Information Sharing Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina

1. Information Sharing Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina March 13, 2006

2. Hurricane Katrina • Highest Sustained Winds: 175 mph • Fatalities: 1,422 • Damages: $75B

3. Investigations • “Our mandate was clear: gather facts about the preparation for and response to Katrina, at all levels of government.” • “Investigate aggressively, follow the facts wherever they may lead, and find out what went right and what went wrong. • “Ask why coordination and information sharing between local, state, and federal governments was so dismal.”

4. Investigations • “Finding: Lack of communications and situational awareness paralyzed command and control.” • “Communications between DOD and DHS, and in particularly FEMA, during the immediate week after landfall, reflect a lack of information sharing, near panic, and problems with process.”

5. Information Sharing • “What we have here is a failure to communicate.”

6. Panelists • Dave Lewis, Senior Policy Advisor • Bureau of Justice Assistance • Harlin McEwen, Chairman • IACP Communications and Technology Committee

7. Chief Harlin R. McEwen Chairman Communications & Technology Committee International Association of Chiefs of Police Communications Advisor Major Cities Chiefs Association Major County Sheriffs' Association National Sheriffs' Association Chief of Police (Ret) City of Ithaca, NYFBI Deputy Assistant Director (Ret) Washington, DC (607) 257-1522  chiefhrm@pubsaf.com

8. SEARCH 2006 Symposium on Justice & Public Safety Information Sharing Washington, DC March 13, 2006 Information Sharing Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina

9. Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For Emergency Communications “People plan for a disaster, and we have them frequently. However, Katrina was a catastrophe. She brought different challenges than the Florida hurricanes in 2004.” Sheriff Kevin Beary, Orange County, Florida FCC Hurricane Katrina Independent Panel, January 30, 2006

10. Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For Emergency Communications Although Public Safety communications are delivered in a number of ways, most agencies rely upon their traditional government owned or leased land mobile radio systems. Such systems are usually built to plan for unusual stresses. Public Safety also relies upon commercial cellular type services, and to a smaller degree on satellite communications, for supplemental or back up communications services, but unfortunately those services are not always reliable when public safety needs them the most.

11. Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For Emergency Communications • PRIORITY # 1 • Reliable Agency Specific Voice Communications • Public Safety mission critical every day voice communications • PRIORITY # 2 • Reliable InterAgency Voice Communications • This is what we commonly refer to as “Interoperability” • PRIORITY # 3 • Reliable Data Communications • There is an increasing need for Public Safety to have access to secure text messaging, documents, photographs, diagrams, streaming video

12. Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For Emergency Communications Reliable means whenever public safety personnel need to communicate that it works !!!! 1. They can reach the intended target directly or through a radio tower & base station or repeater 2. There is an available radio channel 3. The radio has power This is true at all times and not just during disasters or catastrophes

13. Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For Emergency Communications • Reliable means that public safety must plan for • Every day peak service times and large incidents • Radio system disruptions such as power outages, tower failures, system interconnect failures • Personal radio equipment failures (electrical/mechanical problems, battery failure, etc.) • 4. Catastrophic wide area failures of almost everything

14. Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For Emergency Communications Public Safety has traditionally planned for short term events/disasters – not long term widespread catastrophes Five outcomes from Katrina stand out in the reports so far: 1. Tower/Infrastructure Failures 2. Power Failures Tower Sites, Dispatch Centers, Portable Radio Batteries 3. Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) and Network Infrastructure Failures (landline & microwave) 4. Public Safety personnel issues 5. Need for deployable systems

15. Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For Emergency Communications 1. Tower/Infrastructure Failures Most Public Safety radio systems are designed to account for the possibility of a single tower site failure, resulting from the loss of the actual tower, the failure of a base station or repeater, and/or loss of commercial power. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, the affected area (parts of 4 states) was equal to the size of Great Britain, about 90,000 square miles. When many or all tower sites are damaged or destroyed as the result of a catastrophic event, contingency plans must be in place to quickly install temporary alternative Public Safety communications. Such plans must include prior arrangements for bringing in temporary self-contained communications systems including power generating equipment that will enable delivery of basic communications services

16. Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For Emergency Communications 2. Power Failures For Tower Sites and Dispatch Centers, most Public Safety agencies plan for power failures, but generally those plans are for 24-48 hours of outage rather than several days or weeks. Generators are usually powered by gasoline, diesel, natural gas, or propane. Soon after Hurricane Katrina struck it was realized that fuel supplies were not readily available and the natural gas supply was disrupted

17. Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For Emergency Communications 2. Power Failures Public Safety uses rechargeable portable radio batteries that are limited to 8-10 hour duty cycles. Throwaway batteries are costly and have limited storage or shelf life. In many cases the portable radio charging units were either destroyed or there was no generating power to power the chargers.With no way to charge the batteries the portable radio units became useless. Satellite services (SatCom) were also utilized where traditional land mobile services were out of service but the same issues applied to hand held satellite units when they did not have batteries to power the units.

18. Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For Emergency Communications • Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) & • Network Infrastructure Failures (Landline & Microwave) • The failure of the PSTN created massive outages in Public Safety land mobile communications networks and 911 services. Most land mobile systems depend on interconnection through the PSTN or by microwave links, many of which were destroyed or out of power and inoperable.

19. Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For Emergency Communications 4. Public Safety personnel issues The failure to plan for personnel problems resulting from a disaster or a catastrophic event like Katrina is a major problem. Public Safety has to be prepared to support their personnel in first assuring that their families are out of harm’s way. This is essential if they are to be expected to attend to their public safety functions. There must be plans to feed, clothe and house personnel during and after disasters and catastrophic events.

20. Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For Emergency Communications 5. Need for deployable communications systems We need deployable systems that can be brought into an area where communications infrastructure is inoperable or has been destroyed. Commercial services do have what are known as Cellular Systems on Wheels (COWS) but in large scale catastrophes like Katrina there are simply not enough of them and we need similar deployable systems that are available to replace traditional public safety communications.

21. Hurricane Katrina - Lessons Learned For Emergency Communications The lessons learned can easily apply to any short term disaster or long term catastrophic event, whether a natural disaster such as a hurricane, tornado, flood, forest fire, earthquake, or a terrorist attack such as the events of 9/11. The lessons tell us to be prepared for more than the short time outages that we have traditionally planned for

22. Our spirit… bent, but not broken Slidell Police Radio Tower

23. Chief Harlin R. McEwen SEARCH Symposium, March 13, 2006 Additional Observations • Public Safety today faces increased and more complex communications requirements. Public Safety still must handle the criminal investigations, responses to traffic accidents, firefighting and emergency medical situations that we have always faced day-to-day. In addition, we are planning for increased prevention and response activities related to natural disasters like Katrina, and to address potential terrorist activities. Most day-to-day operations require better coordination among departments within a jurisdiction while preparation for disasters and catastrophic events require better communications across multiple levels of government. • Existing communications must be maintained and improved. It must be recognized that there is simply not enough local, state and federal funds to provide for the wholesale replacement of Public Safety communications systems as some have proposed. However, new tools are being developed which will enhance current capabilities.

24. Chief Harlin R. McEwen SEARCH Symposium, March 13, 2006 Additional Observations • Moving into the 21st century, we have the advantage of some key resources such as new spectrum and ingenuity. • New spectrum and necessity spur ingenuity, both by Public Safety agencies and by our industry partners. • Some examples are: • New Gateway or Patching products that allow for the interconnection of systems on difference radio bands and to connect systems of different vintages and manufacturers. • New broadband equipment is becoming available for operation in the 4.9 GHz band. Also, manufacturers are discussing ways to integrate 4.9 systems with traditional systems through IP connections. Our Public Safety agencies are testing these new options and developing ways to use these tools to help protect the public.

25. Chief Harlin R. McEwen SEARCH Symposium, March 13, 2006 Additional Observations • The 700 MHz band has generated the manufacture of standardized dual band voice radios covering both the 700 and 800 MHz spectrum. This means that Public Safety agencies can start to build up 700 MHz capability at the same time they expand or replace their 800 MHz radios. We never had this opportunity in moving from VHF to UHF or UHF to 800 MHz. • The legislation to clear 700 MHz by February, 2009, has also given rise to increased Public Safety and industry discussions on technology for data. The National Public Safety Telecommunications Council (NPSTC) has developed a recommendation that would provide Public Safety users the flexibility to deploy either wideband or broadband data systems to match their needs. We look forward to the FCC opening a rulemaking on this issue and if approved, we should see further development of both wideband and broadband data equipment at 700 MHz over the next two to three years.

26. Chief Harlin R. McEwen SEARCH Symposium, March 13, 2006 Additional Observations • Both satellite operators and radio manufacturers are developing ways to deploy satellite as a backup to provide communications when natural disasters like Katrina disable portions of the traditional land mobile radio infrastructure. • Public Safety users and manufacturers are examining how commercial networks and dedicated private networks could be better leveraged and connected to provide more seamless mobility. • All of these new ingenious tools will require funding to implement. We are working with Congress and the Administration to help increase the awareness of funding requirements. • Finally, these new communications tools and potential funding increases provide a foundation. People - that is the Public Safety administrators and rank and file - are essential in deploying these advances to benefit the public we serve. Agencies are increasingly focused on planning and training to help improve Public Safety communications, both operability and interoperability.

27. DHS/DOJ Katrina Rapid Assessment Teams Mississippi and Louisiana Teams

28. DHS-DOJ Rapid Assessment Team • Respond quickly to law enforcement needs • Utilize personnel with specialized backgrounds • New approach • Multi-agency collaboration response • Focused assessment and evaluation • Listen to those affected on their “turf” • Summarize findings - create “play book” for the future

29. Lessons learned • Complete collapse of justice system • Law enforcement, Courts, Corrections • Prosecution and Public Defenders • Support services • FEMA knowledge of rules imperative • donated items can affect reimbursements • housing for justice system employees • awareness of forms and deadlines (60 days) • Day-to-day funding a major issue • Training is and will be an ongoing issue • Stress, post traumatic shock, and psychological issues will be a predominant need • Preparation, communication, and knowledge

30. Recommendations: • Maintain and expand the multi-agency approach to assist criminal justice agencies in disaster situations • Teams could help complete FEMA project worksheets to address public safety issues and expedite the process • Develop a team approach between BJA’s SAA, DHS SAA, State EOC, and FEMA representatives • Provide technical assistance, e.g. data recovery • Use a non-partisan facilitator to bring groups to table

31. Information Sharing Lessons Learned from Hurricane Katrina Dan Hawkins, Director SEARCH Public Safety Programs

32. White House Report • Critical Challenge: Communications • “[C]ommunications challenges across the Gulf Coast region in Hurricane Katrina’s wake were more a problem of basic operability than one of equipment or system interoperability. • The complete devastation of the communications infrastructure left emergency responders and citizens without a reliable network across which they could coordinate. • Although Federal, State, and local agencies had communications plans and assets in place, these plans and assets were neither sufficient nor adequately integrated to respond effectively to the disaster.”- p. 55

33. White House Report • Critical Challenge: Communications • “Federal, State, and local governments have not yet completed a comprehensive strategy to improve operability and interoperability to meet the needs of emergency responders. This inability to connect multiple communications plans and architectures clearly impeded coordination and communication at the Federal, State, and local levels. A • comprehensive, national emergency communications strategy is needed to confront the challenges of incorporating existing equipment and practices into a constantly changing technological and cultural environment.” - p. 56

34. White House Report • Military Assistance: • “… lack of an integrated command structure for both active duty and National Guard forces exacerbated communications and coordination issues during the initial response … • Similar issues of bifurcated operations and interoperability challenges were also present between the military and civilian leadership. This lack of inter-operable communications was apparent at the tactical level, resulting from the fact that emergency responders, National Guard, and active duty military use different equipment.”- p. 43

35. White House Report • Lesson Learned: • The Department of Homeland Security should review our current laws, policies, plans, and strategies relevant to communications. • Upon the conclusion of this review, the Homeland Security Council, with support from the Office of Science and Technology Policy, should develop a National Emergency Communications Strategy that supports communications operability and interoperability. - p. 44

36. White House Report • Recommendation: Information Sharing • Establish a National Information and Knowledge Management System. • Departments and agencies, working with the NOC and the Program Manager for Information Sharing, should develop a national system of information management to provide a common operating picture which allows for the processing and timely provisioning of interagency infor-mation sources - p. 92

37. Discussion • and • Questions

38. Lessons Learned: Plan for Disruptions • Progressive loss of routine systems • Plan for overload and disruptions. Have a 'emergency traffic' only plan. Move localized operations off the system. • Plan for site trunking and conventional operations for systems normally trunked • Plan for a single channel agency-wide. For what? Dispatch, intelligence, logistics support, cross-incident command coordination? • Plan for ad hoc communications. Direct, analog simplex is the most basic, resilient form of radio communications. Katrina showed that agencies without plans to revert to direct communications lost a lot more than their infrastructure. The amateur radio service is a broad, pliable resource that can be leveraged more than it is in most jurisdictions. “At the end of the world, cockroaches and hams will be left.”

39. Lessons Learned: Plan for Disruptions • Complete loss of routine systems • Satellite telephones can be worth their weight in gold --- as long as they have batteries. They're still telephones though. And still have capacity limits. Reconfiguration necessary in preparation for Rita because of density of use nearby (LA). • Satellite data gateways may be at least as important. • Dependence on cell service for public safety operations is dangerous. Because of their asynchronous, inherently packet-switched mode of operations, cellular text messaging services once again proved more resilient than voice operations. Queuing abilities within the devices, at sites, and further across the disrupted network. Sites coming up and down, allowing traffic to pass, users passing through pockets of coverage. Slow communications preferable to no communications. • The amateur radio service is a broad, pliable resource that can be leveraged more than it is in most jurisdictions.

40. Lessons Learned: Vendor • Complete devastation was a reality • Pre-stage equipment, when possible • Sat-Phone “didn't work” (acted like cell system overload) • First communication (and the only for a while) was Amateur operated shortwave • A deployable Broadcast transmitter, FM or AM, was critical for EOC’s to get the information out to the public, existing assets where down • Reach back, particularly PSTN became a moral upper for first responders since all other means where out • Infrastructure re-build was more feasible that overlay systems, even in the short term • State/local, Federal and National policies need to be in place, but without the communication and logistic channels even those policies can not be unified • Self sustaining • Independence