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Humane Warfare

Bounding the drone-warfare debate Vredespaleis , The Hague , 9 april 2015 ACdre . Prof. Dr. Frans Osinga Netherlands Defence Academy. Humane Warfare. Risk Transfer Warfare. Arguments against drone strikes: it is illegal (Carvin, Cronin, Gross, Jenkins, Jordan, Stein).

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Humane Warfare

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  1. Bounding the drone-warfaredebate Vredespaleis, The Hague, 9 april 2015 ACdre. Prof. Dr. Frans Osinga Netherlands DefenceAcademy Humane Warfare Risk Transfer Warfare

  2. Arguments against drone strikes: it is illegal(Carvin, Cronin, Gross, Jenkins, Jordan, Stein) It equals assassination & extra-judicial killing, just a form of risk management no judicial oversight, no trial, which is immoral & illegal Overly liberal interpretation of the meaning of terrorist, imminent threat, participating in hostilities, self-defence From person specific targeting to signature killing War tactics for fighting what is actually a police task: is it an armed conflict? Lack of transparency of targeting process: what rules does the CIA follow? Violation of souvereignty: licence to kill worldwide?

  3. Arguments against drone strikes: counterproductive(Carvin, Cronin, Gross, Jenkins, Jordan, Stein) Empirical research suggests it had no impact on rate of attacks Arrest is more effective: loss of face, no glory, source of information Too many civ cas: approx 30% of casualties Stress for host society: disrupts social/cultural processes Martyr-effect: leads to resentment and increase in recruitments Bolsters perception of legitimacy of terror groups cause & actions May escalate violence May set precedent that it is ok to target leaders, resulting in strikes on leaders/institutions of democratic states Undermines moral standing of US and Europe

  4. Arguments against drone strikes: moral disengagement(Carvin, Cronin, Gross, Jenkins, Jordan, Stein) Playstationmentality, next step towardsroboticwarfare (US UAS Roadmap) Physicaldistanceproducesemotionaldistance: de-humanization Context & consequences are hard to assessfrom 7000 milesaway No sense of proportionality Problematicaccountability Loss of reciprocity, tooasymmetrical: willing to killbutnot to die for the cause Risk free tacticwhichlowers the politicalthresholdforusing military force: Predator Empire?, Droneworld?, Everywhere War? Drone-ification of foreignpolicy

  5. the New American Way of War as cultural expression Information age warfare Virtual war (Ignatieff) Post-heroic warfare (Mueller) Humane Warfare (Coker) Post Modern war (Gray/Betts) Risk transfer warfare Precision Age Warfare Spectator sport warfare (McInnes) Network Centric Warfare (Cebrowski) 7

  6. Drones as natural extension of Humane Warfare Western societies are trying to humanize war....it is the great project for the 21st Century To be just, wars have to be humane..not only for our own soldiers who fight it but for our enemies as well....it is a western phenomenon(Coker, 2002)

  7. Counterargument 1: what drones do in reality • Most drone strikes not in AfPak region but in Afghanistan • Most drones don’t kill • Most drone strikes are for force protection

  8. Counterargument 2: some concerns lack evidence • Most drone strikes not in AfPak region but in Afghanistan • Most drones don’t kill • Most drone strikes are for force protection • Public outcry is uncorrelated with drone strikes • Unethical behavior is unrelated to technology • Civcas data vary widely, unreliable, hard to verify • No evidence of playstation mentality • Civcas numbers are decreasing Number of Deaths from U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan in 2011

  9. Drones over Pakistan Drop the pilot A surprising number of Pakistanis are in favour of drone strikes Oct 19th 2013 | ISLAMABAD Surveys are also notoriously difficult to carry out in FATA. A 2009 poll in three of the tribal agencies found 52% of respondents believed drone strikes were accurate and 60% said they weakened militant groups…. interviews by The Economist with twenty residents of the tribal areas confirmed that many see individual drone strikes as preferable to the artillery barrages of the Pakistani military….. They also insisted that the drones do not kill many civilians—a view starkly at odds with mainstream Pakistani opinion. “No one dares tell the real picture,” says an elder from North Waziristan. “Drone attacks are killing the militants who are killing innocent people.”

  10. There is significant variation in the civilian casualty rates recorded by the principal media monitoring organizations. They coincide, however, in recording a marked drop in reported civilian casualties from remotely piloted aircraft strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas during 2012 (both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of overall fatalities), a trend that continued during the first half of 2013. • the United States appears to have succeeded in avoiding the infliction of large-scale loss of civilian life in Yemen. Data later issued by NATO indicated that its aircraft conducted 17,939 armed sorties, firing 7,642 missiles. Armed remotely piloted aircraft conducted 250 of those sorties, of which 145 resulted in the discharge of a missile. NATO informed the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya that it had utilized a standard of zero expectation of death or injury to civilians in its campaign, and that no targets had been struck if there had been any reason to believe civilians would be killed or injured (A/HRC/19/68). The Commission reported that NATO had succeeded in conducting a highly precise campaign with demonstrable determination to avoid civilian casualties,

  11. Counterargument 3: drone strikes are rather accurate • Most drone strikes not in AfPak region but in Afghanistan • Most drones don’t kill • Most drone strikes are for force protection • Civcas data vary widely, unreliable, hard to verify • Public outcry is uncorrelated with drone strikes • Unethical behavior is unrelated to technology • No evidence of playstation mentality • Drones may actually help avoid civcas • Multiple source of intelligence • Careful targeting process • Drones allow prolonged observation • Operators run no risk: increases accuracy and proper assessment • More precise/lower risk for casualties than alternative engagement methods

  12. Conclusions and recommendations • 77. If used in strict compliance with the principles of international humanitarian law, remotely piloted aircraft are capable of reducing the risk of civilian casualties in armed conflict by significantly improving the situational awareness of military commanders.

  13. Counterargument 4: drone strikes may be legal & ethical, just like other types of attack • Most drone strikes not in AfPak region but in Afghanistan • Most drones don’t kill • Most drone strikes are for force protection • Civcas data vary widely, unreliable, hard to verify • Public outcry is uncorrelated with drone strikes • Unethical behavior is unrelated to technology • No evidence of playstation mentality • Drones may actually help avoid civcas • Not necessarily illegal/unethical • Nothing unethical about attack from a distance • Nothing new: F-16s, snipers, special forces teams • Not weapon but nature of target determining factor • If attack would be legal if conducted by an F-16, it would also be legal when done by drone • Not forbidden technology • even automatic weapon systems can be legal • Team of experts involved, including legal advisers & oversight and control processes • Non international armed conflict, Threshold of violence, Consent of host country

  14. As regards Pakistan, there is strong evidence to suggest that between June 2004 and June 2008 remotely piloted aircraft strikes in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas were conducted with the active consent and approval of senior members of the Pakistani military and intelligence service, and with at least the acquiescence and, in some instances, the active approval of senior government figures.

  15. Counterargument 5: drone strikes degrade effectiveness of insurgents (Byman, 2006; Price 2012; Johnson, 2012; Carvin, 2012, Rid, 2012) Focuses deliberately on specific individuals Deprive groups of their charismatic spiritual or political leader, hard to replace Eliminates members with highly specialized skills that are hard to replace Damages capacity to excecute strikes Disrupts the organization Reduces trust & cohesion Degrades quality of bombs: decreased lethality Need to change location Need for secrecy, Drives towards dispersed structure makes information flow difficult, while Driving up need for coordination Much time spent on personal and group survival Loss of face, fear in community for association More effective/less risky than other forms of counterterrorism Less damage & collateral damage too than artilery, occupation with ground forces Deterrent effect in the long run

  16. [drones] allow belligerents to carry out their attacks more precisely against military objectives and thus reduce civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects, in other words, to exercise greater precaution in attack President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Jakob Kellenberger

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