200 likes | 342 Views
Domain Name System (DNS). Today & Tomorrow Day 2 - Group 5 Presented By: James Speirs Charles Higby Brady Redfearn. J. Overview. Day 1 Review DNS Exploit Types DNS SEC Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) DNS SEC Implementation Early DNS Fixes DNS SEC Proposals Which Is Best ?. C.
E N D
Domain Name System (DNS) Today & Tomorrow Day 2 - Group 5 Presented By: James Speirs Charles Higby Brady Redfearn • J
Overview • Day 1 Review • DNS Exploit Types • DNS SEC • Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) • DNS SEC Implementation • Early DNS Fixes • DNS SEC Proposals • Which Is Best? • C
Day 1 Review • DNS • Bailiwick • Dan Kaminski • DNS Poisoning • SSL & HTTPS • B
DNS Exploit Types • Cache poisoning • Dan Kaminiski • HD Moore • Metasploit • 10 seconds • Client flooding • No other DNS responses are received • Denial-of-Service (DoS) • Dynamic update • Everything freely available - no query required • Hosts file • Malware attacks • J
DNS SEC • Pros: • Can distribute public keys • email • IPs are distributed securely • Reliable • Robust • Cons: • Rework of DNS infrastructure (UDP) • 10x larger packets • 100x more resources • Easier to run DoS attack • Unbroken zone signing all the way to the root • C
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) • I ask the Certificate Authority (CA) to issue a certificate in my name • The CA validates my identity, then issues me a certificate • I present a certificate containing my identity to the user • The user doesn't know me, so they ask the CA to verify my identity • The CA checks that my certificate is valid: unaltered, unexpired, legitimate • The CA tells the user my certificate is valid • User now trusts me • B
DNS SEC Implementation "Report on the ccNSO’s DNSSEC Survey 2009," http://ccnso.icann.org/surveys/dnssec-survey-report-2009.pdf • C
Early DNS Fixes • Transaction ID randomization • Source port randomization • B
EvgeniyPolyakov • Cracked full-patched BIND 9 • In 10 hrs • With gigabit Ethernet • Trojan horse could do this within network • J
De-Bouncing Double queries • Pros • Verified DNS queries • Easy to implement • Cons • Not enough bandwidth • Servers too busy • Easy to run DoS • C
Abandon UDP Make all DNS traffic TCP • 3-way handshake to start • 2 for question/answer • 2 to shutdown • Pros: • No information limit • Can use PKI • Cons: • 7x more bandwidth • Need more hardware • Bridge UDP to TCP packeting • B
0x20 Case sensitivity • Case is preserved in DNS query • Pros: • Random case can be sent • Reply can be verified • Authoritative Name Servers need no update • No bandwidth increase • Easy to implement • Cons: • Querying servers need update • Client update • Query servers need hardware • J
Domain Vouching Look-aside technology • Pros: • Distributed load • One party maintains all DNS info • Cons: • Bottleneck at voucher • Reliant on third-party service availability • DoS on third-party machine • URL redirection • example.com • example.voucher.com • C
U.S. Controls All Department of Homeland Security (DHS) controls DNS activity • Pros: • Can we trust DHS? • One authority? • U.S. dominance of Internet • Cons: • Politics • Any non-US government is opposed • Censorship • One authority • Trust • B
PGP Signing Model Proven example for PKI • Pros: • Multiple non-governmental signers approve all keys • Peer approval • CA approval • Anyone approves • Create Root Key Set • Distribute Root Key Sets • Distributed load • No single point of failure • Cons: • Someone has to approve your key • Some more hardware • Everyone has to do it • J
Which Is Best? Class Discussion • C
Summary • Everything depends on DNS • DNS SEC 9 yrs old • Lots of proposals • No perfect solution • PGP model seems best right now • Lots of work to do • Without DNS SEC, we're in trouble • B
Vocabulary • KSK - Key Signing Keys • ZSK - Zone Signing Key • RZM - Root Zone Maintainer • RKO - Root Key Operator • RZF - Root Zone File • RKS - Root Key Set • ZKS - Zone Key Set