Odločba o uporabi ali neuporabi 81/1 ali 82 člena ali izpolnjevanju pogojev 8/3 člena člena glede določenih vrst sporazumov • Skupinska izjema (uredba)

42. Nacionalni organi – odločitve (5. člen) • Zahtevajo prenehanje kršitve • Izdajo začasne ukrepe • Sprejemajo zaveze • Nalagajo kazni

43. Nacionalna sodišča • Sporazum omejuje konkurenco (101/1 • Sporazum izpolnjuje kriterije po 101/3 • Sporazum je ničen (101/2 člen)

44. Skupinske izjeme • Uredbe Komisije (izjemoma Svet) • Delimitis (vloga nacionalnih sodišč)