Universalism vs. Relativism: – Relativism Explored

1. Universalism vs. Relativism: – Relativism Explored ER 11, Gov E-1040 Spring 2012

2. Does Harman’s view of morality threaten human rights movement?

3. Task Does Harman’s view of morality threaten the human rights movement? Need not vindicate the whole UDHR – show that idea of universal values and cross-cultural moral engagement is sensible

4. Agenda • First, simple-minded reconstruction of point human rights movement • Then formulate responses to Harman to show his approach does not threaten point of human rights movement • stay focused on Harman and thus make little explicit (but constant implicit) use of texts for today

5. Simple-minded reconstruction • Interconnected world: what ought we to do for each other? • Question arises in numerous ways at global level: we have to confront it • People ask for help, others know about it

6. Consider • persons across cultures share vulnerabilities: suffer from physical pain, require food/water to survive, are susceptible to disease, malnutrition • common goods: bodily health; bodily integrity; desire to be treated with some respect in one’s affiliations • not culture-bound: distinctively human existence

7. Human rights movement Answers question of how to live together by • Taking seriously common human vulnerabilities and broadly shared goods • Considering how these had been thwarted and assaulted in numerous ways in recent memory • Formulating a language specifically of rights in response

8. Ghost of Relativism So: does Harman’s view of morality – his relativism – fundamentally threaten the human rights movement?

9. Response I: • question of how we ought to live together and what we ought to do vis-à-vis each other simply arises • cannot help but negotiate common arrangements, at least to some extent • have irreversibly “encountered each other”

10. Connected to them

11. But also to them

12. And to them as well

13. We do not live like this (any more)

14. But like this:

15. Still Response I • Harman: “Can answer ought-statements only before the background of shared motivational structure. We do not have that globally, therefore the human-rights language cannot tell us what we ought to do.”

16. Still Response I • Harman: “Can answer ought-statements only before the background of shared motivational structure. We do not have that globally, therefore the human-rights language cannot tell us what we ought to do.” • Response: “It’s the other way round: We are stuck with the ought-to-do-question at the global level, and must add the motivational structure.”

17. Remember: • Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

18. Objection to Response I

19. Objection to Response I • “Beside the point – discussion is about something else” • “Too bad if we need it; not there to be had; interconnectedness can’t make it so” • “There are no sufficient value similarities”

20. Ghost of Relativism

21. Response II: Moral engagement across cultures often possible Three points come together powerfully, as critical tools: (a) common vulnerabilities and common goods (b) reasoning that categorically restricts scope of fundamental moral values, or range of what is morally important, to particular cultures or circles inevitably draws on reasoning that is hard to defend explains why most cultures generate forms of universalist thinking, although it may not be dominant (c) Harman’s idea of coherence

22. Response II, Cont. • Harman: “My approach shows people might have fundamentally different value commitments.” • Response: “(a), (b), (c) show that there is no fundamental value disagreement. We can engage across cultures, are intelligible to each other.”

23. Harman: “My approach shows people might have fundamentally different value commitments.” • “(a), (b), (c) show that there is no fundamental value disagreement. We can engage across cultures, are intelligible to each other.” (a) common vulnerabilities and common goods (b) reasoning that categorically restricts scope of fundamental moral values, or range of what is morally important, to particular cultures or circles inevitably draws on reasoning that is hard to defend explains why most cultures generate forms of universalist thinking, although it may not be dominant (c) Harman’s idea of coherence

24. “But clearly we are familiar with much cultural disagreement – what about all that?”

25. “But clearly we are familiar with much cultural disagreement – what about all that?”

26. Response II: A supportive consideration – look who’s talking • Those who speak of “value imperialism” and in support of relativism are often those in power • Those who reject moral relativism generally focus on standpoint of victims • In light of the victims’ standpoint, moral relativism looks a lot less plausible

27. “We do things differently around here” • argument often rests on attribution of unanimity that does not exist • In case of egregious human right violations: no “we” on whose behalf anybody could speak • victims have complaints that are intelligible to us and on whose behalf we can speak up

28. The harder case: What if “victims” agree with the practices?

29. But what if “victims” agree with the practices? – Scanlon • “But even if the victims did take the view that they have no rights against what is is done to them (…) couldn’t they be wrong in thinking this?” • “[W]hich is the more objectionable form of cultural superiority, to refuse to aid a victim on the ground that “they live like that – they don’t recognize rights as we know them,” or to attempt to protect the defenseless even when they themselves feel that suffering is their lot and they have no basis to complain of it?” (P 119)

35. But what if “victims” agree with the practices? – Scanlon • “But even if the victims did take the view that they have no rights against what is is done to them (…) couldn’t they be wrong in thinking this?” • “[W]hich is the more objectionable form of cultural superiority, to refuse to aid a victim on the ground that “they live like that – they don’t recognize rights as we know them,” or to attempt to protect the defenseless even when they themselves feel that suffering is their lot and they have no basis to complain of it?” (P 119)

36. Which is more objectionable form of cultural superiority? • to refuse to aid a victim on the ground that “they live like that – they don’t recognize rights as we know them,” • or to attempt to protect the defenseless even when they themselves feel that suffering is their lot and they have no basis to complain of it? Often aid: (2) is more problematic, whereas (1) seems like an enlightened attitude But: (1) can easily be the more objectionable form of cultural superiority – because people can be brainwashed

37. Must apply with extreme caution • False consciousness: people have been persuaded to support a regime that is to somebody else’s benefit • Brain washing -- severe Manipulation • Population itself, once through the transition, would presumably approve

38. But if this applies… • Then this indeed is the more troublesome attitude of cultural superiority: to refuse to aid a victim on the ground that “they live like that – they don’t recognize rights as we know them”

39. Supported, modified: Response II • Harman: “My approach shows people might have fundamentally different value commitments.” • Response: “(a), (b) plus (c) will generally show that there is no fundamental value disagreement. We can engage across cultures, are intelligible to each other.”